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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Dissertation untersucht das Potential des Insider/Outsider Konfliktes zu einer 
politischen Konfliktlinie in Westeuropa. Die Struktur der Dissertation folgt dabei den 
definierenden Elementen einer Konfliktlinie (Struktur, kollektive Identität und 
politische Organisation).  
 
Kapitel 1 behandelt die sozio-strukturelle Grundlage von Arbeitsmarktdualisierung 
und entwickelt eine Messung die es erlaubt sowohl den Outsider Status als auch die 
Arbeitsmarktverletzlichkeit (’Outsiderness’) eines Individuums zu messen. Das 
zweite Kapitel diskutiert den Einfluss von Arbeitsmarktverletzlichkeit auf 
wohlfahrtstaatliche Präferenzen. Es zeigt sich, dass eine höhere 
Arbeitsmarktverletzlichkeit stärkere Präferenzen für Umverteilung und ‚Social 
Investment’, aber geringere Präferenzen für einen sozialversicherungsbasierten 
Wohlfahrtsstaat mit sich zieht.  
Kapitel 3 und 4 handeln von der politischen Mobilisierung von Insidern und 
Outsidern in ausgewählten Ländern. Kapitel 3 widmet sich der Angebot Seite des 
politischen Wettbewerbs und analysiert die Wahlstrategien von sozialdemokratischen 
Parteien im Kontext von Arbeitsmarktdualisierung. Das letzte Kapitel untersucht auf 
der Nachfrageseite des politischen Wettbewerbs, ob sich Insider und Outsider in 
ihrem Wahlverhalten unterscheiden. Im Schlusskapitel werden die Implikationen der 
Ergebnisse bezüglich einer Politisierung des Insider/Outsider Konfliktes diskutiert.  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses the potential of insider/outsider divides for a political cleavage in 
Western Europe following the defining elements of a cleavage (structure, collective 
identity and political organisation). 
 
Chapter 1 addresses the socio-structural foundation of labour market dualisation. The 
chapter develops a risk-based of insiders and outsiders, which allows identifying not 
only the outsider status of an individual but also the degree of labour market 
vulnerability (‘outsiderness’). Chapter 2 asks how labour market vulnerability is 
related to welfare state preferences in general. We find that labour market 
vulnerability increases preferences for redistribution and social investment, but 
decreases preferences for the equivalence principle. 
Chapter 3 and 4 analyse the political mobilization of insiders and outsiders in 
exemplary countries. Chapter 3 focuses on the supply side of political competition 
analysing the electoral strategies of social democratic parties in the context of labour 
market dualisation. The last chapter examines the electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders, hence the demand side of political competition. The conclusion summarises 
the implications of my findings for a politicisation of insider/outsider divides.  
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Introduction 
 
1 
Introduction  
The financial crisis starting in 2008 and the following international debt crisis plunged 
Europe into a deep economic recession. The economic downturn was accompanied by 
rising unemployment levels and reinforced the deep divide between individuals who are 
firmly integrated in the labour market and whose secure jobs protect them from most of 
the consequences of the economic downturn and those individuals with only unstable 
labour market attachment. When the media’s attention shifted to these ‘indignados’ – as 
they were named in Spain – it became clear that labour market vulnerability is not 
randomly spread across the population. Rather, women, low-skilled, and, above all in the 
Southern European countries, young adults face difficulties to acquire a firm position in 
the labour market. The economic crisis has accentuated the employment crisis, but even 
before, some social groups have found it increasingly hard to compete in the labour 
market and struggled between spells of temporary work, unemployment, or part-time 
work (Oesch 2006, Esping-Andersen 2009, Chauvel 2009). The divide of the workforce 
in insiders with secure positions and outsiders with weak labour market attachment – 
called labour market dualisation – is a trend that we have observed in advanced industrial 
societies since the 1980s (Saint-Paul 2002, Rueda 2005, 2007, Palier and Thelen 2010, 
Emmenegger et al. 2012a). Since then, the labour market has become more unequal, both 
in terms of outcomes (wages) and access (economic inclusion) and the redistributive 
capacity of social policies has decreased (Emmenegger et al. 2012b). At the same time, 
income differences have increased since the 1980s (OECD 2008, 2011). This is not only 
because wages of the low-skilled are stagnant (Kenworthy 2008), but also because the gap 
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between the highest and middle earners has widened, most of all in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries but also in Western Europe (Leigh 2007, Kenworthy 2008, OECD 2008). 
Labour markets have also become more unequal in terms of access. The ‘old’ labour 
market risk of unemployment has – after the golden age of full employment – become 
widespread again and more persistent. In addition, ‘new’ labour market risks, such as 
atypical employment or precarious employment have become common as result of social 
change, skill-based technological change, tertiarization and increased demands for a 
flexible labour force. Indeed, most of job growth in Europe since the 1980s is due to 
atypical forms of employment like part-time, temporary or fixed term employment 
(Plougmann 2003, OECD 2008, 2011) that are characterised by higher insecurity and 
lower social rights than standard employment (Kalleberg et al. 2000, Burgoon and Dekker 
2010).  
The origins and development of labour market dualisation, its translation in social 
protection dualisms and the political and institutional factors contributing to the 
institutionalisation of dualisation are increasingly well researched (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 1999b, Rueda 2006, 2007, Iversen and Stephens 2008, Palier and Thelen 2010, 
Emmenegger et al. 2012a). By contrast, the political implications of labour market 
dualisation are less well understood. Only recently, insider-outsider divides and the 
‘politics of dualisation’ appeared on the research agenda of political science. My thesis 
focuses on the political consequences of the unequal distribution of labour market 
vulnerability and segmentation of labour markets in insiders and outsiders. How does 
labour market vulnerability affect political preferences, especially when it comes to labour 
markets and welfare policies? What are its electoral consequences? And how do parties 
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react to these increased and new forms of inequality in the population? These are the 
questions addressed in my thesis. The conflict potential between insiders and outsiders 
should be considerable, given that labour market segmentation results in different 
economic prospects for insiders and outsiders in terms of actual income (Häusermann and 
Schwander 2012b), but also in different social rights (regarding pension benefits see 
Häusermann 2010, Anderson 2012, Jessoula 2012, Jessoula and Hinrichs 2012, 
Häusermann and Schwander 2012a, regarding employment protection see Rueda 2007 
and Palier and Thelen 2010, see Palier and Thelen 2010 also regarding social rights in 
general).  
I examine the potential of the insider-outsider divide for a political conflict through the 
lenses of the cleavage approach. For a cleavage to be fully developed, three elements are 
needed: a socio-structural element dividing the society in two groups, a normative 
element, i.e. shared collective identity and shared political values and beliefs resulting in 
divergent political preferences, and an organisational element, i.e. expression of the 
conflict on the level of organisations such as parties, unions, the church or other 
politically relevant organisations (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Thus, I will examine a) the 
socio-structural foundation of dualisation, i.e. whether the risk for atypical employment 
and unemployment is structured in stable socio-economic groups and whether being an 
outsider entails empirical labour market disadvantages, b) whether insiders and outsiders 
have distinct political preferences in terms of labour market policies and, more broadly, in 
terms of social policies, c) how the divide between insiders and outsiders is taken up by 
political parties, and more specifically, by social democratic parties, d) to what extent 
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insiders and outsiders participate in elections and, once they have decided to participate, 
how they vote.  
 
The thesis has two parts each comprising two chapters. The first part addresses the socio-
structural foundation of labour market vulnerability and the political preferences of 
insiders and outsiders, i.e. the first two elements of a potential insider-outsider-cleavage. 
First, I examine the structure of labour market vulnerability or ‘outsiderness’ in advanced 
industrial societies. The first chapter, entitled Who is in and who is out? A risk based 
conceptualisation of  insiders and outsiders (co-authored with Silja Häusermann and 
submitted to the Journal of European Social Policy), explores the main independent 
variable of my thesis. We argue that in order to analyse political preferences of insiders 
and outsiders and the political mobilisation potential of dualisation, insiders and outsiders 
must be categorised on the basis of more stable categories that shape their life 
circumstances over a longer run. Thus, in contrast to the existing literature on insider-
outsider divides, which relies on the current employment status to measure insiders and 
outsiders, we consider outsiders as individuals with a particularly high risk for 
unemployment and atypical employment over their entire employment careers. The 
chapter seeks to establish who is at higher risk for unemployment or atypical employment 
in advanced industrial societies, and develops a more socio-structural measure of insiders 
and outsiders. We show the distribution of this risk across 18 advanced industrial societies 
and four welfare regimes. An important finding is that labour market vulnerability affects 
high-skilled individuals too. The chapter also deals with the normative element of a 
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cleavage. We provide a first assessment of insiders and outsiders’ political preferences by 
analysing their preferences regarding labour market policies.  
While Chapter 1 refers to policy preferences quite narrowly related to the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders, the second chapter, entitled Explaining welfare 
preferences in dualized societies: Determinants of insider-outsider divides in Europe (co-
authored with Silja Häusermann and Thomas Kurer) broadens the focus and asks how 
labour market vulnerability is related to welfare state preferences in general. We argue 
that the effect of labour market vulnerability is not limited to policies of immediate 
importance to the insider/outsider distinction and show that it consistently impinges on 
preferences for social policies across Western Europe. The higher labour market risk of an 
individual, the more she or he prefers a redistributive or social investment welfare state. 
Individuals with low labour market vulnerability, in turn, favour a welfare state based on 
the equivalence principle. We also establish an interaction effect with human capital 
levels. 
A second issue of Chapter 2 refers more closely to the potential of the insider-outsider 
divide for a political conflict: Although we find differences in social policy preferences 
between insiders and outsiders, differences are small. We attempt to explain why the size 
of the preference-divide is not as pronounced as we would expect given the unequal 
economic prospects of insiders and outsiders relating the risk structure and household 
formation to the formation of political preferences. 
 
The second part of the thesis refers to the organisational element of the potential insider-
outsider cleavage and analyses the political mobilisation of insiders and outsiders with 
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regard to exemplary cases on both demand and supply sides of political competition. The 
crucial explanatory factor here is party competition. I analyse parties’ responses to the 
new forms of inequality among the electorate in Chapter 3, entitled Are social democratic 
parties really insider-parties? Social democratic electoral strategies in Western Europe 
(submitted to Politics & Society). As the title says, the focus is on electoral strategies of 
social democratic parties: Do social democratic parties aim at mobilising insiders as 
postulated in the literature on the politics of dualisation or do they focus on outsiders as 
economically vulnerable members of society as we can expect from a social democratic 
party? I argue that social democratic parties try to mobilise a large electoral coalition that 
includes both insiders and outsiders with different skill levels. The exact composition of 
the electoral coalition depends on the electoral incentives set by party competition. In 
order to mobilise such a coalition, the social democratic party addresses in its electoral 
campaign the interests of those segments of the electorate for which it has a party 
competitor. I analyse the electoral strategies of the social democratic parties in Britain, 
Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland with a newly collected dataset 
based on party positions related to insider-outsider relevant issues. This dataset refers to 
media coverage of electoral campaigns between 2007 and 2010.  
Chapter 4, entitled The politics of dualisation: The electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders in Germany, France and Britain (submitted to the British Journal of Political 
Science) examines the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders in three exemplary 
countries (Germany, France and Britain). Drawing on data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems I show that the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders varies 
according to the electoral strategy of the social democratic party, which, in turn, is 
Introduction 
 
7 
explained by the party system, and the party alternatives that the party systems offers. A 
second factor accounting for cross-national differences in electoral behaviour of insiders 
and outsiders is the incumbency status of the social democratic party. The mobilisation of 
both insiders and outsiders is more feasible for a social democratic party if it is in the 
opposition.   
Part I: Structure and individual preferences 
 
 
8 
Part I: Structure of labour market vulnerability and individual 
preferences of insiders and outsiders 
 
 
This part of the thesis addresses the structure of the insider-outsider divide and 
preferences of insiders and outsiders with regard to labour market and welfare state 
policies. It is thus situated on the demand side of political competition. To analyse 
structure of dualisation and collective identity of insiders and outsiders across countries 
and regimes, we conduct large N-studies using data from different surveys such as the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (2007), various national 
household panels (2007), the International Social Survey Programme Work Orientation 
III (2005) and Role of Government IV (2006) and the European Social Survey, round 4 
(2008), covering a range of 13 to 18 advanced industrial societies. 
One of the main objectives of the first part is to investigate the socio-structural foundation 
of dualisation and to enhance our understanding of the politics of dualisation. Here, we 
link the literature on the politics of dualisation and insider-outsider divides with the more 
sociological literature on labour market vulnerability by conceptualising insiders and 
outsiders on the basis of an individual’s risk for atypical employment and unemployment. 
We develop both a dichotomous operationalisation of insiders and outsiders and a 
continuous operationalisation of outsiderness, i.e. the extent to which someone is an 
insider or an outsider. With this operationalisation, we go beyond the simple dichotomy of 
insiders versus outsiders, differentiating between various degrees of outsiders and relating 
labour market risks to more stable social and economic categories. This enables us to 
Part I: Structure and individual preferences 
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study the effect of outsiderness on political preferences in a more sophisticated way 
taking into account the composition of the outsider group across countries and welfare 
regimes and the degree of outsiderness of an individual. 
The debate on the politics of dualisation and insider-outsider divides has developed only 
recently. For example, the question whether insiders and outsiders dispose of divergent 
labour market policy preferences is still ongoing (see Rueda 2005 and Burgoon and 
Dekker 2010 for positive findings, while Emmenegger 2009 and Barrows 2012 do not 
find divergent preferences between insiders and outsiders). We contribute to this debate 
by analysing labour market policy preferences of insiders and outsiders with the new 
operationalisations. Further, we analyse insiders and outsiders’ preferences for specific 
social policies. By doing so, we go beyond the notion that welfare state preferences differ 
only with regard to ‘more’ ore ‘less’ state intervention. Research on welfare state 
preferences on the individual level has shown that support for the welfare state is not to be 
equated with support for redistribution (Moene and Wallerstein 2003, explicitly referring 
to welfare state preferences in the context of dualisation, see Fernàndez-Albertos and 
Manzano 2011). Similarly, we show that insiders and outsiders favour a different kind of 
welfare state but both are in favour of a ‘strong’ welfare state. This also demonstrates that 
the political relevance of the insider-outsider divide goes beyond policies that are of 
immediate importance for the insider/outsider distinction. However, the substantive size 
of preference differences leaves us rather pessimistic for a political mobilisation of the 
insiders-outsider divide. This also means that only weak ‘bottom-up’ pressure for a better 
integration of outsiders is likely to manifest itself in a durable way.  
 
  
Chapter 1: Who is in and who is out? A risk based 
conceptualisation of  insiders and outsiders 
 
 
 
 
co-authored with Silja Häusermann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Annual Meeting 2009 of the 
American Political Science Association in Toronto, CA and at the 17th International 
Conference of Europeanists 2010 in Montreal, CA. We would like to thank David Rueda, 
Margarita Estévez-Abe and John D. Stephens, the participants of these conferences for 
helpful comments and two anonymus reviewers of the Journal for European Social Policy 
for their helpful comments. 
Chapter 1 
11 
Introduction 
Since the 1970s, labour markets and family structures have undergone tremendous 
changes. With these transformations, employment patterns have changed. The standard 
post-war model of stable full-time employment – often lifelong for the same company – 
does not correspond to the employment biographies of most individuals anymore. There 
are two reasons for this, the first being unemployment, especially long-term 
unemployment, which has again become common in most Western societies (OECD 
2006). Secondly, an ever-growing share of the workforce can be found in so-called 
atypical forms of employment. Part-time and temporary work has become widespread and 
accounts for most of job creation in the EU since the 1990s (Plougmann 2003, OECD 
2006, 2010). Since welfare states were created in the industrial era to cover the ‘average 
production worker’, this deviation from previously standard employment patterns may 
result in specific risks of poverty and welfare losses, especially if welfare entitlement is 
closely linked to employment, as in the social insurance welfare states of Continental 
Europe (Palier 2010b).  
 
As a consequence of this transformation of labour markets and its welfare implications, 
the links between weak or flexible labour market attachment, social and economic (dis-) 
advantages and political opinions have become an important topic on the research agendas 
in labour market sociology (Ranci 2010, Tomlinson and Walker 2012, Polavieja 2005, 
Burgoon and Dekker 2010) and political science, mostly in the context of the rapidly 
growing literature on dualisation, i.e. the divide between labour market insiders and 
outsiders  (see e.g. Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007, Emmenegger 2009, 2010, Emmenegger et al. 
The structure: Who is in and who is out? 
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2012, Lindvall and Rueda 2012, King and Rueda 2008, as well as Davidsson and Naczyk 
2009 for an overview). We consider the literature on dualisation as an attempt to 
systematise and aggregate different forms of labour market vulnerability and flexibility in 
a way that allows exploring their political implications, both at the individual level of 
preferences and political behaviour, and at the macro-level of policy reforms. However, 
few contributions have actually invested theoretically and empirically in discussing and 
validating the conceptualisation and measurement of insiders and outsiders. Rather, most 
of them have referred to the conceptualisation and measurement previously used in micro-
economics (e.g. Saint-Paul 1998, Lindbeck and Snower 2001), which is based on an 
individuals’ current labour market status (fully employed vs. atypically or unemployed). 
We would like to argue, however, that political preferences and political behaviour are not 
only shaped by individuals’ current situations but also by their expectations and 
perceptions concerning their (future) labour market risks. Such expectations depend 
strongly on the socio-structural environment of an individual, i.e. on the occurrence of 
labour market vulnerability in one’s specific social group. Individuals in specific social 
and occupational groups are more or less likely to experience different forms of atypical 
employment (often alternating with spells of unemployment) throughout their 
employment biography. Many women, for example, work full time at a young age, 
withdraw from the labour market on account of childrearing and re-enter the labour 
market years later to take a part-time job. Hence, their employment trajectory clearly 
differs from the standard model of full time insider employment, but a snapshot of their 
employment status at a specific point in time would not reveal this. Since their entire 
(prospective or retrospective) employment trajectory is likely to affect their political 
Chapter 1 
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behaviour and views, we may want to evaluate their risk of being (and thinking like) an 
outsider on the basis of the social and occupational group they belong to, rather than on 
the basis of their short-term labour market situation.  
Therefore, we would like to propose and explore a conceptualisation of insiders and 
outsiders based on their risk of being atypically employed or unemployed. We do this in 
both a dichotomous and a continuous variant.  
 
The article is structured as following: We first theorise our measures and compare them to 
other definitions of insiders/outsiders. In a second step, we operationalise the risk of 
atypical employment and unemployment, and we propose a ‘map of dualisation’ that 
presents insiders and outsiders across regimes and countries, based on EU-SILC data from 
2007 and additional household panel survey data for countries not included in EU-SILC. 
In a third step, we relate our measures to the key indicators of labour market advantage 
and disadvantage, income and upward job mobility prospects. In the last part of the 
article, we show that our measures predict differences in insider-outsider preferences for 
active and passive labour market policies as hypothesised in the literature.  
 
Theory 
 
Post-industrial foundations of dualised labour markets 
Over the past 30 years, the economies of the advanced Western democracies have 
transitioned to a post-industrial social and economic structure. In the industrial era, the 
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industry and the growing public sector were able to provide stable, full time and well-
insured jobs for virtually the entire male workforce. In the post-industrial era, however, 
unemployment rates and, especially, long-term unemployment rates have increased 
(OECD 2006) and most of job growth is due to atypical employment forms such as part-
time employment and temporary or fixed term contracted work (Plougmann 2003). As a 
consequence, fewer labour market participants work in stable standard employment 
relations, which were so typical of the booming post-war decades. For instance, the 
number of workers on temporary contracts across the European Union has been growing 
by 15-20% annually since the 1980s – a figure, which represents about ten times the 
overall rate of employment growth (Standing 1993: 433, see also Esping-Andersen 
1999b). Similarly, part-time employment accounts for close to 80 percent of the net job 
creation in the EU since the mid 1990s (Plougmann 2003). Of course, part of this 
flexibilisation can be seen as a response to increased demands for more flexible 
employment conditions. However, research shows that fixed-term contracts tend to imply 
economic disadvantages and cannot be considered reliable ‘bridging’ jobs into permanent 
employment (Booth et al. 2000, Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson 2000, Booth et al. 2002, 
Gash 2008). Furthermore, even voluntary atypical work leads to lower social rights in the 
European social insurance welfare states. Hence, atypical work and unemployment can 
generally be interpreted as conditions of increased social and labour market vulnerability. 
This growing segmentation of the labour market in secure jobs and more ‘vulnerable’, 
unstable jobs is known as ‘dualisation of the labour market’ (Saint-Paul 2002, Rueda 
2005, 2007, Palier and Thelen 2010). It is a trend that affects all advanced post-industrial 
economies, but which differs in its extent and social stratification regarding who is 
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affected. Atypical employment – denoting here all employment relations that deviate from 
standard and permanent employment – is, e.g., clearly gendered in many countries. 
Especially for women in Continental Europe, atypical employment is generally the norm 
rather than the exception (Esping-Andersen 1999a, 2009). Similarly, atypical employment 
is more widespread among younger labour market entrants in a range of Continental and 
Southern European countries (e.g. Chauvel 2009) than among the elderly workforce.  
 
Conceptualising labour market vulnerability - defining insiders and outsiders at the 
micro-level 
One may ask whether it makes sense to aggregate different forms of atypical employment 
and unemployment into specific groups, especially two groups of insiders and outsiders 
only. From a labour market sociology perspective, the answer is probably negative, but 
from a political science perspective, the aim is to identify broad socio-structural patterns 
of preferences and divides, which may be thought of as latent conflicts that may or may 
not be politicised and mobilised in terms of dualisation. Furthermore, the existing research 
shows that despite the heterogeneity of the groups of insiders and outsiders, this 
distinction is more than a mere academic notation, as it has political implications in terms 
of individual political preferences1 (for preferences on job protection, see Rueda 2005, 
                                                
1 Not all insider-outsider divides in preferences are uncontroversial, though, and the most debated are 
certainly preferences regarding employment protection. Insiders benefit from strong employment 
protection, while outsiders are forced to stay out of the primary labour market or to work in ‘dead-end’ 
jobs (Lindbeck and Snower 2001: 167). Insiders also benefit from the fact that outsiders function as 
employment buffers in times of an economic downturn (Rueda 2005: 61). Consequently, insiders are 
supposed to strongly advocate employment protection, whereas outsiders are supposed to be less keen 
on employment protection for two reasons; first, it constitutes an entry barrier, and second, it increases 
the insiders’ market power vis-à-vis their company (Saint-Paul 1998, 2002). Emmenegger (2009), 
however, questions a direct relationship between outsider-status and preferences for job security. 
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2007, Emmenegger 2009, on party preferences see Lindvall and Rueda 2012, on 
preferences for social policy see Burgoon and Dekker 2010, as well as Häusermann and 
Schwander 2009, 2011, and Häusermann and Walter 2010).  
 
We would like to contribute to this literature by proposing a new conceptualisation of 
insiders and outsiders and two new measures of it, one dichotomous (similar to the 
existing one) and one continuous, which allows a more fine-grained measurement of 
individual labour market vulnerability. In most of the existing literature, insiders and 
outsiders are distinguished on the basis of their employment status at a particular point in 
time (i.e. the point when a particular survey is conducted). All respondents who are in 
stable employment are coded as insiders, while all ‘unemployed, involuntary fixed-term 
employed and involuntary part-time employed’ are coded as outsiders (Rueda 2007: 14-
15, see also Lindbeck and Snower 2001, Saint-Paul 1998, 2002, Emmenegger 2009). The 
validity of conceptualisations obviously always depends on the specific research question 
one investigates. Hence, if one is interested in labour market processes (e.g. wage 
negotiations), the conceptualisation on the basis of employment status may indeed meet 
its analytical purpose. However, if we are interested in politics, i.e. policy preferences and 
mobilisation, we may need a conceptualisation that classifies insiders and outsiders on the 
basis of less ephemeral social and economic characteristics, which impact on the 
opportunities and constraints of individuals over a longer time span. This means that 
individuals might develop political preferences depending on their expectations about 
                                                                                                                                             
Outsiders may also favour strong employment protection, because of their hope of becoming an insider 
later in their career, for household relationships and labour solidarity (Emmenegger 2009: 134ff).  
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labour market risks, expectations that are strongly linked to the labour market prospects of 
their social group or ‘milieu’.  
A definition of insiders and outsiders based on risk comes with a number of advantages 
and disadvantages as compared to the more widespread measure based on labour market 
status. The disadvantage is that we attribute characteristics to an individual that are 
derived from its specific social group, i.e. we might attribute an individual a labour 
market risk that is never going to become manifest. This implies a number of empirical 
problems, especially for the dichotomous measure, which we address below when 
discussing the operationalisation. On the other hand, we see three possible interests in a 
risk-based measure: first, it is less vulnerable to the problem of volatility, i.e. the fact that 
labour market status may be too unstable to affect an individual’s political preferences 
(see Emmenegger 2009 for a similar argument). Indeed, if people repeatedly move back 
and forth between standard and non-standard employment, i.e. if post-industrial societies 
are fluid and mobile, a categorisation of insiders and outsiders on the basis of their current 
labour market status may lead to problems of misclassification. Therefore, we argue in 
favour of a conceptualisation of labour market risk that is based on a more stable 
category, namely occupational classes. People may change from unemployment to 
employment within a few months, and they may even change jobs within the same time 
span, but they do not change their occupational class (i.e. the ‘type’ of job they are in) 
quickly (Goldthorpe et al. 1987, Mayer 2000). Of course, even occupational categories are 
not the perfect empirical basis for evaluating long-term employment trajectories. Ideally, 
we would rely on data tracing employment biographies over their work life. Such data, 
however, is not available on a comparative basis. We therefore rely on occupational 
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categories as a proxy for employment biographies. They measure permanent, structural 
disadvantages more reliably than a snapshot of labour market status. Think of women in 
Continental Europe who may be employed full time at young age, but who will 
experience periods of career interruption or atypical employment later on, a fact they are 
generally well aware of, meaning that the anticipation of future atypical employment will 
shape their attitudes and preferences. They do have a vulnerable labour market biography, 
irrespective of particular spells of full time employment. In sum, our argument is that 
people form identities and preferences not on the basis of a momentary labour market 
status, but with regard to their general, expected employment biography. We will argue 
below that post-industrial class theory holds the adequate conceptual tools to approximate 
these employment biographies. 
 
A second advantage of a risk-based measure is that a conceptualisation based on current 
labour market status suggests the idea of two relatively homogeneous groups of insiders 
and outsiders. However, outsiders are a heterogeneous category. We find groups of people 
with ‘typically atypical’ work biographies both among high- and low-skilled, in different 
economic sectors, age groups etc. Consider these examples of typical outsiders: A woman 
working part-time in retail, a graphic designer working freelance on fixed-term projects, a 
recent university graduate who is being repeatedly employed on the basis of one-year 
contracts, or an unskilled unemployed worker. All of them are typical outsiders (in 
particular countries), but they are different in many aspects regarding their social risks and 
economic opportunities, which may be relevant depending on the research question. In a 
similar vein, Esping-Andersen (1999b), Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) and Häusermann 
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(2010) show that the ‘B-team’ of post-industrial societies is very heterogeneous, as the 
category of outsiders contains very different social groups. What these groups share – and 
what separates them from insiders – is a high risk of experiencing atypical employment 
during the course of their lives. A measure based on occupational profiles allows for 
differentiating between the heterogeneous group of outsiders and insiders in theoretically 
and empirically meaningful ways depending on particular research interests.  
 
Nevertheless, and this third advantage is linked to our previous point, one may ask 
whether it makes sense to conceptualise insiders and outsiders in two groups at all, since 
these two groups will necessarily have a strong within-group heterogeneity. Such a 
dichotomy only makes sense theoretically, if the two groups share a certain degree of 
social closure, which may structure their political preferences. As a consequence, insiders 
and outsiders may be mobilised by political actors. Our approach to this is on one side 
empirical: if we find significant differences between insiders and outsiders in terms of 
labour market characteristics and political preferences despite the heterogeneity of the two 
groups, it means that the distinction of insiders and outsiders makes sense.  
However, we consider the dichotomous measure generally as a weakness, because it 
entails a loss of information on different degrees of labour market vulnerability that is 
analytically problematic. Given that we measure outsiders based on risk rather than on 
status, we are able to develop a continuous measure of the extent of labour market 
vulnerability, which we may also call a degree of outsiderness.  
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Measuring the risk of atypical employment and unemployment 
Following the above arguments, we define labour market outsiders as those individuals 
who incur a particularly high probability of being in atypical employment and/or 
unemployment. The question is how we can measure this risk. We propose to categorise 
individuals based on the characteristics of their occupational reference group, rather than 
on mere individual-level characteristics. The probability of experiencing unemployment 
or atypical employment obviously depends on the frequency – or rate of occurrence – 
within the relevant occupational category of an individual. We argue that class, gender 
and age form the relevant categories, which relate the individual to a social group sharing 
similar risks regarding atypical employment. Classes are socio-structural groups 
characterised by a particular situation in the production process (i.e. in the labour market), 
which shapes their resources, latent interests and preferences.2 Class schemes are based on 
occupational profiles (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993, Wright 1997, Oesch 2006), because 
people in similar professions tend to share permanent, structural commonalities, meaning 
that classes are characterised by a certain degree of ‘social closure’. Post-industrial 
societies are still structured in different, relatively stable groups or classes, which share 
similar employment conditions. Class is therefore a meaningful starting point for the 
identification of group-specific risks of unemployment and atypical employment. We 
empirically rely on the class schema by Oesch (2006), which is explicitly developed to 
reflect post-industrial societies in two regards; a) it takes into account a heterogeneous 
middle class (Kriesi 1998), and b) it distinguishes between different types of low-skilled 
                                                
2 Oesch (2006) advocates a pragmatic use of the notoriously contested concept of class: ‘class is simply 
referred to as a proxy for similarity in the position within the occupational system’ (2006: 13). We share 
this definition that eludes the normative discussions and implications of the concept of class. 
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employees who can no longer be reasonably subsumed under a single category of (blue-
collar or manual) workers (Oesch 2006: 98ff).  
We follow Rehm and Kitschelt (2005), who argue that the Oesch class schema can be 
regrouped into five ‘class groups’. The location of the five class groups in the 
occupational structure is shown in Table 1: Capital accumulators are high-skilled 
managers, self-employed and experts. Socio-cultural professionals are high-skilled 
professionals in interpersonal professions, most of them in the public and private service 
sector. Lower skilled workers are differentiated into three groups; blue-collar workers are 
unskilled and skilled workers mostly in the industry, low service functionaries are 
unskilled and skilled employees in interpersonal services, and mixed service functionaries 
are routine and skilled workers in jobs with mostly organisational work logic. Table 1 
presents the location of the five classes in the class schema. 
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Table 1: The post-industrial class schema 
Independent work 
logic 
Technical work 
logic 
Organizational 
work logic 
Interpersonal 
work logic  
 
Large employers, 
liberal professionals 
and petty 
bourgeoisie with 
employees (e.g. 
entrepreneurs, 
lawyers)                
 
 
Capital 
accumulators (CA) 
 
Technical experts 
(e.g. executive 
engineers)                 
Capital 
accumulators (CA) 
 
 
Higher-grade and 
associate managers 
(e.g. financial and 
managing 
executives)               
 
 
Capital 
accumulators (CA) 
 
Socio-cultural (semi)-
professionals (e.g. 
teachers, health 
professionals)    
                        
 
 
Socio-cultural 
professionals SCP 
Professional/        
managerial 
Technicians (e.g. 
engineers)                
Mixed service 
functionaries MSF 
 
Associate 
professonal / 
managerial 
Petty bourgeoisie 
without employees 
(small shopkeepers)    
 
 
              
Mixed service 
functionaries MSF 
 
 
Skilled crafts and 
routine operatives 
(e.g. machine 
operators, laborers 
in construction) 
 
Blue-collar 
workers BC 
 
 
Skilled and routine 
office workers (e.g. 
office clerks) 
 
 
 
Mixed service 
functionaries MSF 
 
Skilled and unskilled 
service (e.g. 
salespersons, 
waiters) 
 
 
Low service 
functionaries LSF 
 
Generally / 
vocationally 
skilled 
 
 
Unskilled 
Note: Based on Oesch (2006) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2005); adapted from Häusermann (2010). For the 
classification of occupations (ISCO-2d codes) see appendix 1. 
 
We use these five classes as starting point. We also know that post-industrial labour 
market advantages are not only structured by class but also by gender and age. Much of 
the relevant literature points out that the insider-outsider divide is clearly gendered 
(Esping-Andersen 1999a: 308, 2009, Taylor-Gooby 1991, Kitschelt and Rehm 2006, 
Häusermann and Schwander 2009, Emmenegger 2010), and that research on dualisation 
must be linked to research on gender segregated labour markets (Davidsson and Naczyk 
2009: 5). Other studies point to the fact that post-industrial labour markets also tend to 
hold different occupational prospects for younger and older workers, confronting younger 
workers with more volatile and instable labour markets, while older workers enjoy more 
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job protection (Esping-Andersen 1999b, Kitschelt and Rehm 2006, Chauvel 2009).3 We 
therefore disaggregate the post-industrial classes further according to gender and age 
(except for capital accumulators, which are clearly the most privileged group in the labor 
market and therefore considered insiders by definition). The combination of 4 classes, 2 
sexes and 2 age groups (below/above 40) leaves us with 17 occupational groups, which 
are the basis of our measurement of unemployment/atypical employment risk. We limit 
ourselves to only two age groups and draw the line at 40 for practical reasons and because 
most European countries have still a considerable part of young adults in education at the 
age of 30 (Couppié and Mansuy 2003). Considering that acquiring a firm position in the 
labour market requires another couple of years, a substantial share of people in their 
thirties must still be counted as labour market entrants.  
 
Once established the 17 groups, we compare the group-specific rates of unemployment 
and atypical employment (combined) to the average rate in the workforce. Atypical 
employment includes involuntary part-time employment, fixed-term employment and 
helping family members.4 These group- and workforce-specific rates can be calculated 
both for pooled sets of welfare regimes and for countries individually. Previous work on 
                                                
3 Another criterion that that is related to outsider-status in the dualisation literature is migration status (see 
Emmenegger and Careja 2012). We do not include migration because we are not interested in the 
migration status itself but in the risk of atypical employment. If migrants face a higher risk of atypical 
employment, this is reflected in rate of their socio-structural group.  
4 A related question refers to the quality of fixed-term jobs, for which we are unfortunately unable to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary forms of fixed-term employment because of data non-
availability. Research on the permeability of temporary work has shown that the transition to permanent 
employment depends on various factors such as the sector of employment (Booth et al. 2000), or the 
composition of the temporary workforce (Gash 2008), but generally, fixed-term contracts are followed 
by other fixed-term contracts or unemployment for the vast majority of temporary employed (Booth et 
al. 2000: 10) and most temporary employed express a preference for a permanent contract (Kalleberg et 
al. 1997), i.e. they can be considered involuntarily fixed-term employed. Therefore, all fixed-term 
contracts are included in our measure of labour market vulnerability / outsiderness. 
The structure: Who is in and who is out? 
 
 
24 
the insider-outsider divide across welfare regimes has shown that variation in the 
composition of insiders and outsiders exists both between welfare regimes and within 
regimes (Häusermann and Schwander 2009, 2012b). As this is an explorative article 
suggesting various operationalisations, we do both: the welfare regime-specific 
operationalisation implies that we pool our occupational groups across all countries 
belonging to a regime and compare rates of atypical employment to the regime-average, 
while the country-specific operationalisation implies that we do the same for each country 
individually.  
 
For the dichotomous measure of insiders and outsiders, we select all groups that have a 
rate of atypical employment and unemployment that is significantly (p < .05) higher than 
the workforce average and we code all individuals in these groups as outsiders. For the 
continuous measure of outsiderness, we subtract the workforce average rate from the 
group-specific rate and use the difference as value of labour market vulnerability or 
‘degree of outsiderness’ that we then attribute to all individuals in this specific group.  
In this article, we apply this operationalisation to EU-SILC data from 2007 
(complemented by three national household panel surveys for countries missing in the 
EU-SILC)5. The level of detail of household panel data and the number of respondents 
(3500-8250 respondents for each country in the EU-SILC) is unrivalled by other 
comparative surveys. It thus allows a precise measurement across countries even for those 
groups, which are naturally small such as old female blue-collar workers, for example. 
                                                
5 For countries missing in the SILC data (Australia, Canada and USA) we supplement the information about 
the distribution of the risk for atypical employment with national household panels that provides us with 
the same amount of respondents and detailed information. For the USA we used the ‘American Time 
Use Survey (ATUS)’, for Canada the’ Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID)’ and for 
Australia ‘The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)’. 
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The high number of respondents is also crucial, since we rely on labour market conditions 
that may affect small portions of the electorate only (unemployment, temporary 
employment, etc.). 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive information on the distribution of individuals in the different 
categories and their group-specific deviation in percentage points from the workforce 
average rate of unemployment and atypical employment (which corresponds to their 
‘degree of outsiderness’). We have highlighted all groups whose group-specific average 
significantly exceeds the workforce average (‘outsiders’). We show only the regime-
specific operationalisation in this table for reasons of space. Table 3 is based on Table 2, 
showing the share of outsiders among different groups of the workforce, as well as the 
mean of labour market vulnerability – i.e. outsiderness – of these groups. 
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Table 2: Map of dualisation: difference between the group-specific rate of  atypical employment / unemployment and the rate among the 
entire workforce 
  Liberal regime     Nordic regime     Continental regime     Southern regime     
  
(Australia, Canada, 
Britain, Ireland, 
USA) N 
Atypical 
work/ 
Unempl.  
(Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden) N 
Atypical 
work/ 
Unempl.  
(Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland) N 
Atypical 
work/ 
Unempl.   
(Greek, Italy,  
Portugal, Spain) N 
Atypical 
work/ 
Unempl.   
Outsiders LSF young women 5,019 36.5 LSF young women 2,267 30.1 LSF young women 3,177 30.9 LSF young women 3,789 26.4 
Insiders LSF young men 3,370 19.3 LSF young men 962 13.7 LSF young men 1,439 -5.2 LSF young men 2,014 3.7 
  LSF old women 4,035 18.8 LSF old women 3,039 16.3 LSF old women 3,974 33.9 LSF old women 3,939 22.6 
  LSF old men 2,389 -8.0 LSF old men 847 -4.3 LSF old men 1,568 -14.0 LSF old men 1,867 -17.1 
  SCP young women 5,342 6.9 SCP young women 2,390 9.4 SCP young women 4,418 17.5 SCP young women 2,842 8.1 
  SCP young men 2,287 -5.1 SCP young men 1,285 -5.0 SCP young men 2,367 -14.0 SCP young men 1,606 -8.4 
  SCP old women 5,291 0.0 SCP old women 4,128 2.1 SCP old women 5,384 17.5 SCP old women 2,898 -13.6 
  SCP old men 2,856 -14.0 SCP old men 2,395 -9.8 SCP old men 3,940 -21.1 SCP old men 2,533 -27.3 
  BC young women 1,074 12.2 BC young women 557 9.8 BC young women 869 16.9 BC young women 1,648 20.5 
  BC young men 7,282 -2.4 BC young men 3,291 -7.6 BC young men 4,950 -12.6 BC young men 6,446 -2.1 
  BC old women 1,466 4.6 BC old women 1,005 2.9 BC old women 1,222 22.2 BC old women 2,602 33.2 
  BC old men 7,676 -9.9 BC old men 4,637 -9.6 BC old men 5,720 -17.9 BC old men 7,124 -8.4 
  MSF young women 4,491 10.1 MSF young women 770 15.2 MSF young women 2,792 15.8 MSF young women 2,144 10.2 
  MSF young men 2,644 1.5 MSF young men 741 -6.3 MSF young men 2,187 -17.7 MSF young men 1,646 -7.8 
  MSF old women 4,782 -0.5 MSF old women 1,546 6.5 MSF old women 3,323 20.3 MSF old women 1,588 -4.1 
  MSF old men 2,335 -15.1 MSF old men 1,058 -10.7 MSF old men 2,665 -23.8 MSF old men 1,750 -25.6 
  CA 16,903 -18.6 CA 5,693 -13.6 CA 8,764 -21.1 CA 5,004 -23.2 
  Total 77,164  Total 36,319  Total 57,256  Total 50,636  
  Entire workforce   29.8 Entire workforce   20.3 Entire workforce   38.6 Entire workforce   36.3 
  Minimum   -18.6 Minimum   -13.6 Minimum   -23.8 Minimum   -27.3 
 Maximum  36.5 Maximum  30.1 Maximum  33.9 Maximum  33.2 
Note: Values are the difference between the group-specific rate of atypical employment / unemployment and the rate among the entire workforce (outsiderness). Highlighted are those groups with 
significantly higher rates than the workforce average (outsiders); based on EU-SILC 2007, data for Australia, Canada and USA is based on country-specific national household panels from 2007. 
Abbbreviations: LSF are low service functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed service functionaries and CA are capital accumulators (see Table 1). 
Young means < 40; old means > 40  
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Table 3: Labour market vulnerability in different groups of the workforce 
 
 Liberal regime Nordic regime Continental Regime Southern regime 
 
% of 
outsiders 
Mean of 
outsiderness 
% of 
outsiders 
Mean of 
outsiderness 
% of 
outsiders 
Mean of 
outsiderness 
% of 
outsiders 
Mean of 
outsiderness 
... among total workforce 34.5 1.4 32.6 -1.8 47.0 1.5 38.0 0.4 
... among women 59.5 8.4 62.0 7.6 94.3 21.4 73.9 14.3 
... among young 54.8 6.6 51.6 3.1 48.0 2.7 53.8 5.2 
... among low-skilled 
individuals 40.1 3.2 37.1 -0.6 50.6 3.8 39.0 1.9 
... among high-skilled 
individuals 31.0 -1.6 24.3 -1.9 43.0 -2.7 34.8 -4.5 
Note:’% of outsiders’ means the percentage of individuals which belong to a social group with a rate of 
unemployment and atypical employment that is significantly higher than the workforce average. ‘Mean of 
outsiderness’ denotes the average deviation (in percentage points) of the group-specific rates from the average 
workforce rates (see Table 2). Numbers are based on the regime-specific operationalisations and based on                 
EU-SILC 2007, data for Australia, Canada and USA is based on country-specific national household panels. 
 
Two main insights result from Tables 2 and 3. Firstly, even though there are variations in 
the composition of insiders and outsiders across regimes, female and young labour market 
participants experience atypical employment and unemployment more strongly than men 
and elderly employees in all regimes. In all four regimes, young female low service 
functionaries are most strongly affected by these forms of labour market vulnerability 
than any other group. Their rate of atypical employment and unemployment exceeds the 
regime-specific average rate by 25.2 to 34.2 percentage points. By contrast, high-skilled 
elder men and capital accumulators experience the lowest risk of atypical employment 
and unemployment. The clear gender bias is particularly strong in the Continental regime: 
94.3 percent of women are outsiders when using the dichotomous measure and their mean 
value of outsiderness lies by more than 20 percentage points above the mean of the 
workforce. This is more than in the other three regimes, where women’s outsiderness 
exceeds the average by 7.6 to 14.3 percentage points. Young labour market participants 
are particularly strongly affected in the Liberal and Southern regimes, where more than 
half of the young belong to social groups disproportionally affected by atypical 
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employment and unemployment. Despite, the mean of outsiderness among the young is 
higher than the mean of the entire workforce in all regimes. 
The second insight resulting from Table 2 and Table 3 is that both insiders and outsiders 
are heterogeneous in terms of skills and education level. The high-skilled are not shielded 
from atypical employment. Between 24.3 (in the Nordic regime) and 43 percent (in the 
Continental regime) of high-skilled belong to groups experiencing rates of unemployment 
and atypical employment that lie significantly above the workforce average. Many high-
skilled women, for example, work in part-time jobs and many graduates find their way 
into the labour market through fixed-term contracts only. Even though it may make sense 
– depending on the research question – to analyse low- and high-skilled labour market 
vulnerability separately, it is important to notice that atypical work in particular has 
spread widely into the higher skilled classes, with all the social and political correlates in 
terms of poor social security coverage and weak political mobilisation that this implies 
(for a discussion of the issue of highly skilled outsiders, see also Polavieja 2005, 
Davidsson and Nacyk 2009). 
 
However, it is true that ‘high-skilled outsiderness’ is particularly a matter of involuntary 
part-time employment and fixed-term contracts, rather than being driven by 
unemployment. To illustrate this more clearly, and to differentiate these forms of labour 
market vulnerability, we calculated the rates of unemployment and the rates of 
involuntary part-time and temporary work separately. The resulting tables are shown in 
appendix 2.1 and 2.2. Not unexpectedly, the risk of unemployment turns out to be more 
strongly skill-biased than the risk of atypical employment: If we were to define outsiders 
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solely on the basis of unemployment, they would almost exclusively be found among the 
low service functionaries and blue-collar workers. Nevertheless, age and gender remain 
relevant in structuring the risk for unemployment. In all regimes, blue-collar workers, as 
well as female and young male low service functionaries have particularly high rates of 
unemployment. In contrast to unemployment, atypical employment is generally more 
gender- and less skill-related, as both high and low-skilled women massively tend to work 
in involuntary part-time or in temporary work.  
  
Due to space restrictions we cannot present a table with the specific classification of 
insiders and outsiders for each country in this article.6 In general, the regime-specific and 
the country-specific operationalisations provide very similar results (r = 0.86 for the 
dichotomous measure, r = 0.94 for the continuous measure when correlating them at the 
individual level), but intra-regime variance is stronger in some cases than in others. The 
Liberal regime is quite homogeneous. The pattern in Australia, Ireland, the US and Britain 
corresponds to the pattern of the pooled analysis where skills and gender are important in 
structuring the risk for atypical employment and unemployment. In Canada, the risk for 
being an outsider is somewhat less gendered than generally in the Liberal regime and 
more structured by age (contrary to the pooled analysis, young blue-collars and socio-
cultural professionals are disproportionally affected by atypical employment and 
unemployment).  
Turning to the Nordic regime, we find that in Sweden and Denmark, there are generally 
fewer workers affected by a disproportionate risk for atypical employment7 and 
                                                
6 Country-specific tables are available from the authors. 
7 For Denmark, this may be related to missing information about temporary work. 
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unemployment than in Norway and Finland. In Finland, the risk of being an outsider is 
stronger age-biased than in the pooled analysis, but in all countries, capital accumulators 
clearly face the lowest rate of outsiderness.  
In the Continental regime, the country-specific patterns of outsiders and outsiderness are 
very consistent with the pooled regime-analysis. In all Continental countries, gender is an 
extremely strong predictor of atypical work and unemployment. Only France deviates: 
here, skill level and age are equally important in structuring labour market vulnerability. 
As a result, and contrary to the other countries, French young male low service 
functionaries are counted as outsiders, whereas elder female socio-cultural professionals 
are not. Overall, the French pattern is more similar to the Southern regime than to the 
other Continental countries.  
Finally, the countries of the Southern regime form the most homogeneous pattern. 
Generally, young women and elderly low-skilled women are counted as outsiders in all 
countries. Age plays an important role too: in Spain and Italy, low-skilled young men too 
experience slightly higher labour market vulnerability than the national average (this 
refers to blue-collar workers in Spain and low service functionaries in Italy). Overall, it is 
noteworthy that the range of outsiderness between the minimum value of -27.3 (old male 
socio-cultural professionals) and the maximum value of 33.2 (old female blue-collar 
workers) is highest in the Southern regime, indicating strong inequality in terms of labour 
market vulnerability.  
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Assessing the validity of the risk-based conceptualisation of insiders and outsiders 
To further assess our risk-based conceptualisation of insiders and outsiders, we discuss 
both the criterion and construct validity of our conceptualisation (see Oesch 2006: 94f, 
Evans 1992). The criterion validity assesses whether a concept measures what it is 
indented to measure. It depends on measuring outcomes or characteristics that are directly 
linked to the concept one wants to validate (Evans 1992: 212). For the risk-based 
conceptualisation of insiders and outsiders this implies that we assess whether the 
conceptualisation is indeed related to actual differences in labour market (dis)advantages. 
Construct validity, on the other hand, is assessed by testing if a concept predicts other, 
more distant variables in a theoretically meaningful way (Evans 1992: 212). The literature 
on dualisation postulates different policy preferences of insiders and outsiders due to their 
different positions in the labour market (Rueda 2005, Emmenegger 2009). Consequently, 
we will test whether the risk-based conceptualisation is able to predict differences in such 
labour market policies preferences.  
 
 
Analysis of labour market advantages 
In this section, we first assess criterion validity by discussing two key indicators of labour 
market advantages: work income and upward mobility (see also Oesch 2006). We expect 
outsiders to fare worse on both indicators of labour market advantages. Data wise, we rely 
on the ISSP Work Orientation III survey (2005), which includes 15 countries.8 We use the 
four insider/outsider measures developed in this article: the dichotomous and continuous 
                                                
8 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. 
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measures based on the regime-specific rates of atypical employment and unemployment – 
outsider/outsiderness (regime) – as well as both measures based on country-specific rates 
of atypical employment and unemployment– outsider/outsiderness (country). To control 
for country-specific differences, we include country dummies in all models and use 
clustered standard errors. For both dependent variables we specify four models: the first 
model shows the estimate for the regime-specific, dichotomous measure. Model 2 refers 
to the country-specific, dichotomous measure. Model 3 uses the regime-specific, 
continuous measure and model 4 shows the estimate for the country-specific, continuous 
measure. All models control for age, gender, education, union membership, church 
attendance, if an individual lives in a couple household and (for the upward mobility) 
income, following the literature in this field (Emmenegger 2009, Burgoon and Dekker 
2010). Details regarding the operationalisation are documented in appendix 3.
Chapter 1 
33 
Table 4: Determinants of labour market advantages: Income and promotion chances 
 Income Chances for promotion in current job 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Outsider (Regime) -0.277**    -0.372***    
 (0.093)    (0.079)    
Outsider (Country)  -0.242**    -0.184*   
  (0.088)    (0.095)   
Outsiderness (Regime)   -0.013***    -0.016***  
   (0.004)    (0.004)  
Outsiderness (Country)    -0.011**    -0.011*** 
    (0.005)    (0.004)    
Female -0.226** -0.247*** -0.169* -0.152* 0.015 -0.091 0.050 -0.017    
 (0.087) (0.080) (0.091) (0.074) (0.059) (0.078) (0.077) (0.092)    
Age 0.004** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Education 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.279*** 0.230** 0.262*** 0.281*** 0.255*** 0.273*** 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.083) (0.086) (0.060) (0.067) (0.061) (0.055)    
Union membership -0.120 -0.113 -0.027 0.124 -0.050 -0.042 -0.067 -0.070    
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.122) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.077) (0.076)    
Church attendance -0.016** -0.016** -0.019** -0.012 0.024* 0.024* 0.026* 0.027*   
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
Living in a couple 
household  
0.163*** 
(0.048) 
0.158*** 
(0.047) 
0.141*** 
(0.043) 
0.126** 
(0.048) 
0.042 
(0.061) 
0.034 
(0.060) 
0.053 
(0.060) 
0.054    
(0.059) 
Income     0.260*** 0.266*** 0.232*** 0.240*** 
     (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)    
Country fixed effects          yes           yes yes yes yes yes            yes            yes 
Pseudo R2 0.740 0.740 0.742 0.782 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.034 
N 8577 8577 10010 9149 6983 6983 6505 6505 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; OLS regression for income; ordered logistic regression for promotion chances; regressions with clustered 
standard errors and country dummies ;data is weighted country dummies and cut-points not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and 
Zavoina R2; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level; Data source: ISSP Work Orientations III 
(2005).  
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The effect of outsiderness on income is clear-cut and as expected: Being an outsider has a 
consistent, strong and negative effect on income regardless of the measure we use. The 
negative effect of being an outsider (net of all control variables such as gender, age, 
education etc.) lowers the respondent’s income by 277 Euros when we use the regime-
specific, dichotomous operationalisation, and by 244 Euros using the country-specific, 
dichotomous operationalisation. Regarding the effects of the continuous measures, we 
calculate substantive effects by comparing the estimated income of an individual with the 
maximum outsiderness value to an individual with the minimum outsiderness value 
holding all other variables constant: this difference is 850 Euros for the regime-specific 
operationalisation and 880 Euros for the country-specific operationalisation.  
The control variables show no surprising effects: Gender and church attendance are 
negatively related to income, while age, high education and living in a couple household 
have a positive association with income. Union membership does not affect income 
significantly. 
 
The disadvantaged position of outsiders in the labour market also shows in the subjective 
assessment of upward mobility. Outsiders are consistently and significantly less likely 
than insiders to agree to the statement that chances for advancement in their current job 
are high. In order to discuss the effects substantively, we compare predicted probabilities 
of agreeing to that statement for insiders and outsiders. We calculate predicted 
probabilities for an individual with average income and age, holding all other variables at 
zero, i.e. a 42-years old, not religious, low-skilled male outsider, who lives alone, is not a 
union member, earns 1878 Euros and lives in France. Compared to an insider, his 
probability of saying that he definitely expects to be promoted is 9.1 percentage points 
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lower (regime-based, dichotomous operationalisation). The difference is 4.3 percentage 
points when we use the country-specific, dichotomous measure. To estimate the 
substantive effects of the continuous measure, we compare the probabilities of the same 
individual, attributing him the highest and the lowest value of outsiderness (26.4 and -16.5 
in France): the net effect of outsiderness amounts to 15.6 percentage points. If we use the 
regime-specific measure, an individual with the highest value (31.9) has a likelihood of 
15.7 percent to say that he expects definitively to be promoted, while the likelihood for 
the same individual with the lowest labour market vulnerability (-18.5) is 33.6 percent. 
This is a difference of 17.9 percentage points. Hence, being an outsider and labour market 
vulnerability more generally have substantial net effects on subjective promotion 
prospects, which are independent from other determinants such as age, gender and 
education. 
Turning to the control variables, we see that high-skilled employees and high income 
earners are more optimistic about their career advancement prospects while elder 
employees assess their career chances less optimistically. The other control variables do 
not display significant effects, with the exception of church attendance being slightly 
positively related with the subjective assessment of upward mobility.9  
 
We conclude from this section that the risk-based measure of outsiders is valid, insofar as 
we find significant differences in labour market advantages between insiders and 
outsiders. This holds even for the dichotomous measures, despite the heterogeneity of 
                                                
9 We tested whether the results hold only in high unemployment countries because fixed-term employment 
is thought to be more problematic in these countries. Similarly, unemployment is more persistent in 
countries of high unemployment. However, for neither of the two indicators of labour market 
disadvantage do we find stronger effects in high unemployment countries (results available from the 
authors). See also footnote 13. 
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these two groups. Literature on social closure of post-industrial classes (Oesch 2006) and 
reproduction of poverty spells over generations (Tomlinson and Walker 2012) shows that 
these differences are persistent over time. Such a longitudinal analysis, however, lies 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 
Analysis of preferences for labour market policies  
We now move to the discussion of the construct validity. The literature on dualisation 
suggests that insiders and outsiders hold different preferences regarding labour market 
policies. We replicate these analyses of the existing insider-outsider literature using our 
measures. For this part of the analysis, we rely on ISSP Role of Government IV 2006 
survey data, which includes the same 15 countries as before plus the Netherlands. To 
predict labour market policy preferences of insiders and outsiders we use ordered logit 
regressions. Our main focus in this analysis is on the direction and consistency of effects, 
rather than the magnitude and substantive differences, which are notoriously small in all 
micro-level analyses (see Rueda 2005, Emmenegger 2009).  
 
The existing literature (most clearly so Rueda 2005, and Emmenegger 2009) has 
evidenced insider-outsider preferences with regard to active labour market policies. As an 
indicator of preferences for active labour market policies (ALMP), we use a question 
asking respondents whether they agree that the government is responsible for providing a 
job for everyone who wants one. We operationalise preferences for passive labour market 
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policies (PLMP) with a question asking if the respondent agrees that the government 
should spend more on unemployment benefits.10  
Table 5 shows the estimates of preferences for active and passive labour market policies.  
For each dependent variable, models 1-4 test the influence of labour market vulnerability 
with regard to the four different risk-based measures of outsider and outsiderness. The 
models include the same set of control variables as before. 
                                                
10 Both Emmenegger (2009) and Rueda (2005) refrain from operationalising preferences for passive labour 
market policies. Emmenegger focuses on preferences for job security. Rueda argues theoretically that 
outsiders favour passive labour market policies more strongly than insiders but the data he uses 
(Eurobarometer 94) does not allow to operationalise preferences for passive labour market policies 
(Rueda 2005: 65).  
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Table 5: Determinants of labour market preferences 
 Active labour market policies Passive labour market policies 
 Government should provide a job for everyone Government should spend more on unemployment benefits 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Outsider (Country) 0.014    0.077    
 (0.073)    (0.087)    
Outsider (Regime)  0.208***    0.213**   
  (0.073)    (0.107)   
Outsiderness (Country)   0.004*    0.006*  
   (0.002)    (0.003)  
Outsiderness (Regime)    0.009***    0.010*** 
    (0.002)    (0.003)    
Female 0.152** 0.006 0.071 -0.021 0.027 -0.088 -0.052 -0.123    
 (0.060) (0.076) (0.070) (0.058) (0.101) (0.097) (0.110) (0.105)    
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Income -0.258*** -0.252*** -0.251*** -0.242*** -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.198*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)    
Education -0.508*** -0.494*** -0.490*** -0.470*** -0.191* -0.179* -0.170* -0.153    
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100) (0.104)    
Union membership 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.277*** 0.367*** 0.366*** 0.368*** 0.365*** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107)    
Church attendance 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019    
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)    
Living in couple -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.232*** 
household (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)    
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.078    
N 8401 8401 8401 8401 8453 8453 8453 8453 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors, ordered logistic regression with clustered standard errors and country dummies; data is weighted; country 
dummies and cut-points not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 
0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level; Data source: ISSP RoG IV 2006. For details on operationalisation, see appendix 3 
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We start by discussing the estimates for active labour market policy preferences. Models 2-
4 show that outsiders clearly and significantly want more public job creation than insiders –  
which is in line with the expectations in the literature. The effect of the country-specific 
outsider dummy variable goes in the right direction, but does not reach significance. This 
might be due to the fact that the comparison with country-specific averages (the overall 
variance being lower than in the regime-comparison) leads to a dichotomous measure with 
too heterogeneous groups, an observation that adds value to the continuous measure. In 
terms of substantive effects, we calculate probabilities for the same individual as specified 
before:11 being an insider lowers his probability of agreeing that the government is 
(definitely or probably) responsible for providing a job for everyone by about 6 percentage 
points when we use the regime-specific, dichotomous operationalisation. Using the country-
specific continuous measure, going from the highest to the lowest value of outsiderness has 
a net effect of about 15 percentage points (from 78.5 to 63.4 percent) on the likelihood that 
a respondent agrees that the government should provide a job for everyone. The same effect 
is even 18.4 percentage points when using the regime-specific continuous measure. Turning 
to the control variables, income, education and if a person lives in a couple household 
influence preferences for active labour market policies negatively, while union members are 
more likely to be in favour of active labour market policies than non-union members. The 
frequency of church attendance exerts no influence on the preferences for active labour 
market policies and gender has no consistent effect either.  
 
For passive labour market policy preferences we find very similar results. As expected, 
outsiders have stronger preferences for passive labour market policies, i.e. they are more 
likely to agree more to the statement that the government should spend more on 
                                                
11 The average individual is a 43-years old (mean), non religious man who lives alone, is not a union member, 
earns 2’147 Euros (mean) and lives in France. 
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unemployment benefits. Again, the coefficient for the country-specific dummy variable 
does not reach significance, but the effect goes in the expected direction. In terms of 
substantive effects, the net difference between insiders and outsiders is 4.2 percentage 
points for the regime-specific, dichotomous measure.12 Regarding the continuous measure 
of outsiderness, we find that net of all other determinants, an individual with the highest 
value of labour market vulnerability is about 13.1 (regime-specific measure) or 14.4 
(country-specific measure) percentage points more likely to favour more generous 
unemployment benefits than an individual with the lowest score of labour market 
vulnerability. The effects of the control variables are similar to the effects we found for 
active labour market policy preferences. Income, education and living in a couple 
household have a significant negative influence on passive labour market policy 
preferences, while union members and elder employees are more likely to be in favour of 
passive labour market policies than non-members and younger individuals. Religiosity, 
again, exerts no influence on preferences.13  
 
Overall, we find evidence for the construct validity of our risk-based measures of outsiders 
and outsiderness with regard to preferences for active and passive labour market policies: 
outsiders are consistently more likely to agree that government should provide a job for 
everyone, and that the government should spend more on unemployment benefits. Overall, 
we argue that the empirical analysis supports the new measure that we have theoretically 
and empirically developed in this article. Indeed, preferences for active labour market 
policy are the core measure on which insiders and outsiders are expected to differ. For this 
                                                
12 As the country-specific, dichotomous measure was not significant in Table 5, we refrain from calculating 
predicted probabilities for this measure. 
13 We again tested whether the results hold only in countries with high rates of unemployment. The effects, 
however, are generally consistent in countries with high and low unemployment rates. Only for one 
measure (regime-specific, dichotomous operationalisation), we have stronger results in countries with high 
unemployment (results available from the authors). Given the overall robustness of results independent of 
the country-specific unemployment rate, we refrain from analysing this contextual effect further. 
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variable, we clearly find evidence for the risk-based measures. When it comes to passive 
labour market policies, expectations in the literature are somewhat less clear, since income-
related passive transfers benefit insiders too, given that insiders are likely to have much 
better contribution-records. However, insiders are also – by definition and by measurement 
– less likely to become unemployed at all, so that we still expect outsiders to be more 
favourable towards generous unemployment benefits, a hypothesis that is confirmed by the 
data.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article proposes a new conceptualisation and measurement of labour market insiders 
and outsiders, and of labour market vulnerability more generally. We have argued that if we 
want to explain political preferences of insiders and outsiders, it may be useful to 
operationalise insider and outsiders on the basis of stable social and economic 
characteristics, which are likely to shape their (current and future) life chances and 
constraints. We suggest a conceptualisation of insiders and outsiders that is based on the 
risk of individuals to find themselves in atypical employment or unemployment, this risk 
being measured by specific rates of unemployment/atypical employment of the social group 
they belong to. On this basis, we propose both a dichotomous operationalisation of 
insiders/outsiders and a continuous measure of ‘outsiderness’, or more generally labour 
market vulnerability. The dichotomous measure codes individuals as outsiders if they 
belong to a social group whose rate of unemployment and atypical employment is 
significantly higher than the workforce average, all other individuals are coded as insiders. 
The continuous measure departs from the dichotomous view of insiders and outsiders that 
prevails in the literature on insider-outsider divides, but it allows a more fine-grained 
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measurement of labour market vulnerability by attributing each individual the difference 
between his/her group-specific rate of unemployment and atypical employment and the 
average rate in the workforce as value of outsiderness. With these measures, we developed 
a map of dualisation across the four welfare regimes and the individual countries, which 
shows that, overall, low-skilled service sector employees, women and young labour market 
participants tend to be most strongly affected by labour market vulnerability, with a few 
regime- and country-specific differences.  
We also assessed the criterion and construct validity of our conceptualisation: outsiderness 
(as measured in terms of the risk of unemployment/atypical employment) clearly 
contributes to a disadvantage in terms of income and job mobility, net of other factors such 
as gender, age or education. We also showed that our measures predict active and passive 
labour market policy preferences of insiders and outsiders as expected in the literature of 
dualisation. Based on these findings, we argue that the definition of outsiders and 
outsiderness as developed in this article is empirically and theoretically relevant for the 
research on dualisation, and that it might be of interest to other studies in this area. 
However, we are also aware that our measures are more complex and require more fine-
grained data (especially in terms of occupational classes) than the standard 
operationalisation, which simply codes outsiders based on their current labour market 
status. Hence, one may ask whether it is worthwhile choosing the more complex path. We 
would argue that it is, given its added theoretical value with regard to specific research 
questions (notably if we are interested in analysing not the immediate labour market 
disadvantages of outsiders, but the political consequences of dualisation) and its added 
degree of differentiation regarding the continuous measure of outsiderness and labour 
market vulnerability. Additionally, the map of dualisation we presented in Table 2 can be 
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used very conveniently in subsequent analyses, and country-specific values are available 
from the authors. 
 
More generally, we think that this article bears insights for the literature on dualisation and 
insider-outsider divides irrespective of the precise measurement we use. The distinction 
between a core workforce of insiders, which is fully integrated in the labour market, and a 
more marginal and vulnerable the outsiders is empirically validated, and we were able to 
identify a pattern of socio-structural groups of insiders and outsider who – despite the 
heterogeneity of these two groups – face distinct labour market disadvantages and hold 
distinct preferences. We also think that our continuous measure of outsiderness allows 
linking the more political science oriented dualisation literature with the more sociological 
literature on labour market vulnerability. Finally, we were able to show cross-country and 
cross-regime differences in the degree and structure of labour markets vulnerabilities and 
dualisation. This raises many questions for future research: where and to what extent will an 
insider-outsider divide be mobilised politically? Do the political preferences of insiders and 
outsiders differ only regarding labour market policies, or do they hold different preferences 
regarding the welfare state in general? Moreover, to what extent does labour market 
vulnerability affect vote choices and electoral preferences for political parties? These are 
questions that current research on dualisation and insider-outsider divides needs to address, 
in order to spell out the social and political consequences of changing labour markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups 
 
Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups, based on Oesch 2006 and Kitschelt and 
Rehm 2005: 23  
Independent work 
logic 
Technical work 
logic 
Organizational 
work logic 
Interpersonal work 
logic  
Large employers, self-
employed professionals 
and petty bourgeoisie 
with employees 
(Capital accumulators)  
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
<=24 
Technical experts 
(Capital 
accumulators)  
ISCO88-2d 21  
Higher-grade 
managers (Capital 
accumulators)                         
ISCO88-2d 11, 12 
Socio-cultural semi-
professionals (Socio-
cultural 
professionals)   
ISCO88-2d 22-24, 32-34     
Professional/        
managerial 
Technicians (Mixed 
service 
functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 31 
Associate managers 
(Capital 
accumulators) 
ISCO88-2d 13 
Associate 
professional 
/ managerial 
Petty bourgeoisie 
without employees 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
>24 
Skilled crafts (Blue-
collar workers) 
ISCO88-2d 71-74                   
Skilled office 
workers and routine 
office workers 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
ISCO88-2d 41, 42                       
Skilled service and 
routine service (Low 
service functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 51, 52, 91                      
Generally / 
vocationally 
skilled 
 Routine operatives 
and routine 
agriculture (Blue-
collar workers)     
ISCO88-2d 61, 92, 81-
83, 93               
Low/ un-
skilled 
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Appendix 2.1 – Difference (in percentage points) between the group-specific rate of atypical employment or unemployment and the rate among 
the entire workforce 
 
Liberal regime (AU, 
CA, IE, UK, US) N Unemp 
Part-time 
& temp  
Nordic regime 
 (DK, FI, NO, SE) N Unemp 
Part-time 
& temp 
Continental regime 
(AT, BE, CH, FR, 
GE, NL) N Unemp 
Part-time 
& temp 
Southern regime  
(ES, GR, IT, PT) N Unemp 
Part-time 
& temp 
LSF young women 5,019 8.0 35.6 LSF young women 2,267 1.9 32.7 LSF young women 3,177 4.8 28.9 LSF young women 3,789 10.7 23.3 
LSF young men 3,370 8.6 15.2 LSF young men 962 1.3 12.7 LSF young men 1,439 2.8 -6.4 LSF young men 2,014 3.8 2.0 
LSF old women 4,035 -0.3 16.7 LSF old women 3,039 0.6 18.0 LSF old women 3,974 1.9 24.4 LSF old women 3,939 0.9 21.5 
LSF old men 2,389 -0.9 -8.8 LSF old men 847 0.9 -9.0 LSF old men 1,568 1.8 -18.8 LSF old men 1,867 -1.8 -19.6 
SCP young women 5,342 -1.3 8.4 SCP young women 2,390 -0.5 9.0 SCP young women 4,418 -1.4 20.3 SCP young women 2,842 0.6 7.7 
SCP young men 2,287 -1.6 -3.9 SCP young men 1,285 -0.7 -9.8 SCP young men 2,367 -1.6 -10.4 SCP young men 1,606 -0.1 -6.3 
SCP old women 5,291 -4.9 2.7 SCP old women 4,128 -0.9 3.1 SCP old women 5,384 -1.6 15.6 SCP old women 2,898 -3.5 -15.5 
SCP old men 2,856 -5.5 -9.7 SCP old men 2,395 -0.9 -15.2 SCP old men 3,940 -2.4 -18.4 SCP old men 2,533 -4.6 -27.2 
BC young women 1,074 8.8 5.9 BC young women 557 0.9 14.7 BC young women 869 6.9 15.8 BC young women 1,648 14.7 15.3 
BC young men 7,282 5.8 -7.5 BC young men 3,291 0.6 -13.5 BC young men 4,950 1.1 -13.3 BC young men 6,446 2.5 -2.9 
BC old women 1,466 1.3 4.0 BC old women 1,005 1.3 12.7 BC old women 1,222 2.7 13.2 BC old women 2,602 -0.5 35.5 
BC old men 7,676 0.6 -11.1 BC old men 4,637 0.4 -14.3 BC old men 5,720 0.7 -23.2 BC old men 7,124 -1.8 -5.9 
MSF young women 4,491 1.9 9.2 MSF young women 770 0.0 14.0 MSF young women 2,792 1.0 14.6 MSF young women 2,144 2.0 5.8 
MSF young men 2,644 3.4 -0.6 MSF young men 741 -0.2 -14.6 MSF young men 2,187 -1.1 -19.0 MSF young men 1,646 0.9 -11.6 
MSF old women 4,782 -2.7 -0.3 MSF old women 1,546 0.2 5.8 MSF old women 3,323 0.5 11.7 MSF old women 1,588 -1.7 -9.8 
MSF old men 2,335 -2.8 -13.8 MSF old men 1,058 0.0 -20.9 MSF old men 2,665 -1.6 -27.0 MSF old men 1,750 -3.3 -29.7 
CA 16,903 -4.7 -16.0 CA 5,693 -1.2 -21.4 CA 8,764 -2.2 -19.2 CA 5,004 -3.1 -13.6 
Total 77,164   Total 36,319   Total 57,256   Total 50,636   
Entire workforce   7.4 25.6 Entire workforce   2.0 35.8 Entire workforce  4.4 39.8 Entire workforce  6.0 36.8 
Minimum   -5.5 -16.0 Minimum   -1.2 -21.4 Minimum  -2.4 -27.0 Minimum  -4.6 -29.7 
Maximum  8.8 35.6 Maximum  1.9 32.7 Maximum  6.9 28.9 Maximum  14.7 35.5 
Note: Values are the difference (in percentage points) between the group-specific rate of atypical employment or unemployment and the rate among the entire workforce. Highlighted are those groups 
with significantly higher rates than the workforce average; based on EU-SILC 2007, data for Canada, USA and Australia is based on country specific household panels (see appendix 3). 
Abbbreviations: Unemp. = deviation in percentage points of a group from the regime-mean of unemployment; part-time & temp = deviation in percentage points of a group from the regime-mean of 
involuntary part-time and temporary work; LSF are low service functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed service functionaries and CA are capital 
accumulators (see Table 1) Young means < 40; old means > 40. 
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Appendix 2.2 – Risk for atypical employment and unemployment in different groups of the 
workforce 
  
 Liberal regime Nordic regime Continental Regime Southern regime 
Risk for unemployment % at risk  mean % at risk Mean % at risk Mean % at risk Mean 
... among total workforce 47.3 0.3 24.9 0.3 54.9 0.1 36.9 0.2 
... among women 48.5 8.0 26.4 0.2 56.0 0.7 42.7 1.6 
... among young 70.5 5.4 33.5 0.3 66.3 0.7 76.3 4.0 
... among low-skilled individuals 59.1 2.2 29.6 0.4 68.2 0.5 39.9 -0.7 
... among high-skilled individuals 35.9 -0.7 17.8 -0.6 25.8 -0.9 36.7 -0.7 
         
Risk for involuntary part-time 
and temporary work % at risk Mean % at risk Mean % at risk Mean % at risk Mean 
... among total workforce 42.3 0.1 47.3 -2.2 47.8 -1.2 38.0 0.6 
... among women 74.1 8.0 92.6 10.5 94.3 16.2 73.9 13.1 
... among young 55.6 5.4 51.6 2.4 48.0 2.8 53.8 8.8 
... among low-skilled individuals 44.5 2.2 46.9 -0.7 50.6 0.0 39.0 2.0 
... among high-skilled individuals 40.5 -1.3 48.6 -5.1 43 -3.1 34.8 -4.3 
Note:’% at risk’ means the percentage of individuals which belong to a social group (see appendix 2.1) with a rate 
of unemployment or atypical employment that is significantly higher than the workforce average. ‘Mean’ denotes 
the average deviation (in percentage points) of the group-specific rates from the average workforce rates (see 
appendix 2.1). Numbers are based on the regime-specific operationalisations and based on EU-SILC 2007, data for 
Australia, Canada and USA is based on country-specific national household panels. 
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Appendix 3 – Table of operationalisation 
 
Variable Operationalisation 
Income 
ISSP WO III 2005; monthly mean income, individuals are attributed the mean 
value of their income group (mostly deciles) in 1000 Euros.  
Promotion chances in 
current job 
ISSP WO III 2005; opportunities for advancement are high; recoded V31; 1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither/nor, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree 
Preferences for active 
labour market policies 
ISSP 2006 RoG IV; government is responsible for providing a job for everyone 
who wants one; recoded V25; 1 = definitely should not be, 2 = probably should 
not be, 3 = probably should be, 4 = definitely should be 
Preferences for passive 
labour market policies 
ISSP 2006 RoG IV; government should spend money on unemployment 
benefits; recoded V23; 1 = spend much less, 2 = spend less, 3 = spend the same 
as now, 4 = spend more, 5 = spend much more 
Outsider (regime and 
country) 
Dummy variable, based on a comparison of group-specific rates of atypical 
employment / unemployment and the regime(country)-specific average rate.  
EU-SILC 2007 
For the USA: American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 
For Canada:!Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) 
For Australia: The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) 
Outsiderness (regime 
and country) 
Continuous variable, difference between group-specific rates of atypical 
employment / unemployment and the regime(country)-specific average rate. 
EU-SILC 2007 
For the USA: American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 
For Canada:!Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) 
For Australia: The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) 
Regimes 
Liberal countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Great Britain, United States 
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden                                    
Continental countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland Southern countries: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain 
(Data for Austria, Belgium, Italy and Greece lacking in Table 3 and Table 4, 
data for the Netherlands lacking in Table 3) 
Classes 
ISCO-2d codes, recoded into CA, MSF, BC, SCP, LSF; see appendix 1 
EU-SILC 2007: pl050  
HILDA (AU): gjbm682 
SLID (CA): nocj2e6, nocg, manag1 
ATUS (USA): peio1ocd, prdtocc1 
Unemployment 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring unemployment  
recoded from EU-SILC: pl030  
HILDA (AU): gesdtl 
SLID (CA): altstat28 
ATUS (USA): pemlr 
Involuntary part-time 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring involuntary part-time work, 
recoded from pl030 (self-classification of respondents) and pl120 (reason for 
part-time work) 
HILDA (AU): gesdtl (self-classification of respondents) and gjbptrea (reason 
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for part-time work) 
SLID (CA): scsum28 (self-classification of respondents) and reawpt1 (reason 
for part-time work) 
ATUS (USA): prwkstat (self-classification of respondents) and pehrwant 
(reason for part-time work) 
Fix-term contract 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring fix-term contract work, recoded 
from pl140 
HILDA (AU): gjbmcnt 
SLID (CA): prnjb1 
ATUS (USA): CPS-Supplement (2005) “Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements" 
Atypical work / 
Unemployment 
EU-SILC 2007, HILDA (AU), SLID (CA), ATUS (USA); 
dummy variable measuring atypical employment (involuntary part-time, fix-
term work, helping family member) and unemployment among all other 
employment status 
Church attendance 
ISSP RoG IV 2006, ISSP WO III 2005; recoded from ATTEND (how often do 
you go to church); 8 = several times a week, 7 = once a week, 6 = 2 or 3 times 
a month, 5 = once amonth, 4 = several times a year, 3 = once a year, 2 = less 
frequently, 1 = never 
Living in a couple 
household 
ISSP RoG IV 2006, ISSP WO III 2005; dummy variable measuring if 
respondent lives in a couple household (MARITAL and COHAB); 1 = living 
in a stable couple (married or not), 0 = divorced, widowed, single, separated 
Education 
ISSP RoG IV 2006, ISSP WO III 2005; dummy variable based on highest 
completed degree (DEGREE), 1 = completed higher secondary education, 0 = 
below higher secondary education 
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Introduction 
The socio-structural foundations of Western welfare state politics have changed profoundly 
over the past few decades: de-industrialization, tertiarization, the feminization of the 
workforce and labor market deregulation have altered structure and distribution of labor 
market vulnerability, as the risks of unemployment and atypical employment are concentrated 
among particular social groups (e.g. Bernardi and Garrido 2008, Ranci 2010, Eichhorst and 
Marx 2012). Against this background, and given the constraints the fiscal crisis places on 
distributive programs, a growing literature asks whether inequalities in risk distribution will 
be reflected in political preferences and – eventually – in political conflict, thereby opposing 
different segments of the working class against each other (e.g. Rehm 2009, 2011, 
Häusermann 2010). Most explicitly, this question has been taken up by the literature on 
dualization and insider-outsider divides, which argues that European labor markets are 
increasingly divided between, on the one hand, workers in relatively secure, stable 
employment and, on the other hand, workers in unstable, flexible or marginal employment 
(Rueda 2005, 2007, Emmenegger et al. 2012). The literature asks if these two types of 
workers differ in their political demands and attitudes. The evidence on individual-level 
preference divides regarding social and labor market policy between insiders and outsiders is 
still contested (see e.g. Rueda 2005, as well as Häusermann and Schwander 2011, who find 
such evidence, whereas Emmenegger 2009 or Barrows 2012 do not), which in large parts may 
be due to the inherent difficulty of clearly delineating the two groups of insiders and outsiders 
analytically and empirically (see Schwander and Häusermann 2012 for a discussion). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of individual level-preference divides based on labor market 
vulnerability is crucial, because the political implications and consequences of institutional 
labor market dualization depend on it: if people’s preferences for social and labor market 
policy are not structured by their employment-situation, then dualization is highly unlikely to 
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ever become a relevant, politically salient conflict line. In other words: if people do not 
identify themselves as, and consequently think like insiders and outsiders, the inequality 
between them will most probably not be mobilized and politicized in the political arena. In 
order to contribute to this analysis of the socio-structural underpinnings of dualization, we 
investigate the relationship between outsiderness – i.e. the extent of labor market 
vulnerability, introduced as a continuous measure – and social policy preferences in this 
article.  
 
We argue that vulnerability is a result of precarious, weak or unstable labor market 
attachment. Therefore, individuals with more vulnerable labor market positions should prefer 
policies that allocate resources based on need (redistribution), rather than those based on 
contribution-payments (social insurance), because discontinuous employment leads to 
incomplete or low contribution records in social insurance schemes. In addition, we expect 
individuals to be more strongly in favor of public job creation the more vulnerable their labor 
market position, i.e. the higher their degree of outsiderness. Conversely, low levels of labor 
market vulnerability are characterized by stable employment, a strong and continuous labor 
market attachment and – consequently – full social insurance contribution records. Hence, we 
expect outsiderness to be negatively related to support for the equivalence principle, i.e. social 
insurance benefits dependent on employment-performance. We also theorize and test how the 
level of human capital interacts with employment risk, arguing that labor market vulnerability 
generates different needs for low- and high-skilled individuals. 
 
We find evidence for the expected effects, which are consistent and robust, though relatively 
small in substantive terms. In order to assess the potential for political mobilization of these 
divides, we then go a step further by testing whether the size of the preference divides 
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depends on the level of institutional labor market dualization (employment protection and 
pay-roll taxes), which corresponds to an oftentimes implicit assumption in the dualization 
literature. We establish the surprising result that the level of institutional labor market 
dualization does not seem to exacerbate divides in insider-outsider preferences. There is no 
empirical link between the ‘objective’ extent of labor market segmentation and the size of the 
preference divides between insiders and outsiders, as measured by labor market vulnerability. 
We use the remainder of this article to, on the one hand, discuss the implications of this 
puzzling finding for the potential politicization of insider-outsider divides and, on the other 
hand, develop and test a possible explanation for it by analyzing the effect of household 
structures on the relationship between labor market vulnerability and social policy 
preferences. 
 
 
Theory 
Labor market vulnerability and social policy preferences 
The exceptional economic growth during the post-war decades allowed for male full 
employment, growing status homogenization and job security regulations, a relatively 
cohesive working class and social peace. Since then, however, advanced industrial societies 
have moved to a post-industrial social and labor market structure. Ever fewer people’s work 
biographies correspond to the industrial blueprint of stable, full time and fully insured insider 
employment, while a growing proportion of the population deviates from the standard model 
and incurs higher labor market risks. Three structural changes drive this development towards 
an increasingly unequal distribution of labor market risks: The tertiarization of the 
employment structure, the educational revolution and the feminization of the workforce 
(Oesch 2006). After 2000, service sector employment outdid industrial employment 
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throughout the OECD by a factor of 2 to 3 (Oesch 2006: 31). Jobs in the service sector differ 
from industrial employment, because they tend to be more polarized (Maarten and Manning 
2007, however see also Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2011) and they involve more atypical, 
non-standard employment (Kroos and Gottschall 2012). The educational revolution – as the 
second structural change of the post-industrial era – has led to a broader and more 
heterogeneous middle class (Kriesi 1998, Oesch 2006) in which atypical employment and 
unemployment increasingly affect middle class workers as well. Finally, the massive entry of 
women into paid labor – itself driven by the educational revolution, changing values and the 
increasing instability of traditional family structures (Esping-Andersen 1999b) – coincides 
with the spread of atypical employment throughout Western Europe’s coordinated market 
economies (Estévez-Abe 2006). Aside from these structural determinants of growing 
inequality in labor market risk, institutional labor market regulations as such (in terms of job 
security regulations and high labor costs) are supposed to having contributed to dualization, 
i.e. the distinction of a secure core workforce and a growing share of atypical, more 
marginally protected jobs (Esping-Andersen 2000, Jessoula et al. 2010, Palier and Thelen 
2010, Eichhorst and Marx 2012). 
 
This increasingly unequal distribution of labor market vulnerability among the workforce has 
been addressed both in the scholarly literature and the public debate in terms of growing 
inequality between insiders and outsiders. Labor market outsiders are more strongly affected 
by the risk of unemployment and atypical employment. Their labor market attachment is 
weaker, more irregular, and they tend to be rather poorly protected by the traditional social 
insurance model (most prevalent in Continental and Southern Europe), i.e. by exactly those 
welfare policies that are in the main interest of insiders with secure jobs. Hence, policies, 
which are in the main interest of one part of the workforce may themselves be harmful to a 
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different part of the workforce, leading to potential divides within the working class. Given 
these distributive policy trade-offs and the unequal distribution of labor market risks, we 
expect labor market vulnerability to affect preferences for social policies. We share this 
hypothesis with several contributions to the dualization literature, which have tried to 
establish whether insiders and outsiders differ in their policy preferences. The evidence on 
this matter, however, is still inconclusive: While some contributions find robust preference 
divides regarding social policy and/or labor market policies (Rueda 2005, 2007, Häusermann 
and Schwander 2011), others do not (Emmenegger 2009, Barrows 2012). We differ from 
these earlier analyses in three points: first, we conceptualize labor market vulnerability not as 
a dichotomous variable of insiders and outsiders, as these two groups are hard to distinguish 
and probably too heterogeneous among themselves (Davidsson and Naczyk 2011, Schwander 
and Häusermann 2012), but rather as a continuous measure of labor market risks, i.e. labor 
market vulnerability (similar to Rehm 2011, who, however, focuses exclusively on the risk of 
unemployment). This allows us to distinguish different degrees of ‘outsiderness’, which is 
more appropriate in dealing with the large variance of insider- and outsider-employment. 
Second, we introduce new dependent variables: we test the impact of outsiderness on very 
specific social policy instruments (not spending levels generally), which imply different 
distributional consequences depending on the degree of outsiderness. And third, we introduce 
human capital as a factor that affects the extent to which an individual’s outsiderness shapes 
his or her policy preferences, since we argue that high- and low-skilled individuals have 
different resources at their disposal when dealing with similar levels of vulnerability. 
 
Why would we expect labor market vulnerability to affect social policy preferences? Our key 
argument lies in the different distributive implications of specific social policy schemes. 
Employment-based social insurance policies that distribute social rights and benefits in 
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proportion to contributions match the interests of insiders with stable and secure employment. 
On the other hand, individuals exposed to high labor market vulnerability, with a 
consequently weaker labor market attachment benefit more strongly from social benefits 
distributed on the basis of need, i.e. from redistribution. Consequently, social insurance 
policies benefit insiders who have full contribution records, while outsiders need 
compensation for a more tenuous and discontinuous labor market attachment in the form of 
redistributive policies. Additionally, insiders favor contribution-based systems, because they 
feel they have ‘earned’ their social rights (Palier 2002). 
Responding to the specific needs of labor market outsiders, an alternative to needs-based 
redistribution is social investment (Lister 2004, Palier 2006b, Morel et al. 2011). Social 
investment policies are activation policies aimed at increasing employment opportunities by 
investing in the employability of individuals, rather than compensating for income loss. 
Policies focusing on education, training, child care facilities and the creation of jobs are at the 
center of this approach. We expect individuals with high degrees of outsiderness to be more 
supportive of these policies than insiders, because unstable or limited access to the labor 
market is a key trait of their vulnerability.  
In sum, we expect a positive relationship between an individual’s labor market vulnerability 
and her or his support for income redistribution and social investment policies. At the same 
time, we expect a negative relationship between an individual’s labor market vulnerability 
and her or his support for social insurance policies. 
 
While we expect these relationships between labor market vulnerability and policy 
preferences to hold across the entire workforce, we also argue that labor market vulnerability 
interacts with levels of human capital. Indeed, in a post-industrial society, labor market 
vulnerability and levels of education are not necessarily colinear, as the risk of unemployment 
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and atypical employment is also widespread among certain parts of the more highly educated 
workforce, such as young labor market entrants or women re-entering the labor market after 
periods of child rearing. Hence, labor market vulnerability, i.e. outsiderness, affects both low-
and high-skilled individuals (Schwander and Häusermann 2012, Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, 
Polavieja 2005). We would expect high- and low-skilled individuals with the same level of 
outsiderness to differ nonetheless, since their specific welfare needs are not the same as we 
will explain below. We therefore hypothesize an interaction effect between outsiderness and 
human capital to explain individual support for redistribution, social insurance or social 
investment. 
Individuals with high levels of human capital have the cognitive resources and the marketable 
skills to earn their income through the market as long as they have the employment 
opportunities to put their human capital to use. Hence, we expect high-skilled outsiders to 
have particularly strong preferences for activation, i.e. for policies that enable them to 
participate in the labor market, whereas low-skilled outsiders should favor more strongly a 
redistribution of income through social transfer payments. An example may illustrate this 
idea: imagine a young university graduate who just cannot find a job, and an unemployed 
low-skilled super market cashier. Both are exposed to high levels of labor market risks. We 
assume that the former wants to put her education to use in the labor market, while the latter 
is concerned about covering his daily expenses with income from any source, be it a job or the 
state. Hence, high-skilled individuals with high labor market vulnerability should prefer an 
enabling welfare state, whereas low-skilled individuals with high labor market vulnerability 
are in need for a correcting welfare state. We expect the effect of labor market vulnerability 
on preferences for income redistribution to be stronger among low-skilled individuals than 
among high-skilled individuals. By contrast, we expect the effect of labor market 
vulnerability on preferences for activation to increase with increasing levels of human capital.  
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We predict a similar interaction effect regarding preferences for social insurance. The higher 
the earning potential of an individual based on his or her human capital, the higher the 
contribution he or she pays to the social insurance system and the more he or she benefits 
from insurance. Furthermore, the stakes of high-skilled individuals for social insurance are 
higher than the stakes of lower skilled individuals because they have more to lose in case of 
unemployment (Moene and Wallerstein 2003). Consequently, we expect the effect of labor 
market vulnerability on social insurance preferences to increase with increasing levels of 
human capital. 
 
 
Empirical analysis 
The goal of the empirical analysis is twofold: First, we want to analyze whether labor market 
vulnerability has the expected impact on individual-level preferences for social policies. The 
analysis of specific social policy preferences is based on data from the European Social 
Survey, round 4 (2008), which includes 13 countries.14 Second, we examine differences in the 
extent of insider-outsider divides in a cross-national analysis.  
 
Data and operationalization 
We operationalize social policy preferences with three questions from the European Social 
Survey 2008. Preferences for redistribution are measured by means of a question asking 
respondents whether they think that the government should reduce income differences. For 
preferences for a social investment state, we use a variable asking respondents about their 
approval that it is the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone. Finally, 
                                                
14 Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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preferences for the equivalence principle of social insurance are measured with a variable 
asking respondents whether they think that individuals who have contributed more to the 
pension system should be entitled to higher benefits (as opposed to individuals in greater need 
being entitled to higher benefits). To our knowledge, this is one of the only comparatively 
available survey questions capturing the difference between a needs-based and an 
employment-based welfare state. Each variable is recoded, so that higher values reflect higher 
preferences for the specific social policy. Table 1 shows the precise wording of the questions. 
 
Table 1: Operationalization of dependent variables 
Needs-based welfare 
state 
Redistribution 
ESS 4 gincdif: Government should reduce differences in income 
levels 
Social Investment state Job creation 
ESS 4 gvjbevn: How much responsibility the government should 
have to ensure a job for everyone who wants one? 
Employment-based 
welfare state 
Social insurance 
ESS 4 earnpen: Some people say that higher earners should get 
larger old age pensions because they have paid in more, whilst other 
think that lower earners should get larger old age pensions because 
they are in greater need. Please tell me which of the following three 
statements you agree with most?    
1. Higher earners should get larger old age pensions than lower 
earners. 
2. High and low earners should get the same amount of old age 
pensions. 
3. Lower earners should get a larger old age pension than higher 
earners. 
 
 
Labor market vulnerability – i.e. the degree of outsiderness – is our main independent 
variable. We conceptualize vulnerability as the risk of being unemployed or/and in atypical 
employment (involuntary part-time, temporary employment or helping family member). For 
an individual, we determine this risk on the basis of the frequency of unemployment and 
atypical employment within his or her occupational class (for an extensive discussion of this 
measure, see Schwander and Häusermann 2012). Similarly to Rehm’s work on 
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unemployment risk (2011), we rely on occupational classes for the measurement of risk, 
because the probability of experiencing unemployment or atypical employment is highly 
unequally distributed among different occupational classes. Hence, we use the class schema 
by Oesch (2006) in the collapsed version of Kitschelt and Rehm (2005). They distinguish five 
occupational classes: Capital accumulators (i.e. high-skilled managers, self-employed and 
experts), socio-cultural professionals (i.e. high-skilled professionals in the public and private 
service sector), blue-collar workers (i.e. unskilled and skilled workers mostly in the industry), 
low service functionaries (i.e. unskilled and skilled employees in interpersonal services), and 
mixed service functionaries (i.e. routine and skilled clerks).15 We further distinguish those 
five classes according to gender and age, two additional variables that account for much of the 
variance in the distribution of unemployment and atypical employment within the workforce 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999, Taylor-Gooby 1991, Oesch 2006, Chauvel 2009). The 
combination of 5 classes, 2 sexes and 2 age groups (below/above 40) leaves us with 20 
occupational groups, which are the basis of our measurement. We compute the rates of 
unemployment, involuntary part-time or temporary employment16 from data of the EU-SILC 
household panel 2007 for each occupational group and the average workforce in every 
country. We then subtract the average rate of the national workforce from the group-specific 
rates in order to obtain the group-specific deviations (over- or underrepresentation) in 
unemployment, involuntary part-time and temporary employment. The average of these three 
standardized deviations indicates the value of labor market vulnerability, i.e. the ‘degree of 
outsiderness’. Occupational groups with a lower labor market vulnerability than the entire 
workforce have negative values of outsiderness, while groups with an over-proportional labor 
                                                
15 Appendix 1 shows the location of these five classes in the class schema. 
16 Due to their low proportion (1.2 percent of respondents), we refrained to construct a separated category for 
’helping family members’ and added them to the category of temporary employment.  
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market vulnerability have positive values of outsiderness. We then attribute the value of his or 
her occupational group to each respondent of the ESS 2008.17  
The distribution of labor market vulnerability is – as expected – highly unequal. Women, 
workers below the age of 40 and the low-skilled are the most vulnerable groups in the labor 
market across all countries. More specifically, young female low-skilled service sector 
workers and elderly female blue-collar workers are the most vulnerable groups, while male 
medium- and high-skilled managers and technicians enjoy the most secure positions. We also 
find that 48.7 percent of the entire workforce face a significantly higher labor market 
vulnerability than the average workforce, varying from 25.8 percent in the Nordic to 62.7 
percent in the Continental countries (for more details on this operationalization of 
outsiderness, see Schwander and Häusermann 2012). 
 
Education is measured as the highest completed degree (in five levels from primary education 
to tertiary education). We include household income as a control, measured as deciles in the 
national income distribution, and a dichotomous variable measuring whether a person lives in 
a couple household. We also control for union membership and church attendance, which 
might affect social policy preferences (see, for example, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, De la O 
and Rodden 2008, Rehm 2009, 2011). To control for country-specific differences in the level 
of approval towards social policies, we include country dummies. The precise 
operationalization of all variables is explained in appendix 2. 
 
                                                
17 We do not calculate the values of outsiderness directly in the ESS for one main reason: the number of cases. 
The number of respondents (3500-8500 respondents for each country) in the EU-SILC household panel is 
unrivalled by any comparative survey. It thus allows a precise measurement of labor market vulnerability across 
countries even for those groups which are naturally small (such as old female blue-collar workers, for example) 
which is even more important since we rely on labor market conditions (unemployment, atypical employment) 
that may affect very small portions of the workforce only.  
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The effect of labor market vulnerability on individual social policy preferences 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of social policy preferences on the basis of 
ordered logit regressions (Table 2). For each dependent variable, we specify two models: The 
first one tests the linear impact of labor market vulnerability (outsiderness) on the preferences 
for the specific social policy. The second model interacts outsiderness and education to test 
whether the effect of outsiderness varies at different levels of education.  
 
Table 2: Determinants of social policy preferences: Coefficients from ordered logit regressions 
 Redistribution Job Creation Social Insurance  
      M1      M2      M3      M4      M5    M6 
Outsiderness 0.187*** 0.039 0.214*** 0.030 -0.165*** 0.014 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Education -0.088*** -0.085*** -0.092*** -0.088*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Outsiderness x Education 
 
 0.051  0.063***  -0.062*** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Female -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.079*** -0.078*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Age 0.016 0.008 0.028 0.018 0.112* 0.120* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Income 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Union membership 
 
0.384*** 0.384*** 0.223*** 0.223*** -0.127*** -0.126*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Church attendance 
 
-0.071*** -0.071*** -0.036 -0.035 0.038 0.038 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Living in a couple 
household 
0.119** 0.117** 0.046 0.043 -0.026 -0.025 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Country fixed effects   yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.049 0.025 0.025 0.094 0.095 
N 19269 19269 19265 19265 18726 18726 
Notes: Values are in parentheses are standard errors; ordered logistic regression with clustered standard errors 
and country dummies; data is weighted; country dummies and cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; 
Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** 
= significant at the 0.01 level. Data source: ESS 4 2008. 
 
We first discuss the linear effects only. Models 1, 3 and 5 show that outsiderness is clearly 
linked to higher support for redistribution and job creation, but to lower support for the 
equivalence principle of social insurance. This is exactly what our hypotheses predicted, as it 
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shows that labor market vulnerability shapes the social policy demand of individuals in ways 
consistent with the insider-outsider literature. To estimate the substantive effects of labor 
market vulnerability, we compute predicted probabilities for an average individual with the 
highest and lowest degree of outsiderness, holding all other variables at their median.18 
An average individual with the highest degree of outsiderness is about 11 percentage points 
more likely to agree strongly that the government should be responsible to reduce income 
differences than the same individual with the lowest degree of outsiderness. In terms of 
preferences for social investment, the average individual with the highest degree of 
outsiderness is even 21 percentage points more likely to strongly support public job creation 
(‘strongly’ meaning a score of 7 or more on a scale from 0 to 10) than the same individual 
with the lowest degree of labor market vulnerability. Finally, the difference regarding social 
insurance preferences (i.e. the probability to agree that individuals who have contributed more 
to the pension system should also receive higher benefits) is 15.5 percentage points between 
average individuals with the highest and lowest degrees of outsiderness. These results 
correspond to our expectations that outsiders prefer a welfare state, which is based on 
activation and need, rather than on the equivalence principle.  
 
In terms of control variables, education has a consistent effect in all linear models: high-
skilled individuals want less redistribution of income and are less supportive of job creation 
than individuals with lower skill levels (models 1 and 3). By contrast, the higher educated an 
individual, the more likely she or he is to agree that old age pensions should be proportional 
to previous contributions (model 5). Given the generally firmer attachment of high-skilled 
individuals in the labor market and the higher gains from social insurance, this makes sense. 
Gender and age seem to have no direct effect on preferences for redistribution and job 
                                                
18 The average individual is a 47 years old, not religious women with a upper secondary degree, who lives alone, 
is not a union member, has a household income within the 6th earning-decile and lives in Norway.  
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creation, but women are more likely to favor social insurance. It is also important to note that 
in addition to labor market risk, the vertical stratification in terms of income still structures 
welfare preferences strongly: income has the expected negative effect on preferences for 
redistribution and job creation and the expected positive effect on preferences for social 
insurance. Considering the higher stakes of high-income earners in social insurance and 
redistribution of income, this stands to reason. Union members are more likely to support 
income redistribution and job creation but less likely to favor social insurance while church 
attendance reduces the support for redistribution but has no impact on the other social policy 
preferences. Finally, we note that individuals living in a couple household are more likely to 
be supportive of income redistribution than individuals living alone. 
 
Let us now turn to the discussion of the interaction effects in Table 2. We find evidence for 
interaction effects for two of our three interaction models: As expected, the effect of labor 
market vulnerability (outsiderness) on preferences for job creation (model 4) and social 
insurance (model 6) increases with levels of education, which is consistent with our 
theoretical expectations. However, the effect of labor market vulnerability on preferences for 
income redistribution is independent from the level of education over the entire sample 
(model 2). Here, we rather expected a negative effect, since we assumed that redistribution 
would be more salient for low-skilled outsiders than for high-skilled. Figures 1 to 3 visualize 
the interaction effects, by showing the marginal effect of outsiderness on preferences for 
specific social policy at different levels of education. 
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of outsiderness on preferences for redistribution at varying levels of 
education 
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of outsiderness on preferences for redistribution at varying levels of 
education. We see that the effect of outsiderness on redistribution preferences is positive and 
significant, but only for respondents with an upper secondary degree or higher (which 
represents a majority of respondents, about 65 percent). Below that level, labor market 
vulnerability has no impact on preferences for income redistribution. An explanation for this 
finding might be that individuals with low levels of education find it hard to earn a sufficient 
income through the market even if they have a stable job. Hence, even low-skilled insiders 
might be in favor of redistribution. This explanation is supported by the fact that the level of 
support for redistribution is particularly high among all low-skilled: the probability for a low-
skilled individual with the highest level of outsiderness to strongly agree that the government 
should reduce income differences is 28.0 percent, while the same probability of a low-skilled 
individual with the lowest level of outsiderness is 15.6 percent.19 By contrast, the level of 
                                                
19 All other variables being held at their median. 
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support is generally lower among the high-skilled, with a significant difference within the 
high-skilled based on their level of outsiderness: a high-skilled outsider has a likelihood of 
21.5 percent to strongly support income redistribution by the government, while the same 
probability is 11.5 percent for a high-skilled individual experiencing the lowest level of 
outsiderness. 
 
  
Figure 2: Marginal effect of outsiderness on preferences for social investment at varying 
levels of education 
 
Figure 2 shows the effect of outsiderness on preferences for social investment at varying 
levels of education. We hypothesized that the effect should be stronger among high-skilled 
than among low-skilled individuals, because the high-skilled outsiders should have 
particularly strong incentives to favor jobs over transfers: what they want is not welfare, but 
jobs. The hypothesis is fully confirmed by the data: the higher the education level, the 
stronger is the effect of outsiderness on preferences for social investment. Only for those 
individuals with secondary education or less (36 percent of our sample), labor market 
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vulnerability does not make a difference in their social investment preferences. Our 
theoretical explanation of this finding is corroborated when we look at predicted probabilities: 
high-skilled outsiders have a stronger preference for public job creation than high-skilled 
insiders. The predicted probability for a high-skilled individual with the highest degree of 
outsiderness to strongly agree to job creation is 61 percent, while the same individual with the 
lowest level of labor market vulnerability has only a chance of 36.7 percent to support public 
job creation. We interpret this findings as reflecting the fact that high-skilled outsiders’ 
primary concern is to make use of their skills and they thus favor the creation of jobs that 
enables them to do so. 
 
 
Figure 3: Marginal effect of outsiderness on preferences for social insurance at varying 
levels of education 
 
With regard to social insurance, we expected preferences for social insurance to be 
particularly strong among high-skilled insiders, because for higher skilled individuals with 
higher earning potentials more is at stake. We therefore expect the insider-outsider divide to 
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widen with levels of education. Model 6 in Table 2 indicates that the preference divide does 
indeed become deeper with higher levels of education. Figure 3 confirms this graphically. 
These result are supportive of our theoretical reasoning: social insurance is rather unattractive 
for the very low-skilled, because of their inherently low contributions regardless of their labor 
market vulnerability. The higher the human capital, however, the more is at stake: high-
skilled insiders with their complete contribution records advocate the equivalence principle 
more strongly than high-skilled outsiders with their weak contribution records. Accordingly, a 
high-skilled individual with the lowest degree of outsiderness has a likelihood of 51.4 percent 
to agree that individuals with higher contribution records should receive larger old age 
pensions benefits. For the same individual with the highest labor market vulnerability, the 
probability is 16 percentage points lower. 
  
The empirical findings so far confirm that socio-structural labor market vulnerability has a 
significant and substantive impact on people’s preferences for specific social policies. This 
looks like clear evidence that insider-outsider politics may become a relevant conflict line in 
West European welfare politics. However, as soon as we start making arguments about 
politics and the mobilization of conflict, we analytically move to the country-level, since 
political mobilization and interest representation take place at country level. Hence, in order 
to make a statement about the structural prerequisites for a politicized insider-outsider divide, 
we need to look more closely at the structuration of this divide at the national level. 
 
 
The effect of risk structure on the size of insider-outsider preference divides  
It is an oftentimes implicit assumption in the literature that the divide in social policy 
preferences between insiders and outsiders should be strongest where the institutional 
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barriers generating labor market vulnerability are highest. From a rational-choice perspective, 
this makes perfect sense: we would expect insider-outsider politics to surge in the most 
dualized countries, because this is where insiders and outsiders are most clearly affected by 
their differential labor market status. In the labor market economics literature, this 
relationship is implicitly assumed on the basis of employment protection. Authors such as 
Saint-Paul (2002) or Lindbeck and Snower (2001) conceptualize insiders based on their 
institutionally secured labor market position. Hence, where the institutional level of 
employment protection is highest, you would expect the deepest divide between insiders and 
outsiders. In the political science oriented contributions from welfare state research and 
comparative political economy, however, this institutional definition of dualized labor 
markets is generally more implicit and somewhat broader. Most contributions tend to link 
institutional dualization to welfare regimes, which are characterized by a broader range of 
institutional characteristics than pure employment protection legislation. Rather, an 
institutionally complementary and interdependent set of institutions favoring insiders’ social 
and political rights must be taken into account here, which includes not only employment 
protection, but also a contribution-based social insurance welfare state and sectoral 
corporatism. And given that these characteristics cluster in Continental and Southern 
European countries (Esping-Andersen 1990), most authors expect insider-outsider divides to 
be most salient in these regimes. Each of them, however, emphasizes specific mechanisms 
that link institutions to insider-outsider politics, which is why we review them briefly in the 
following.  
 
One of the earliest and most encompassing accounts of the genesis of institutional dualization 
in Continental and Southern Europe is still Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999a). Job security for 
the core workers has increased through corporatist bargaining, in which trade unions traded 
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productivity and wage moderation against security, with the unintended consequence of 
raising high barriers of entry to the labor market for outsiders. Furthermore, labor market 
participation among women was traditionally low in Continental and Southern Europe due to 
the predominance of the conservative and Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity, the corresponding 
low provision of family services and the small public sector providing only few employment 
opportunities for women. Because incentives and opportunities for women to take up 
employment were spare, trade unions negotiated for the male breadwinner wages to be high 
enough to support an entire family, which in turn caused labor costs to rise (Esping-Andersen 
1990), not least through steadily increasing pay-roll taxes to the social insurance systems of 
Continental and Southern Europe. As a consequence, (Esping-Andersen 1999b) expected 
divides between the ‘A- and B-team of the post-industrial society’ to be most ardent in these 
countries.  
 
Similarly, Palier and Thelen (2010) as well as Iversen and Stephens (2008) explain the 
development of insider-outsider divides in Continental Europe in political terms. Palier and 
Thelen see insider-outsider politics as an indirect and largely unintended consequence of 
corporatist strategies to save the industrial production through the protection of the core 
workforce in the face of increased pressure for international competitiveness. From this 
origin, they argue, dualization has spilled over to social protection, resulting in an ever 
sharper distinction between social insurance for the insiders and social assistance for 
outsiders. Iversen and Stephens (2008: 611f), by contrast, concur with locating dualization in 
Continental and Southern Europe, but their argument is based on electoral politics. They 
argue that the heterogeneous Christian democratic coalition has always been unable to agree 
on redistribution, which steered these countries towards social insurance welfare states with 
high pay-roll taxes, generating insider-outsider divides. In the Nordic countries, by contrast, 
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the Left was able to mobilize enough cross-class support for universalism and tax-financed 
redistribution, which prevented institutional dualization to a large extent (Iversen and 
Stephens 2008: 630). Even though emphasizing different sources, both contributions expect 
insider-outsider divides to be deepest in Continental and Southern Europe, because high 
levels of employment protection and pay-roll taxes disadvantage outsiders. This hypothesis is 
echoed in Häusermann and Schwander (2012b), who find the strongest differences in 
economic and social rights between insiders and outsiders in Continental and Southern 
Europe (though not looking at micro-level preferences). It is also echoed in Barrow’s (2012: 
7)  study, in which he argues that the insider-outsider divide is less pronounced in the Nordic 
countries than in Continental and Southern European countries due to universalistic policies 
of Nordic welfare states.  
 
While the above contributions largely equalize the structural preconditions of Continental and 
Southern Europe, a range of studies have more specifically focused on the ‘Southern rim’. If 
Continental welfare states are social insurance states, the welfare states of Southern Europe 
are ‘hyper social insurance states’. From the very start of their development, their social 
insurance schemes privileged old age risks, with core workers being entitled to generous 
pension benefits (Ferrera 1996, Jessoula and Alti 2010). By contrast, unemployment 
insurance has remained underdeveloped, which is why strict employment protection has 
developed as a functional equivalent to unemployment insurance. Most importantly, labor 
markets in Southern Europe never achieved full employment but have always suffered from 
high levels of segmentation, i.e. strong employment protection for the core workers, resulting 
in an unparalleled polarization between the ‘regular’ at the one hand and the ‘irregular’ and 
‘underground’ workers at the other hand (Ferrera 2005: 5). Confronted with demands for a 
more flexible workforce, labor market flexibility has been achieved through ‘flexibility at the 
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margins’ or ‘selective flexibilization’ (Regini 2000) at the expense of the young generation. 
Despite some reforms in the 1990s aimed at reducing the overdeveloped pension schemes and 
to extend social and family benefits, segmentation and economic exclusion persist (Trifiletti 
1999, Ferrera 2005, 2007, Jessoula 2012). Hence, if we expect institutional dualization to be 
the reason for insider-outsider divides in social policy preferences in Continental Europe, this 
should hold all the more true for Southern Europe. 
 
In order to be able to test the relationship between dualization and insider-outsider preference 
divides, we need a measure of the institutional barriers between insiders and outsiders. Rather 
than relying on regimes, as most of the abovementioned studies do, we draw on these works 
and argue that their smallest common denominator is a consensus according to which strict 
employment protection and high pay-roll taxes constitute such barriers.  
Figure 4 thus plots the OECD-index of employment protection legislation as well as non-
wage labor costs as a percentage of the average wage as indicators for dualization. As 
expected, we clearly see that dualization is most pronounced in Continental and Southern 
Europe.  
Chapter 2 
 73 
 
Note: Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) measures the procedures and costs involved in 
dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-
term or temporary work agency contracts. 
Labor costs indicate taxes on payrolls, employment or reduction to reflect subsidies. 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 
 
Figure 4: Institutional dualization: employment protection legislation and non-wage labor 
costs  
 
Figure 4 shows a clear positive relationship between the two indicators of labor market 
dualization. With few – explainable – exceptions, the countries cluster into four groups, which 
correspond largely to the abovementioned regimes. The first group of Continental countries is 
characterized by strict employment protection legislation and high labor costs (Belgium, 
Germany and France). The second group, including the Southern European countries and 
Norway, exhibits also a strong degree of dualization but places greater emphasis on 
employment protection. The Nordic countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as the 
Netherlands can be classified as ‘semi-dualized’ due to their intermediate levels of 
employment protection and non-wage labor costs. Considering that the Netherlands is one of 
the prime examples of ‘flexicurity’ (Visser and Hemerijck 1997, van Oorschot 2004, Bonoli 
and Bertozzi 2009, Anderson 2012), its position in the intermediate group – instead of the 
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Continental group – does not surprise. The least dualized countries, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom, are known for their liberal labor market regulations with low employment 
protection and low labor costs.20  
 
Based on these theoretical arguments and empirical patterns, one would expect the divide in 
social policy preferences to be strongest in Continental and Southern Europe. For this 
empirical analysis, our measure of institutional dualization is an additive index of the 
employment protection legislation score (normalized from 0 to 100) and the percentage of 
labor costs at the average wage. Our measure of the size of insider-outsider divide in social 
policy preferences relies on predicted probabilities that we derive from the linear models 
specified in Table 2 above, but this time at the country-level: for each item of the dependent 
variable (i.e. the respective policy preference), we compare the predicted agreement 
probabilities of individuals with minimum and maximum values of outsiderness and we 
compute an average of this distance, holding all other variables at their median. Given that we 
have three dependent variables, we calculate three insider-outsider divides for each country. 
Figures 5 to 7 show the bivariate relationships between the extent of institutional dualization 
on the x-axis and the average insider-outsider divide on the y-axis. 
 
                                                 
20 Despite generous levels of unemployment benefits, Switzerland for historical reasons (Armingeon 2001) has a 
liberal labor market with low employment protection, low social contributions, weak unions and a high degree of 
flexibility (Häusermann and Schwander 2012a). 
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Figure 5: Extent of dualization and divide in preferences for redistribution 
 
 
Figure 6: Extent of dualization and divide in preferences for social investment  
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Figure 7: Extent of dualization and divide in preferences for social insurance  
 
The main insight we gain from all three figures is an intriguing non-finding, which raises 
questions on the implicit assumptions much of the above referenced literature relies on: 
contrary to all expectations, there is no positive relationship between the extent of institutional 
dualization and the extent to which insiders and outsiders differ in their social policy 
demands. Figure 5 relates to the divide in redistribution preferences: even though three 
Continental countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands) seem to be among the countries 
with the deepest divide, there is not much evidence for a linear relationship: the Southern 
countries show only weak to medium insider-outsider divides in redistribution preferences 
and we have countries that entirely defy the expected link (Switzerland and Belgium, most 
notably). Regarding social investment (Figure 6), the disconfirming evidence is even clearer: 
The Continental and Southern countries (except the Netherlands) are on the lower end of a 
preference divide. Even though outsiders are clearly more strongly disadvantaged in these 
countries than in the Liberal and Nordic ones, this does not seem to be reflected in more 
diverging preferences of insiders and outsiders for public job creation. Regarding social 
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insurance preferences, Figure 7 again disconfirms a linear relationship between dualization 
and insider-outsider divides. Belgium, Greece, and Germany display weak preference divides 
despite high levels of institutional dualization.21 
It appears clearly that – at odds with both theory and intuition – the divide in social policy 
preferences is not as closely related to the extent of institutional dualization as one would 
have expected based on our initial findings, which established that labor market vulnerability 
clearly impacts on social policy preferences. The main question here clearly is how we can 
explain that insider-outsider divides are so weak in Continental and Southern Europe? In the 
remainder of the article, we develop and test a possible explanation based on the effect of the 
socio-structural risk distribution and household patterns on social policy preferences. 
 
We argue that the size of the preference divide might depend on the role of the household in a 
society, i.e. on the extent to which the effect of labor market vulnerability on an individual’s 
socio-economic situation is affected by his or her household situation. In other words, we 
think that certain welfare systems imply stronger advantages for dependent family members, 
be they spouses or children, than others. Consequently, we contend that for outsiders in 
                                                
21 As a robustness test, we compared the results with alternatives measures for the insider-outsider preference 
divides. As a first alternative measure of the size of the divides, we use the average change of the predicted 
probability across all items of the dependent variable as the outsiderness value of an individual changes from 1/2 
standard deviation below the mean to 1/2 standard deviation above the mean, holding all other variables at their 
median. This measure controls for the possibility that the divides might only be due to preferences of individuals 
with extreme values of labor market vulnerability. However, the correlations with the measure based on the 
average change from minimum to maximum values of outsiderness are very high (r = 0.95 for the size of the 
divide in preferences for redistribution, r = 0.98 for the size of the divide in preferences for job creation, r = 0.99 
for the size of the divide in preferences for social insurance). Also, the non-relationship between divides and 
extent of dualization remains the same.  
As another alternative measure, we use the difference of the predicted probabilities to agree to the specific social 
policy between an individual with the maximum and minimum values of outsiderness (strongly agree for 
redistribution preferences, 7-10 on the 11 point scale for job creation, agreement that higher contribution payer 
should receive larger old age pensions for social insurance preferences) instead of the average change across all 
items of the dependent variable. Again, the results do not change: The correlations between the measures are 
high (r = 0.84 for the size of the divide in preferences for redistribution, r = 0.89 for the size of the divide in 
preferences for job creation, r = 0.97 for the size of the divide in preferences for social insurance) and the 
relationship between the extent of dualization and the size of the divides remain largely unchanged. The only 
exceptions are the Netherlands and Denmark, where the relationship between the divide in preferences for 
redistribution and the extent of dualization becomes even slightly less strong. 
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Continental and Southern Europe, household composition matters more than for outsiders in 
the Nordic and liberal countries for two reasons: first, labor market vulnerability is distributed 
differently in Continental and Southern countries than in Nordic and Liberal ones. In 
Continental and Southern countries, labor market vulnerability is concentrated among 
dependent family members (young adults or wives, see Schwander and Häusermann 2012). 
Hence, preferences are equalized if outsiders live with insiders, because the social insurance 
welfare state treats the family as the unit of welfare to be covered. A female outsider in 
Continental Europe gains social rights as dependent family member and “at the end of the 
day, the income of both spouses adds to a household income” (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008: 
13). For the same reason, Barrows (2012: 21) expects even outsiders to benefit from insider-
policies in Continental Europe, which explains why social preferences of outsiders that are 
married to an insider resemble those of insiders. In Southern Europe, where the family acts as 
a solidarity net (Ferrera 2005: 7) and labor market vulnerability is predominant among young 
adults, outsiders form their preferences on the basis of the household position as well, and not 
on the basis of their own labor market position only. Moreover, outsiders in Southern Europe 
might hope to become insiders like their parents and benefit from employment protection and 
social insurance. Age is a variable factor and young outsiders might hope to ‘grow out’ of 
their labor market risks. In the Nordic welfare states, by contrast, being married to an insider 
does not affect your social rights vis-à-vis the state, because welfare states are individualistic 
and universalistic. This is why individual differences in labor market vulnerability, even 
though the labor market is overall more flexible, show up more strongly when looking at 
individual preferences. Finally, in the Liberal regime, where labor market risks are structured 
by skill levels (Schwander and Häusermann 2012), marriage and household formation does 
not change outsiders’ fate as strongly, either. As Barrows (2012: 19) shows, 77 percent of 
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individuals in the USA and Britain are married to a partner in the same or adjacent class of the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme.22 
We examine these theoretical mechanisms by testing an interaction effect between the 
respondent’s outsiderness and the outsiderness of the partner. We hypothesize that the labor 
market vulnerability of the partner should increase the effect of outsiderness in Continental 
Europe on preferences for social policies but not in the other regimes.  
 
The results of the interaction between the outsiderness value of the respondent and the 
outsiderness value of his or her partner for each regime are shown in Table 3.23 Models 1 – 4 
present the results for preferences for redistribution, models 5 – 8 refer to preferences for 
social investment and models 9 – 12 refer to preferences for social insurance. The analyses 
include the same control variables as before and they control for country effects.
                                                
22 Data from the ISSP Role of Government, 2006. 
23 We have also computed the linear models, in order to estimate the direct effects at the level of regimes (rather 
than pooled). The direct effects are robust as compared to the pooled analysis in Table 2. 
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Table 3: Effect of household composition on social policy preferences: Coefficients from ordered logit regressions 
 Redistribution  Job Creation   Insurance   
 Liberal Nordic Continental Southern Liberal Nordic Continental Southern Liberal Nordic Continental Southern 
     M1    M2   M3   M4   M5   M6   M7  M8   M9   M10   M11   M12 
Outsiderness 0.741*** 0.779*** 0.220* 0.109 0.542** 0.372*** 0.230*** 0.109 0.075 -0.587*** -0.137*** 0.115    
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.34) (0.18) (0.03) (0.13)    
Outsiderness of  0.255 0.377** 0.108* -0.079 0.380 0.136 0.059 0.166 0.272 -0.284* -0.013 0.108    
partner (0.27) (0.18) (0.06) (0.14) (0.27) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13) (0.29) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16)    
Outsiderness x 
Outsiderness of partner 
0.146 0.302 0.185*** -0.032 -0.178 0.180 0.147*** 0.125 -0.710 -0.028 0.109 0.364*** 
(0.49) (0.26) (0.03) (0.13) (0.51) (0.21) (0.03) (0.12) (0.56) (0.25) (0.07) (0.14)    
Education 
 
-0.076 -0.101*** -0.114** 0.046 0.012 -0.058 -0.112*** -0.134** 0.083 0.156*** 0.113* 0.172**  
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)    
Female -0.062 0.229** 0.008 0.008 0.151 0.383*** 0.155 0.175 0.202 -0.136 0.030 0.077    
 (0.25) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23) (0.20) (0.30) (0.12) (0.15) (0.25)    
Age -0.001 0.026*** 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.008* -0.002 0.007 -0.021** -0.007** -0.005 0.006    
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income -0.112*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.120*** -0.064* -0.075*** -0.113*** -0.006 0.080* 0.110*** 0.177*** 0.009    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)    
Union membership 0.459** 0.501*** 0.309*** -0.077 0.434*** 0.165 0.300*** 0.120 -0.192 -0.100 -0.232* 0.188    
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14) (0.06) (0.20) (0.18) (0.08) (0.12) (0.25)    
Church attendance 0.021 -0.098*** -0.114*** -0.028 -0.036 0.051*** -0.087* -0.054 0.110 -0.033 0.080** -0.111**  
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)    
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.059 0.051 0.029 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.020 0.080 0.086 0.051 
N   684  3060  3141 1216  687  3062  3146 1212  677  3010  3080 1158 
Notes: Values are in parentheses are standard errors; Ordered logistic regression with clustered standard errors and country dummies, data is weighted; country dummies and cut-points 
are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level. For 
the classification of regimes, see appendix 2. Data source: ESS 4 2008. 
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The most important finding in Table 3 is that we find significant and positive interaction 
effects regarding preferences for income redistribution and social investment in Continental 
Europe (Model 3 and 7), but not in the other regimes. The effect of respondents’ labor 
market vulnerability on preferences is increased by the partners’ labor market vulnerability. 
Conversely, this means that the effect is lowered if the partner is in a less vulnerable 
situation. As argued by Barrows (2012), Continental welfare states aim at maximizing not 
only the individual welfare, but the welfare of the spouse. Therefore, the partner’s labor 
market situation matters more for preferences than in the other regimes.  
Regarding social insurance, the results do not correspond to our expectations. Model 11 
indicates a positive but not significant interaction effect for the Continental regime while 
the interaction effect is significant in the Southern countries (model 12). This could be due 
to the fact that the specific survey question is about pension benefits, and old age pension 
regimes are highly traditionally ‘male-breadwinner’ in the sense that they are oriented 
towards insuring insiders and their spouses. In Continental Europe itself, however, the 
derived rights of dependent spouses have been considerably reduced over the past years 
(Häusermann 2010).  
 
By contrast, the interaction effects are not significant in the Nordic and Liberal regimes, 
indicating that the labor market position of the partner does not affect the effect of labor 
market vulnerability of respondent on preferences for income redistribution, social 
investment and social insurance. This corresponds to our expectation that the household 
composition does not alter the individual socio-economic situation to a great extent.   
 
Overall, these findings confirm our expectation that the strongly gendered structuring of 
labor market vulnerability in Continental Europe in combination with the specific structure 
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of the welfare state in these countries allows outsiders to minimize the effects of labor 
market vulnerability through the household.  
We conclude that the comparatively low preference divides between insiders and outsiders 
in Continental and Southern Europe may indeed by explained by the specific structure of 
risk and welfare states, providing outsiders with the opportunity to derive benefits from 
forming a household with an insider. It should be noted that we do not claim to provide a 
conclusive analysis of how outsiders might compensate their labor market vulnerability or 
how to explain the low divides in preferences between insiders and outsiders generally. This 
clearly provides ample questions for further investigation of individual-level mechanisms 
and institutional effects. However, our analysis does provides a first hint at explaining why 
institutional labor market dualization has not become more strongly politicized yet.  
 
Conclusions 
This article shows that labor market vulnerability affects the social policy preferences of 
individuals. The higher someone’s risk to be either unemployed, involuntarily self-
employed or temporarily employed, the more likely this person is to demand social policy 
that is oriented towards needs-based redistribution or job creation, i.e. towards the specific 
needs of outsiders. On the contrary, the more secure someone’s labor market situation, the 
more supportive this person is of social policy that is based on contribution-based social 
insurance, i.e. a type of welfare that rewards stable and continuous insider employment. We 
also find robust evidence for the fact that human capital levels affect the extent to which 
labor market vulnerability determines social policy preferences: at higher levels of 
education, vulnerability has a stronger positive effect on the support of job creation policies 
than at lower levels of education, because highly skilled people in atypical employment and 
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unemployment are keen on re-entering the labor market on a firmer basis. Similarly, 
vulnerability has a stronger negative effect on people’s attitudes towards contribution-based 
social insurance at higher levels of education than at lower levels, because the opportunity 
costs of social insurance for highly skilled outsiders are higher than for the more low-skilled 
outsiders. Regarding preferences for redistribution, however, we find no interaction effect, 
which makes sense if we keep in mind that redistribution is attractive for all low-income 
workers and less so for all more highly skilled people. These findings at the individual level 
are based on a pooled analysis of 13 West European countries, and they conform very 
clearly to straightforward rational-choice expectations about welfare preferences. They also 
represent clearly confirming evidence for the insider-outsider theory of labor market 
preferences, which suggests that conflicts cross-cutting the working class on the basis of 
secure vs. precarious employment have become a salient social reality in post-industrial 
societies (e.g. Rueda 2007, Emmenegger et al. 2012). Looking at the individual level only, 
this clearly seems to be the case.  
 
However, our ultimate interest as political scientists is knowing if these preference divides 
at the socio-structural level might become politically salient, i.e. if the distinct preference 
profiles of individuals in secure vs. precarious employment may lend themselves to political 
mobilization, politicization and representation in the policy-making spheres. In order for 
this to be the case, we would expect preference divides to be deepest where the extent of 
inequality in labor market vulnerability is highest. In other words, we would expect that 
high institutional barriers between insiders and outsiders at the macro level (employment 
protection and high pay-roll taxes) exacerbate the preference divides at the micro-level, 
thereby preparing the ground for a politicization of the unequal distributive effects of these 
institutions. This, however, and this non-finding is probably the most intriguing result of 
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our analysis, is not the case. In Continental and Southern Europe, where the dualized 
institutional set-up clearly discriminates against labor market outsiders, the divide between 
vulnerably employed and the securely employed regarding their social policy demands is by 
no means deeper than in more flexible or egalitarian labor market regimes. Rather, the 
substantial size of this divide is generally small all across Europe, even in countries such as 
Spain, France or Germany, where both labor markets and welfare states draw sharp lines 
between the life chances of insiders and outsiders. We have investigated what we consider 
the most promising explanation of this non-finding: in the more dualized countries, 
outsiders are able to ‘make up’ for their disadvantages through the household. Indeed, being 
married to an insider clearly moderates the preferences of outsiders in Continental Europe 
(and to some extent in the South), but not in Northern Europe and the UK. This makes 
perfect sense when considering that Continental welfare states still imply generous derived 
rights for dependent spouses, whereas this is much less the case in universalistic and liberal 
welfare states. And given that labor market vulnerability in Continental Europe is radically 
concentrated among women, it explains the relatively low insider-outsider divides. We 
assume that a similar mechanism is at work in Southern Europe, where labor market 
vulnerability clusters among the younger generations, who in most cases depend on their 
family until far into their adult lives, but unfortunately we were unable to test this 
empirically in this article for reasons of lacking data on the labor market vulnerability of 
parents in the ESS. 
 
With the findings presented in this article, we make contributions to three debates: we 
corroborate the micro-level hypotheses of the insider-outsider theory with different and 
more detailed indicators of social policy demands than the ones used in the previous 
analyses (Rueda 2005, 2007, Emmenegger 2009, Barrows 2012), but we also raise a red 
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flag to this literature by showing that there is no automatic translation of micro-level 
preferences in politics, let alone in policies, a caveat that is all too often neglected. We also 
contribute to the more macro-level literature on the politics of dualized labor markets (such 
as Esping-Andersen 1999a, Iversen and Soskice 2009), which tends to assume that 
dualizing institutions are underpinned by, and exacerbate, socio-structural preference 
divides between insiders and outsiders. We show that this institutionalist assumption does 
not hold up to empirical testing. This, obviously, bears an even broader point to the 
institutionalist literature, by questioning the direct link between political institutions and 
micro-level preferences, which is implicit in much of the recent literature on the varieties of 
capitalism. Our analysis shows that the effect of institutions may be moderated, if not 
annulled by other societal or economic determinants of preferences.  
 
Finally, and as we think most importantly, we contribute to the analysis of the political 
implications that post-industrial labor markets and the current turmoil of crisis and austerity 
have – or have not – on the politics that shape the distribution of resources and life chances 
in Western Europe. In hard times where youth unemployment is over 50 percent in many 
regions of Southern Europe, and where atypically employed workers are the first to loose 
their jobs all over Continental and Southern Europe, the question whether outsiders are 
likely to mobilize politically – and whether they can be mobilized or not – is of crucial 
importance. Our findings suggest that even though the potential for mobilization exists at 
the level of individual preferences (given that labor market vulnerability affects preferences 
in a consistent and robust way), we are very far from a mobilization of the insider-outsider 
cleavage, because these divides are to a large extent de-mobilized both socially (through the 
household) and politically (through the welfare states). A failure of both of these 
compensation mechanisms might change this balance, but for now, the chances for 
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outsiders to act politically on the basis of their ‘outsiderness’ are slim. Moreover, there is an 
obvious lack of incentives for parties and trade unions (the ‘supply side’) to contribute to 
this mobilization, not only because of institutional power asymmetries, but also because 
labor market vulnerability strongly contributes to abstentionism (Häusermann and 
Schwander 2012b). Hence, we might very well assist at a deepening of dualization and 
labor market precariousness without this increasing inequality being politicized.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 - Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups 
Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups, based on Oesch 2006 and Kitschelt and 
Rehm 2005: 23  
Independent work 
logic 
Technical work 
logic 
Organizational 
work logic 
Interpersonal work 
logic  
Large employers, self-
employed professionals 
and petty bourgeoisie 
with employees 
(Capital accumulators) 
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
<=24 
Technical experts 
(Capital 
accumulators) 
ISCO88-2d 21  
Higher-grade 
managers (Capital 
accumulators)                         
ISCO88-2d 11, 12 
Socio-cultural semi-
professionals (Socio-
cultural 
professionals)   
ISCO88-2d 22-24, 32-34     
Professional/        
managerial 
Technicians (Mixed 
service 
functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 31 
Associate managers 
(Capital 
accumulators) 
ISCO88-2d 13 
Associate 
professional 
/ managerial 
Petty bourgeoisie 
without employees 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
>24 
Skilled crafts (Blue-
collar workers) 
ISCO88-2d 71-74                   
Skilled office 
workers and routine 
office workers 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
ISCO88-2d 41, 42                       
Skilled service and 
routine service (Low 
service functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 51, 52, 91                      
Generally / 
vocationally 
skilled 
  
 Routine operatives 
and routine 
agriculture (Blue-
collar workers)     
ISCO88-2d 61, 92, 81-
83, 93               
Low/ un-
skilled 
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Appendix 2 - Table of operationalisation 
Variable Operationalization 
Needs-based welfare 
state: Redistribution 
ESS 4 2008; 5 point scale ranging respondent’s answer to the variable 
“gincdiff” :”Government should take measure to reduce differences in 
income levels”; 1 = disagree strongly,  2 = disagree, 3 = neither disagree nor 
agree, 4 = agree, 5 = agree strongly; recoded so that higher values means 
higher agreement with redistribution 
Social investment state: 
job creation 
ESS 4 2008; 10 point scale ranging respondent’s answer to the variable 
“gvjbevn”: „How much responsibility the government should have to ensure 
a job for everyone who wants one?”; 1 = not government’s responsibility at 
all, 10 = entirely government’s responsibility 
Employment-based 
welfare state: Social 
insurance 
ESS 4 2008; respondent’s answer to the variable “earnpen”: ”Some people 
say that higher earners should larger old age pensions because they paid more 
in, whilst others think that lower earners should get more because they are in 
greater need”; 1 = higher earners should get larger old age pensions, 2 = high 
and low earners should get the same amount, 3 = lower earners should get 
larger old age pensions. 
Outsiderness  
EU-SILC 2007; continuous variable, difference between group-specific rates 
of atypical employment / unemployment and the country-specific average 
rate, value attributed to members of occupational categories in ESS 4 2008 
Welfare regimes 
Liberal countries: Britain 
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden                                    
Continental countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland  
Southern countries: Greece, Portugal, Spain 
Classes 
ISCO-2d codes, recoded from pl050 (EU-SILC) and iscoco (ESS 4 2008) into 
CA, MSF, BC, SCP, LSF; see appendix 1 
Unemployment 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring unemployment, recoded from 
pl030  
Involuntary part-time 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring involuntary part-time work, 
recoded from pl030 (self-classification of respondents) and pl120 (reason for 
part-time work) 
Fix-term contract 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring fix-term contract work, recoded 
from pl140 
Atypical work / 
Unemployment 
EU-SILC 2007; dummy variable measuring atypical employment 
(involuntary part-time, fix-term work, helping family member) and 
unemployment among all other employment status; 
Female 
ESS 4 2008; dummy variable for gender, recoded from pb150 (EU-SILC 
2007) and (ESS 4 2008), 1 = women, 0 = men 
Young 
Age 
Dummy variable for young, recoded from pb140 (EU-SILC 2007) and agea 
(ESS 4 2008); 1 = below 40, 0 = above 40 
ESS 4 2008; ratio-scaled variable based on agea, age in years 
Education 
ESS 4 2008; continuous variable based on highest completed degree (edulvl), 
1 = primary or less, 2 = lower secondary, 3 = upper secondary, 4 = post-
secondary, 5 = tertiary 
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Income ESS 4 2008; total net household income in deciles (hinctnta) 
Union membership 
ESS 4 2008; dummy variable measuring union membership (mbtru); 1 = 
union member; 0 = not union member 
Church attendance 
ESS 4 2008; recoded from rlgatnd (how often do you attend to religious 
services); 7 = everyday, 6 = more than once week, 5 = once a week, 4 = at 
least once a month, 3 = only on special holidays, 2 = less often, 1 = never 
Living in a couple 
household 
ESS 4 2008; dummy variable measuring if respondent lives in a couple 
household (lvgptna and lvghwa); 1 = living in a stable couple (married or 
not), 0 = divorced, widowed, single, separated 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
OECD Employment database; index measuring the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures 
involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts 
in 2008 
Non-wage labor costs 
OECD Employment database; labor taxes as percentage of labor costs at the 
average wage, 2008 
Index of dualization 
Normalized additive Index from Employment Protection Legislation and non-
wage labor costs 
Insider-outsider divide in 
preferences for 
redistribution 
ESS 4 2008; average of absolute value of the change in predicted 
probabilities across categories of preferences for redistribution when 
outsiderness moves from minimum to the maximum 
Insider-outsider divide in 
preferences for social 
investment 
ESS 4 2008; average of absolute value of the change in predicted 
probabilities across categories of preferences for job creation when 
outsiderness moves from minimum to the maximum 
Insider-outsider divide in 
preferences for social 
insurance 
ESS 4 2008; average of absolute value of the change in predicted 
probabilities across categories of preferences for social insurance when 
outsiderness moves from minimum to the maximum 
Outsiderness of partner 
EU-SILC 2007; continuous variable, difference between group-specific rates 
of atypical employment / unemployment and the country-specific average 
rate, value attributed to members of occupational categories in ESS 4 2008 
Gender of partner 
ESS 4 2008; dummy variable for gender of the respondent’s partner, recoded 
from  gndr2/3/4 (gender) and rshipa2/3/4 (relationship with household 
member); 1 = female, 0 = male 
Age category of partner 
ESS 4 2008; dummy for young of the respondent’s partner, recoded from 
yrbrn2/3/4 and rshipa2/3/4 (relationship with household member); 1 = below 
40, 0 = above 40 
Class of partner 
ESS 4 2008; recoded from iscocop (ISCO88-2d code of partner) into CA, 
MSF, BC, SCP, LSF; see appendix 1 
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Part II: The mobilisation of the insider-outsider divide 
 
 
After having discussed the distribution of labour market vulnerability and the divergent 
labour market and social policy preferences of insiders and outsiders, we turn now to the 
mobilisation of the insider-outsider conflict. The next chapter deals with the response of 
parties to the insider-outsider divide examining parties’ electoral strategies. More precisely, 
I analyse whether social democratic parties are representatives of insiders as postulated in 
the literature on the politics of dualisation (Rueda 2006, 2007) or whether they try to 
mobilise outsiders as well. The third chapter is devoted to the electoral consequences of the 
insider-outsider divide. In line with the focus on social democratic parties of the previous 
chapter, I analyse the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders with regard to vote 
abstention and voting for the social democratic party in Chapter 4. Thus, while the third 
chapter examines the electoral strategies of the social democratic parties, the fourth chapter 
deals with the success of the electoral strategies. For both chapters, the competitive situation 
of the social democratic party within the party system figures as crucial explanatory 
variable.  
In terms of analytical focus, I move from large N-studies to smaller case studies to analyse 
the electoral strategies of social democratic parties in more detail in six West European 
countries (Britain, Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). The country 
selection is motivated by the following reasons: First, within these countries we find 
different party systems confronting the social democratic party with a varying number of 
competitors for its electorate. These countries enable us to study the electoral strategies of 
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social democratic parties in different competitive constellations. Additionally, a substantial 
share of the workforce in these countries is confronted with a high risk of atypical 
employment and unemployment.24 A more practical reason refers to the nature of the data 
collection which was done by means of human coding of newspaper articles. As this is a 
work-extensive method to collect data (as I will explain below), which also requires 
language knowledge, we had to restrict the country sample to a manageable set.  
To assess the electoral strategies of parties, we need their positions regarding those issues 
that are relevant for insiders and outsiders, i.e. labour market regulation and social policies, 
on a comparative basis. Such data did not exist as available data on parties’ positions code 
their positions only regarding more or less state intervention. Fortunately, I could rely on a 
new dataset collected in a larger project25 on parties’ social policy positions, derived from a 
coding of party statements as reported in newspapers during election campaigns. I re-coded 
the statements according to more fine-grained dimensions (logics) of welfare state 
orientation and interests of high- and low-skilled insiders and outsiders, respectively. A 
further advantage of the data is that it relies on the media coverage of national election 
campaigns. For a long time, party positions have been coded mainly from party manifestos 
(see Laver 1989, Klingemann et al. 1994, Budge et al. 2001, Benoit and Laver 2006). In the 
time of media democracy, however, most voters obtain their information through the media. 
Moreover, voters’ perceptions about the relevance of an issue are shaped by the media 
(Petrocik et al. 2003). Thus, a recent strand of research on party positions has argued that 
parties’ manifestos have become less relevant for transporting information of party 
                                                
24 Share of outsiders in the workforce: UK: 39.5%, FR: 34.2%, ES: 48.1%, DE: 50.6%, NL: 45.4, CH: 46.0%, 
own calculations, based on EU-SILC 2007. 
25 SNF-Project „How is in and how is out“, grant-number: 1000017-131994/1 funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation, Project leader: Silja Häusermann.  
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positions and we should focus on media coverage to assess party positions (Kleinnijenhuis 
and Pennings 2001, Kriesi et al. 2008, Kriesi et al. 2012, Bornschier 2010).  
 
 
Social democratic parties and their role in the dualisation of labour markets 
Regarding the mobilisation potential of the insider-outsider divide, I am particularly 
interested in the responses of the social democratic party for two reasons: Since it is the 
main representative of the working class, it is the social democratic electorate that is divided 
into outsiders and insiders. This makes the social democratic party vulnerable to rival 
parties competing for its electorate. Moreover, as ‘welfare state party’, the social democratic 
party should be particularly concerned about the new inequalities in the workforce. The 
second reason refers to the ambivalent assessment of the role of social democracy for the 
development of dualisation. It has both been argued that social democratic parties foster 
dualisation by addressing only the interests of their core constituency, the insiders (Rueda 
2006, 2007), but also that social democracy has prevented dualisation with universalistic 
and redistributive policies (Palier and Thelen 2010, Pontusson 2011, Häusermann and 
Schwander 2012a) or through cooperation with encompassing unions (Obinger et al. 2012). 
The role that social democratic parties have played in shaping dualisation is, thus, far from 
clear. Moreover, in many European countries, the social democrats proved crucial in 
reforming labour markets and welfare states. To emphasize the importance of social 
democratic parties in the course of dualisation, I present two examples of welfare and 
labour market reforms under a social democratic government which have not preserved the 
privileges of insiders. The first example is the flexibilisation and deregulation of the Dutch 
labour market in the 90s and 2000s that transformed the Dutch economy from ‘welfare 
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without work’ to the ‘Dutch miracle’ (Hemerijck and Visser 2001). The second example is 
the reform of the labour market and welfare state by the German social democratic party in 
the early 2000s, exemplified by the introduction of the Agenda 2010 and the Hartz laws. 
 
The Netherlands 
During the 1980s, the Dutch economy suffered from a persistent recession and high levels 
of unemployment. As in many Continental-conservative welfare states, employment 
protection for standard employment was high (3.1 in the late 1980s, OECD 1999). Because 
it was so difficult to lay off employees, unions and employers used the sick and disability 
scheme (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, WAO) to dispose of abundant 
employees. This strategy of workforce shedding resulted in a share of the workforce 
depending on social benefits so high that the Dutch economy was tagged with the label 
’welfare without work’. Even though the story of the flexibilisation of the Dutch labour 
market and adaption of the welfare state to a flexible workforce cannot be told without 
emphasizing the role of corporatism (Visser and Hemerijck 1997), the government took a 
leading role in the decision-making process (Wolinetz 2001, Salverda 1999, cited in 
Anderson 2012) and its changed ambitions to maximise employment rates guided the 
directions of the reform (Hemerijck and Visser 2001: 234). In 1989, a coalition of Christian 
democrats and the social democratic Partij van der Arbeid (PdvA) introduced harsh 
measures to lower the incentive to use the sick and disability scheme as exit option, 
resulting in an increase of the de facto retirement age (Anderson 2012). The reform was 
highly unpopular and brought both parties electoral defeat in 1994 (Hemerijck and Visser 
2001: 232).  
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Nevertheless, the PdvA was able to form the ‘purple coalition’ with the two liberal parties 
VDD and D66 and declared ‘work, work, work’ as the central slogan of its government. 
The government continued to deregulate and flexibilise the labour market, a process 
accompanied by various activation policies (Merkel et al. 2006: 250, Hemerijck and Visser 
2001). Exemplary of the changed ambition of the government and the social partners was 
the promotion of flexible employment: the status of part-time work was improved and, 
since 1999, the use of flexible work contracts was facilitated (Flex-Wet). At the same time, 
social protection for atypical employmed was expanded and atypical employment forms 
were included in the collective social security schemes (OECD 2002, van Oorschot 2004, 
Anderson 2012). For example, atypical employment was included in the unemployment 
insurance. However, this came at the price of reduced overall levels of generosity and 
toughened incentives to accept work. The reforms resulted in a massive increase in female 
labour market participation and the highest share of part-time workers in the OECD (OECD 
2000). At the same time, the Netherlands invested heavily in active labour market policies, 
spending more on active labour market policies than the OECD average in 2001 (Anderson 
2012). The second strategy to enhance employment rates was the creation of a low-pay 
sector with several in-work benefits. The ‘purple coalition’ introduced wage support, 
reduced or no social contribution and tax breaks for low paid jobs to increase the 
employment rate of the low-skilled (Hemerijck and Visser 2001). In 2001, tax credits 
increased the incentives for the second earner to work either full time or part-time and 
paved the way to a ‘one and a half earner’-economy (OECD 2002: 47).  
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Germany 
When the German Sozialdemokratische Partei (SPD) took over the government together 
with its green junior partner in 1998, unemployment was the most pressing political and 
economic problem. German reunification and a slogging economy caused unemployment 
rates to rise to 9.4 percent in the election year (OECD 2005). Especially women, low-skilled 
and elderly individuals found it hard to find full time employment (Merkel et al. 2006) As 
in the Netherlands, unions and employers used to reduce labour supply through the use of 
early retirement at the costs of contribution payers what caused labour costs to rise. 
Germany represents thus a classical example of dualisation (see Palier and Thelen 2010).  
The initial aim of the red-green coalition was to revert the tentative reforms of its Christian 
democratic predecessor, but after the resignation of finance minister Lafontaine, the SPD 
changed its strategy. A strategy paper in 1999 with Tony Blair constitutes a changing point 
in the SPD’s ambitions and understanding of employment and economy. It was argued that 
a flexibilisation of labour markets and a reduction of taxes are essential to create a booming 
economy for the benefits of all (Hassel and Schiller 2010). Instead of reducing labour 
supply, the focus shifted on activation and increasing employment rates, also for low-skilled 
individuals (Hinrichs 2010) what required to reform welfare state and labour market 
institutions. After various, less successful attempts to increase employment rates (Job-
AQTIV Law in 2001), the red-green government introduced the Agenda 2010 and the Hartz 
reforms from 2003-2005. The last, and most controversial, Hartz IV law reduced the 
generous earning-related unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I, ALG I) from 32 
months to 12 months. After that, the unemployed have to rely on the flat-rate 
Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG IL) which corresponds to the level of the former social assistance. 
The management und placement of unemployed individuals was improved through personal 
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service agencies (Personalserviceagenturen, PSA) but obligations of benefit recipients to 
seek and accept work were strengthened (Hassel and Schiller 2010, Hinrichs 2010, 
Fleckenstein 2011). The SPD also reduced employment protection for employees in small 
enterprises and introduced various activation measures, for example a training program for 
young adults (JUMP) that guaranteed a training place or a job after six months of 
unemployment (but had little effect, see Fleckenstein 2011:76, Blancke and Schmid 2003: 
227). Further measures included the reduction of social contributions on low-paid jobs and 
secondary employment to create low-pay-low-skill service jobs that were hindered before 
by the high social contributions (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, Fleckenstein 2011). 
While the Agenda 2010 is often seen as a ‘paradigmatic shift’ (Fleckenstein 2011: 1) in the 
previously blocked Germany political economy, its implications are more critically 
evaluated. The reform project is often seen as move towards the liberal model (Hinrichs 
2010). Indeed, the reduced levels of income security and a stronger reliance on means-
tested benefits signify a loss of rights for insiders as the focus has shifted from income 
maintenance to poverty prevention. Income maintenance should be secured through private 
insurance (Hinrichs 2010) what makes the reform particularly painful for low-skilled 
insiders, who do not have the means to secure protection from the private market, a 
phenomenon particularly pronounced in the pension system. At the same time, the reduced 
duration of the earning-related unemployment benefit ALG I  means that insiders face a 
greater risk of becoming outsiders. The activation side of the reform project, in turn, has 
been neglected by the red-green government. Activation was mainly achieved by punitive 
workfare policies: a reduction of benefit levels and stronger obligations for unemployed to 
accept work. This makes it unclear how much the reform enhanced the situation of 
outsiders. Only the grand coalition that followed the red-green government in 2005, 
extended family service by expanding paid parental leave for both mother and father and, 
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even more important, introduced the right for child care for all children under three years 
from 2013.  
The previous examples show that social democratic parties have been decisive to modernise 
the industrial welfare state and flexibilise the labour market. Indeed, it has been argued that 
it is more feasible for left parties to cut back the welfare state following a ‘Nixon goes to 
China’-logic (Ross 2000, Kitschelt 2001). While my argument does not focus on 
retrenchment of the welfare, I share the conviction that social democratic parties are 
credited with higher leverage in reforming the welfare state, exactly because of their 
positive welfare image (Schumacher et al. 2012) but also because of their closer links to 
trade unions. 
 
 
From the supply side to the demand side of political competition: The electoral 
consequences of dualisation 
The third chapter examines the strategies of social democratic parties with regard to low- 
and high-skilled insiders and outsiders, respectively. A related question refers to the 
electoral behaviour of these groups. Do low-skilled insiders still vote for social democratic 
parties? Literature on the electorate of right populist parties shows that young, male low-
skilled workers constitute the backbone of electoral support for right populist parties 
(Kitschelt 1995, Mayer and Perrineau 1996, Kriesi 1998, Oesch 2008, Bornschier 2010). 
Conversely, as the core constituency with strong partisan ties to the social democratic party 
we could expect low-skilled insiders still to vote for the social democratic party because 
they need less persuasion from their ideologically close party (Dalton 2012). Similarly, the 
electoral behaviour of outsiders is unexplored: Do outsiders react to the social democratic 
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mobilisation efforts and vote for the social democratic parties or do they abstain from 
voting? 
This is the topic of Chapter 4 which examines the electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders in Germany, France and Britain drawing on data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES). To relate the electoral consequences to the electoral strategies of 
parties but to keep the complexity at a minimum, I restrict the analysis to the exemplary 
cases Germany, France and Britain. In contrast to the chapters examining the individual 
level-preferences, I use the dichotomous conceptualisation. The reason for this lies in the 
logic of political mobilisation: Parties mobilise their electorate as social groups, not as 
individuals. I therefore conceptualise insiders and outsiders as two distinct social groups. In 
order to take into account the heterogeneity of the insider and outsider groups, especially in 
terms of skill levels, I control for education levels. I also tested an interaction effect with 
education levels as we did for third chapter but without finding significant effects. Thus, in 
contrast to the determinants of social policy preferences, the effect of being an outsider on 
the likelihood to vote for the social democratic party or to participate in the elections does 
not vary at different levels of education. 
 
The mobilisation of insiders and outsider in the context of the literature 
One of the goals of my thesis is to strengthen the link between the literature on political 
representation and political parties and the literature on social policy. The social policy 
literature has shown that welfare states have changed profoundly over the last decades. 
After a period where welfare reform was deemed to be unrealistic due to feedback effects of 
the welfare state which created large groups of beneficiaries and the fear of governing 
parties to bear the electoral consequences of welfare retrenchment (Pierson 1996), social 
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policy research has shown that even the previously ‘frozen landscapes’ of Continental 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1996) have changed incrementally but profoundly (Bleses 
and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Häusermann 2010, Palier 2010b), whether in the realm of 
unemployment insurance (Clegg 2007), pension policies (Bonoli 2003, Bonoli and Palier 
2007, Häusermann 2010) or family policies (Leitner et al. 2003, Daly 2004, Morel 2007, 
Lewis et al. 2008, Daly 2011). From the literature on new social risks we also know that 
these reforms do not entail primarily a retrenchment but rather a restructuring of the welfare 
state to new social risks (Bonoli 2006: 5, Taylor-Gooby 2004, see also Häusermann 2010) 
with different distributive implications for different social groups (as for example, insiders 
and outsiders, but also younger and older generations). Additionally, a vast literature has 
shown on the level of marco-outcomes that a large welfare state does not need to be a 
redistributive welfare state (see for example, Esping-Andersen 1990, van Kersbergen 1995, 
Huber and Stephens 2001, van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). By contrast, the literature on 
party politics still treats parties as parties with either a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ welfare 
image (Schumacher et al. 2012), as ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ welfare parties (Green-Pedersen 2002). 
My thesis takes up this differentiation between the general welfare state and the different 
dimensions (or logics) of the welfare state on the supply side of political competition. I 
show that parties base their electoral campaigns on different welfare logics to mobilise a 
large electoral coalition. In times where distributive conflicts are not only about more or 
less redistribution (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006, Häusermann 2010, Fernàndez-Albertos and 
Manzano 2011) and traditional lines between pro and contra welfare state parties have 
become blurred (Ross 2000, Kitschelt 2001), this insight is relevant for the literature on 
political parties and welfare state research alike. 
My thesis provides also insights for the literature on dualisation and party competition. In 
contrast to most of the literature about partisan effects on the welfare state, which equates 
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the position of a party with the position of its core constituency, I argue that we should not 
merely focus on the preferences and interests of the party’s core constituency. Rather, we 
need to consider the preferences and interests of the contested segments of the electorate 
since these voters are at risk to vote for a rival party. Thus, with regard to the mobilisation 
of insiders and outsiders, patterns of party competition explain whether social democratic 
parties are insider parties or try to integrate outsiders in their electoral coalitions. Finally, I 
contribute to the literature on the politics of dualisation by examining the electoral 
behaviour of insiders and outsiders cross-nationally. 
 
  
Chapter 3: Are social democratic parties really insider-parties? 
Social democratic electoral strategies in Western Europe  
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Introduction 
A successful mobilisation of voters is crucial for any party, whether it aims to maximise 
votes, gain office, or implement policies (Strøm 1990). In this paper, I investigate the 
electoral strategies of social democratic parties in times of increasing inequalities among the 
electorate and hard times for the welfare state. Over the last decades, social and economic 
inequality has risen in Western Europe (OECD 2008, 2011). One of the reasons is the 
reduced capacity of the welfare state to correct market income inequalities, another the 
increased segmentation of the labour force into insiders with secure jobs and outsiders with 
an unstable attachment to the labour market (see Emmenegger et al. 2012b). This 
dualisation of the labour force entails a differentiation of economic interests among the 
social democratic electorate. Due to their unequal exposure to labour market risks, insiders 
and outsiders’ interests differ with regards to social policies (Rueda 2005, Emmenegger 
2009, Häusermann and Schwander 2011, Schwander and Häusermann 2012). In general, 
insiders benefit from a welfare state that protects the existing distribution of social and 
economic rights, while outsiders benefit from a redistribution of such rights (Häusermann 
and Schwander 2011). In the literature on the politics of dualisation, social democratic 
parties are portrayed as the representatives of insiders for historical and ideological reasons 
but also for the outsiders’ weaker political organisation (Rueda 2006: 388, 2007: 12). In 
contrast to this literature, I argue that social democratic parties do not only represent the 
interests of their traditional core constituency. Rather, they try to mobilise a larger electoral 
coalition. Instead of exclusively promoting policies matching the interest of insiders, they 
campaign for policies that appeal to outsiders  as well, while at the same time promising to 
provide the ground for economic prosperity. 
Furthermore, I argue that the pattern of party competition affects the composition of the 
electoral coalition a social democratic party tries to mobilise. Social democratic parties are 
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confronted with a number of parties from the left and right that compete for their electorate. 
I argue that in order to prevent voters from giving their vote to competing parties, a social 
democratic party will focus its electoral campaign in particular on these voter.  
To analyse the electoral strategies of social democratic parties, I focus on the socio-
economic dimension of political competition, as the welfare state is one of the core issues 
for social democratic parties (Ross 2000, Kitschelt 2001, Green Pedersen 2002, 
Schumacher et al. 2012),and because it is on economic issues that insiders and outsiders 
differ. I examine statements of social democratic parties regarding insider-outsider relevant 
issues during the electoral campaigns in six West European countries between 2007 and 
2010. This enables me to study the electoral strategies of social democratic parties in 
different competitive constellations. The analysis is based on a new database from a 
sentence-by-sentence coding of newspaper coverage of election campaigns. By analysing 
electoral strategies of social democratic parties, I address three strands of research: I 
combine the literature on the politics of dualization and research on party competition. I 
show that that social democratic parties are not only concerned about insiders but also about 
outsiders and that the competitive situation of the social democratic parties within the party 
system sets the incentives for the mobilisation of different electoral coalitions. Additionally, 
a vast literature has shown on the macro-level that a large welfare state does not need to be 
a redistributive welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990, van Kersbergen 1995, Huber and 
Stephens 2001, van Kersbergen and Manow 2009), and that support for the welfare state is 
not to be equated with support for redistribution on the level of individual preferences 
(Moene and Wallerstein 2003, Fernàndez-Albertos and Manzano 2011). The article takes up 
the differentiation between the general welfare state and the different dimensions (or logics) 
of the welfare state with different distributive effects. The difference between support for 
the welfare state in general and the redistributive logic of the welfare state is particularly 
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pronounced in dualised societies where the welfare state does not redistribute income but 
preserves the status quo by providing insiders with social insurance policies (Fernàndez-
Albertos and Manzano 2011). My main argument is that social democratic parties mobilise 
different segments of the electorate by emphasising distinct logics of the welfare state, each 
of which has different implications for particular segments of the social democratic 
electorate. 
 
The article is organised as follows: I first outline four ways in which the welfare state can 
be adapted to post-industrial challenges, and discuss  how the social democratic parties can 
use these welfare logics to mobilise the electorate. I then provide an argument that explains 
how the constellation of party competition sets the incentives to forge different electoral 
coalitions between low- and high-skilled insiders and/or low- and high-skilled outsiders. In 
the empirical section, I start by explaining in detail how the data was created before 
analysing the social democratic electoral strategies in Britain, Spain, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The final section discusses the results and their implications.  
 
 
Welfare state reforms and the implications for the social democratic constituency   
The welfare state, understood as a set of social policy and labour market institutions, has 
been under enormous pressure to adapt to the requirements of a post-industrial, efficient, 
and internationally competitive labour market with a flexible and high-skilled workforce. 
The structural changes of post-industrialisation and globalisation together, coupled with 
social and demographic changes, accentuated the trilemma between equality, employment 
and budgetary restraint of post-industrial economies (Wren and Iversen 1998), and has 
The electoral strategies of social democratic parties 
 106 
resulted in the emergence of new social risks for large segments of the population (Bonoli 
2006). Especially the conservative-corporatist welfare states are pressured to reform. Their 
strictly regulated labour markets, the resulting high non-wage labour costs and the reliance 
on the ‘male bread-winner’ model make them particularly ill-suited for the challenges of a 
post-industrial economy and society (Palier 2010b). Partly as a result of these and other 
reforms, partly as a result of socio-economic transformations, atypical employment has 
become widespread in Europe over the last decades (Emmenegger et al. 2012). While not 
all atypical employment is problematic per se, all sorts of atypical employment relations are 
a potential source of economic precariousness as post-war welfare states are built on the 
model of continuous employment that provides atypical employees with only incomplete 
protection against labour market risks. Consequently, the ever-growing share of outsiders 
working in insecure and atypical employment relationships while insiders are being 
shielded from fluctuations of labour demands by high employment protection leads to a 
dualisation of the labour market (Rueda 2007, Palier and Thelen 2010, Emmenegger et al. 
2012b). Research on the implications of dualisation has not only shown that the atypically 
employed (outsiders) have lower earnings and lower access to vocational training and 
promotion than insiders (Häusermann and Schwander 2012b), but also different preferences 
regarding labour market policies (Rueda 2005, Burgoon and Dekker 2010, Schwander and 
Häusermann 2012)26 and distributive policies in general (Häusermann and Schwander 2010, 
Häusermann and Walter 2010, Häusermann and Schwander 2011). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 While the above mentioned studies find divergent preferences of insiders and outsiders, Emmenegger 
(2009) and Barrows (2012) do not find such differences.  
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In the following section, I discuss four ways in which the welfare state can be adapted to the 
post-industrial challenges.27 I argue that the institutional design of welfare states differs 
according to two criteria. The first criterion refers to the stratification effect of the welfare 
state, while the second criterion refers to the timing of the state intervention.  
Regarding the first criterion, welfare states are either redistributive or are based on the 
equivalence principle, which has a stratifying and status-preserving effect. Redistribution 
means to re-allocate a property that was previously unequally allocated in the society. In a 
narrow sense, redistribution refers to the re-allocation of material resources from the 
affluent to the poor. In a broader sense, redistribution can also mean to re-allocate 
opportunities and possibilities. For example, a welfare state may not only redistribute 
income but also working opportunities by reducing the working hours or by creating new 
public jobs. As the redistribution of jobs leads to higher employment rates and higher 
revenues for the welfare state, it represents one of the possible ways to adapt the welfare 
state to a post-industrial society (see Häusermann 2010, who stresses the reliance of the 
Continental welfare states on high employment rates). 
By contrast, the equivalence principle, which lies at the heart of the social insurance state, 
does not alter the existing distribution of rights and privileges but rewards differences in 
labour market performance. It preserves social stratification by insuring the actual holders 
against an eventual loss of their assets (Esping-Andersen 1990). Access to benefits is 
mainly based on work and contribution records, and benefits, mostly in cash, are paid as a 
proportion of earnings (Palier 2010b). Moreover, the social insurance state is characterised 
by strict employment protection that shield insiders from fluctuations in labour demands 
                                                
27 An earlier version of the argument about the welfare logics and its implications for high-and low-skilled 
insiders and outsiders, respectively, has first been made in a conference paper „Explaining Welfare 
preferences in dualized societies“, together with Silja Häusermann, presented at the 17th Conference of 
Europeanists in Montreal, Canada, April 14-17, 2010 and published as a working paper „Who are the 
outsiders and what do they want? Explaining welfare preferences in dualized societies“, Les Cahiers 
européens de Sciences Po, n° 01, Paris: Centre d’études européennes at Sciences Po, in 2011. 
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(Esping-Andersen 1990). One of the possible ways to achieve greater flexibility in labour 
markets is to flexibilise the labour market at its margins (Regini 2000) and to promote 
atypical employment forms which enjoy lower employment protection, while the privileges 
of the core workforce remain untouched. Often, atypical employment is not subject to social 
contributions and when it is, the expected benefits are much lower for atypical employed 
than for insiders who have complete contribution records (Ferrera 2005). I refer to this way 
to reform labour market and welfare state as the dualisation strategy. 
The second differential criterion refers to the timing of state intervention. The state may 
either intervene ex-ante or ex-post the interaction between individual and labour market. 
This has consequences for the property to be redistributed. Depending on the timing of the 
state intervention, the welfare state either aims to establish equality of inputs or equality of 
outputs. If the welfare state redistributes ex-post, outcomes (for example income) are to be 
equalised. Both the redistribution and social insurance state seek to achieve this kind of 
equality. If the welfare state intervention takes place ex-ante the interaction between 
individual and labour market, however, it aims to equalise the inputs. In this case, the 
welfare state levels ‘the playing fields’ by providing equal opportunities for everyone 
(Roemer 2005). This is likely to happen if the state plays an active role in investing in the 
employability of individuals. Such a welfare state, called ‘enabling’ or ‘social investment’ 
state (Lister 2004, Palier 2006a, Morel, Palier and Palme 2011) focuses on policies of 
education, training and care services. The last possibility is that the state does not interfere 
in the interaction between individual and labour market. The distribution of both 
opportunities and outcomes are then untouched. Such a reform strategy would imply to cut 
back state responsibilities, deregulate the labour market and allow a greater influence of 
market mechanisms. 
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We may therefore distinguish welfare states whether the state intervention takes place ex-
post the interaction between individual and labour market or not. Combining the two 
criteria results in a typology that distinguishes four different welfare logics: Redistribution, 
social investment, social insurance and liberal welfare state.  
 
Table 1: Welfare state logics 
 
 
 
 
 Stratification effect 
 Redistribution Equivalence 
Timing of state 
intervention 
Ex-post Redistribution Social Insurance 
Not ex-post Social Investment Liberal Welfare State 
  
 
The welfare state plays a major role in stratifying the society (Esping-Andersen 1993), and 
specific institutional arrangements are more favourable to some social groups than to others, 
depending on the welfare logic that lies underneath the design of the welfare state.  
The implications of the welfare logics for the social democratic electorate differ according 
to two cross-cutting conflict lines in the labour market: Dualisation, denoting the insider-
outsider divide, and human capital resources. The welfare logics have different impacts for 
insiders and outsiders due to their unequal positions in the labour market. At the same time, 
outsiderness is not confined to low-skilled individuals but affects high-skilled individuals 
too (Polavieja 2005, Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, Schwander and Häusermann 2012). Due 
to the importance of skills for labour market prospects, being an outsider has not the same 
implications for low- and high-skilled individuals. I will discuss the implications of the 
reforms for these social groups (low-skilled outsiders, low-skilled insiders, high-skilled 
outsiders and high-skilled insiders) below. However, it is important to note that the welfare 
logics do not correspond one-to-one to the interests of the four groups. While it is true that a 
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specific institutional arrangement benefits some social groups more than others, individuals 
may find policies corresponding to more than one welfare logic beneficial. 
In general, a welfare state that protects the existing distribution of social rights and 
economic opportunities lies in the interests of insiders, while outsiders benefit from a 
redistribution of social rights and economic opportunities. This holds especially for the 
social insurance state which was tailored to the needs of (male) industrial workers, their 
employers, and their unions (Thelen 2004, Häusermann 2010: 15). For example, the 
equivalence principle of the social insurance state benefits insiders who have full 
contribution records, while outsiders need compensation for their tenuous and discontinuous 
labour market attachment in form of redistributive policies. However, outsiders are not the 
only ones who benefit from redistribution. Low-skilled insiders may benefit from some of 
the redistributive policies too. For example, both low-skilled insiders and outsiders benefit 
from a subsidised lowering of the retirement age for low-income earners.  
A similar argument applies for social investment policies. All policies that facilitate entry 
and integration in the labour market such as childcare policies, the right for part-time work, 
jobs for graduates, reduction of employment barriers etc. lie in the interests of high-skilled 
outsiders. They have the human capital resources to perform well on the labour market once 
they have the opportunities to make use of their resources. At the same time, low-skilled 
outsiders benefit from these policies as well, especially if the policies are coupled with in-
work benefits such as tax breaks for low-pay jobs or minimum wages.  
Low-skilled insiders benefit from a strong social insurance state, as it protects the existing 
distribution of employment opportunities and guarantees them a firm integration into the 
labour market by strong employment protection. Furthermore, their lower skill levels hinder 
them to purchase social protection on the private market. They therefore rely on a strong 
welfare state with entitlements based on contribution records. High-skilled insiders, by 
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contrast, dispose of both the human capital resources and the employment opportunities to 
achieve a high income through the labour market and to insure social risks privatively. 
Therefore, they do not need a strong welfare state (Häusermann and Schwander 2011).  
 
Parties’ electoral strategies 
A political party has different goals: it wants to win votes, to be elected into office, and to 
implement policies (Müller and Strøm 1999, Green-Pedersen 2001b, 2002). Regardless of 
the hierarchy of these goals, winning a maximum number of votes is crucial: Parties need to 
win the support of the electorate to be elected into office. Also, for implementing their 
preferred policies, parties need to be either in government or electorally strong enough that 
the governing party takes up its demands in order to prevent a loss of voters to this party 
(Strøm 1990, Picot 2012).28 Thus, a successful mobilisation of the electorate during 
electoral campaigns is decisive for every party. Electoral campaigns are based on different 
issues, generally on those issues the electorate regards the party as particularly competent to 
deal with (Petrocik 1996, Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003). Social democratic parties are 
seen as ‘welfare state’ parties (Ross 2000, Green-Pedersen 2001a, 2002, Schumacher, Vis 
and van Kersbergen 2012) because they were first dedicated to expand and later to preserve 
the welfare state establishing a ‘positive welfare image’ (Schumacher et al 2012: 7f). In the 
terminology of the salience and issue ownership theory, social democratic parties ‘own’ the 
welfare state issue as the electorate expects them to fight hard for social security and social 
justice (Green-Pedersen 2002: 36). Consequently, the social democratic party benefits if 
welfare issues are salient during the electoral campaign (Bélanger and Meguid 2008). At the 
                                                
28 For example, the fear of the Italian socialist party (PSI), which was continuously losing votes to the Italian 
communist party (PCI) in the 1970s, of further electoral loses to the left enabled the PCI to push its demands 
of generous unemployment benefits for industrial workers through the parliament (Picot 2012: 110f). 
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same time, the social democratic party must combine social justice and effective 
governance of the economy to be electorally attractive (Green-Pedersen and van 
Keersbergen 2002). Depending on the way the social democratic party reforms the welfare 
state, it satisfies the interests of one or several social group(s) and is therefore likely to be 
elected by groups, since support for a party is strongly motivated by the hope that the party, 
once in government, will change or maintain a situation in favour or against the interests of 
this group (Petrocik 1996: 828). 
 
My argument about the electoral strategies of social democratic parties has two parts: I first 
argue that social democratic parties need to mobilise an electoral coalition beyond low-
skilled insiders. In order to do so, social democratic parties will emphasise the social 
investment logic of the welfare state. The second part of the argument deals with the 
composition of the electoral coalition the social democratic party intends to mobilise. I 
argue that the electoral coalition of the social democratic party varies between countries, 
depending on the party system. Thus, while the first part of my argument emphasises the 
similarities between social democratic electoral strategies, the second part focuses on 
differences due to different competitive constellations. The importance of party competition 
for social policy reforms has been stressed by several contributions to the literature of social 
policy and party politics (Green-Pedersen 2001b, Picot 2012). However, these contributions 
focus on the interplay between different parties (mostly between the Christian democratic 
and the social democratic parties) and on the implementation of policies during the 
legislative period, while I focus on the strategies of social democratic parties in the electoral 
arena.29  
                                                
29 The argument about the importance of party competition for the social democratic electoral strategy 
regarding low-skilled and high-skilled insiders and outsiders has been originally made in the project 
application for the project „Who is in and how is out?“, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
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The industrial working class (low-skilled insiders) is the traditional constituency of social 
democratic parties (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Bartolini and Mair 1990, Bartolini 2000, 
Elff 2007). To mobilise the industrial working class, social democratic parties are therefore 
expected to emphasise the social insurance logic of the welfare state and pursue a strategy 
of dualisation (see Rueda 2005, 2007). However, social democratic parties must forge larger 
electoral alliances to gain office (Przeworski and Sprague 1986), especially since party 
alignments of workers to their traditional representatives are declining (Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000, Dalton 2002) and the size of the industrial working class is decreasing 
due to de-industrialisation. The libertarian part of the middle class has become an important 
segment of the social democratic electorate (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Oesch 2006), and 
social democratic parties adjusted their electoral strategies to mobilise the middle class 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Hopkin 2004). At the same time, the social democratic 
party is concerned not to lose the support of the working class, especially in proportional 
electoral systems, where extreme left or right populist parties present the working class with 
an alternative to the social democratic party. Thus, the social democratic party is confronted 
with the difficulty to reconcile economic preferences of the middle and working class 
segments of its electorate. Due to the fact that parts of its middle class constituency are 
especially affected by atypical employment (high-skilled women working part-time, young 
graduates in temporary jobs, etc.), the strategy of dualisation is not suitable for this purpose. 
Moreover, the social insurance state is seen as particularly ill-suited to deal with post-
industrial realities of financial austerity, instable labour markets and demographic changes 
(Palier 2010), and to cover new social risks (Bonoli 2006, Häusermann 2010). Accordingly, 
the flexibilisation at the margins has led to high risks of poverty and social exclusion. I 
argue that the social investment logic opens up opportunities for the social democratic 
                                                                                                                                                
(grant number 100017-131994/1). The project is conducted by Silja Häusermann, Thomas Kurer and Hanna 
Schwander. The data collection of this paper originates from this project as well.  
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electoral strategy. The social investment logic enables the party to offer middle class 
policies and support for the weakest members of the society at the same time. To offer 
support to low-skilled outsiders is important for three reasons: a) as parties of social justice, 
social democratic parties are ideologically committed to help the weakest members of 
society, b) support for the weakest members of the society corresponds to values of 
solidarity of the libertarian middle class (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998), c) as 
long as support for low-skilled outsiders promises to rise employment rates, it is important 
for the functioning of the welfare state in times of increased international competitiveness 
and public debts and allows to combine labour market flexibility with social justice in 
theory and practice. Hence, the social investment logic with its enabling and activation 
policies allows for a broad electoral coalition and at the same time is seen as a viable 
solution to reform the welfare state and to promote economic growth. Thus, I expect the 
social democratic party to emphasise most of all the social investment logic during its 
electoral campaign (H1). 
 
However, to emphasise social investment is not sufficient for a successful mobilisation of 
the electorate. I argue that social democratic parties combine different welfare logics to 
mobilize a larger electoral coalition composed of several distributive groups. In times of 
blurring bonds between parties and voters (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), parties find it 
increasingly hard to establish long-term commitments among the electorate, a challenge 
which is especially pronounced for those parts of the electorate that other parties aim to 
mobilise as well. Depending on the party system, the social democratic party is confronted 
with various competitors for its electorate, either for the low-skilled, the high-skilled, or 
both segments of its electorate. Because the contested segments are particularly at risk not 
to vote for the social democratic party, the party is compelled to focus on exactly these 
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segments and to address their concerns during the electoral campaign. Hence, it depends on 
the competitive constellation within the party system which segments of the electorate the 
social democratic party aims to mobilise. The party therefore combines different welfare 
logics and emphasises those logics that correspond to the interests of the electoral coalition 
it aims to mobilise. Thus, in contrast to Rueda (2006), my argument does not focus on the 
interests of the core constituency but on the contested segments of the social democratic 
electorate.  
 
We can discern three different competitive constellations depending on the presence and 
type of competitor for the middle class and the working class electorate. In the following, I 
discuss how the implications of the different competitive constellations affect social 
democratic electoral strategies. 
As a first competitive constellation, the social democratic party competes with the main 
party of the right to gain a plurality of the votes to be elected into office, but has no 
competitor for the low-skilled voters. The middle class is a highly contested electorate, as 
both the social democratic party and the main party of the right aim to mobilise these voters. 
Such a constellation is found in majoritarian systems. Competition for the middle class is 
further accentuated by the presence of a new left, green, or liberal party. In this case, the 
social democratic party is freed from the fear that the low-skilled electorate votes for 
another party but focuses on the middle class. Consequently, the social democratic party 
pursues a ‘middle-class strategy’ and combines the social investment logic with the liberal 
logic. This combination implies a reduction of the social minimum and pushes low-skilled 
outsiders to accept any jobs at the risk of remaining working poor or losing the job again. 
By contrast, it matches the interests of high-skilled outsiders, as it enables them to 
participate in the labour market and high-skilled insiders as it promises higher employment 
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rate, lower state responsibilities and lower public spending. It follows that in majoritarian 
countries where the social democratic party is confronted only with competitors for its high-
skilled electorate, the social democratic party adapts a ‘middle class’-strategy and promotes 
social investment combined with liberal policies (H2a). With this strategy, the social 
democratic party aims to mobilise an electoral coalition of high-skilled insiders and high-
skilled outsiders (H2b). 
 
In a second possible constellation, the social democratic party faces competition for the 
low-skilled segments of its electorate by left or right populist parties. As the same time, the 
main right party tries to mobilise the middle class segment of the social democratic 
electorate. We find this constellation in mixed electoral systems (i.e. proportional systems 
with a two-round electoral process or proportional systems where the election districts are 
so large that the system has a similar effect as a majoritarian system). Several studies have 
shown that social democratic parties are more ‘working-classish’ if confronted with a rival 
for their low-skilled electorate (Rueda and Pontusson 2000, Hopkin 2004). The argument 
can be extended to the presence of a right populist party, because the working class 
represents today one of the electoral strongholds of right populist parties (Oesch 2008, 
Bornschier 2010). In this case, the social democratic party tries to mobilise the middle class 
but combines the social investment logic with redistributive policies for the low-skilled 
voters. The ‘outsider-strategy’ aims to achieve activation through the provision of good jobs 
for both low- and high-skilled individuals, through wages above the poverty line (for 
example a minimum wage) and upgrading of flexible or atypical work. Consequently, not 
only high-skilled outsiders, but also low-skilled outsiders benefit from social investment.  
Thus, if the social democratic party is confronted with a challenger for the low-skilled 
voters in a majoritarian system, it will pursue an ‘outsider-strategy’ and combines social 
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investment with the redistribution logic (H3a). The social democratic party will appeal to 
low-skilled and high-skilled outsiders (H3b).   
 
The third competitive constellation includes rival parties for both the low- and high-skilled 
segments of the social democratic electorate. For example, in some proportional systems, 
we find a strong right populist party and a green party competing for the social democratic 
electorate. Or the left block is divided into a moderate left, a radical left and a green party. 
This is a challenging constellation for the social democratic party, as the party must fear for 
the electoral support of both the working and the middle class electorate. For example, the 
high-skilled segment of the social democratic electorate, the socio-cultural professionals,  
represents also the electoral base for green parties on grounds of their environmental, 
libertarian and pro-immigration attitudes (Dolezal 2010). Because young socio-cultural 
professionals are in many countries the exemplary type of high-skilled outsiders, especially 
in the case of women (see Schwander and Häusermann 2012), the social democratic party 
must address the economic concerns of high-skilled outsiders to mobilise this part of its 
electorate. The situation of the social democratic party is further complicated by the 
presence of a Christian democratic party. The Christian democratic party is a challenging 
rival as the party is (at least) co-responsible for the creation of a welfare state based on the 
principle of social insurance (Esping-Andersen 1990, van Kersbergen 1995, Huber and 
Stephens 2001, van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). As a response to the presence of a 
Christian democratic party, the social democratic party will emphasises the social insurance 
logic in addition to the redistribution and social investment logics. However, emphasising 
social insurance entails an electoral risk: The strategy jeopardises economic performance 
because the social insurance logic includes strict employment protection and high labour 
costs, which hamper job growth and, especially, the creation of low-paid jobs in the private 
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service sector (see Iversen and Wren 1998). However, the economic performance is of 
crucial importance for any government that wants to be re-elected (Powell and Whitten 
1993, van der Brug et al. 2007, Duch and Stevenson 2008) and parties must appear capable 
of governing the economy efficiently (Green-Pedersen and van Keersbergen 2002). The 
social democratic party faces thus a trade-off between the need to protect the interests of  
low-skilled insiders and the need for a flexible and efficient organisation of the labour 
market that creates economic growth and reduces unemployment (see Kitschelt 2003, who 
discusses the trade-off between social protection and economic performance for the German 
parties from 1990-2002). Additionally, the strategy of dualisation risks to put off the middle 
class which is more concerned with economic prosperity and opening employment 
opportunities than with employment protection. Hence, the social democratic party will 
stress the social insurance logic only if it risks losing the low-skilled insiders otherwise. In 
this constellation, the social democratic party does not want to neglect one of its electoral 
segments and broadens the electoral appeal perusing an ‘encompassing strategy’. Hence, if 
confronted with a competitor for the low-skilled electorate, a competitor for the high-skilled 
electorate and a Christian democratic party, I expect the social democratic party to 
emphasise all three logics that are beneficial for its electorate: Redistribution, social 
investment, and social insurance (H4a). The social democratic party will appeal equally to 
low-skilled outsiders, low-skilled insiders, and high-skilled outsiders (H4b). 
 
I examine the electoral strategies of the social democratic party30 in six West European 
countries which allow analysing their electoral strategies in three competitive constellations. 
While the majoritarian system in Britain prevents a competitor of Labour at the margins of 
                                                
30 I use the expression social democratic party for the French Socialist party, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
party, the Dutch Labour party, the Swiss and German Social democratic party and the British Labour party. 
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the political spectrum, Labour faces the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, two 
rivals for the votes of the high-skilled (see Kriesi et al. 2008). By contrast, the Socialist 
party in France struggles with both left and right populist competitors for the votes of their 
low-skilled electorate: Several radical left parties such as Lutte Ouvrière, Parti Communist 
or Ligue Révolutionaire compete with economic arguments for the working class (Sperber 
2010) while the right populist party attracts voters through opposition to the cultural issues 
of globalisation, immigration and Europeanisation (Bornschier 2010). The two round-
majoritarian formula used in French national elections encourages voters to support parties 
with little chances of victory in the first round (Blais and Loewen 2009). Consequently, the 
system does not reduce the number of parties as strongly as pure majoritarian systems, but 
in the second round of the election the competition takes place between the main party of 
the left and the main party of the right (Bornschier and Lachat 2009).31 Similarly, in Spain, 
the social democratic party must win the support of the middle class to constitute the 
government due to the large electoral districts. At the same time, a coalition of radical left 
parties, the Izquierda Unida, competes for the low-skilled voters under the leadership of the 
communist party. In Germany, the Christian democratic party is the main rival on the right, 
while the only competitor on the left was the green party until the mid 2000s. However, 
since the implementation of the reform project Agenda 2010, Die Linke emerged as a 
radical left competitor. We find the same constellation of competition for both the low- and 
high-skilled electorate in the Netherlands and in Switzerland.  
Hence, I expect the British Labour party to pursue a ’middle class’-strategy. The French and 
Spanish Socialists are expected to follow an ‘outsider’- strategy, while the social democratic 
parties in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland should follow an ‘encompassing’-
                                                
31 A famous exception is the presidential election in 2002, where the candidate of the right populist Front 
National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the candidate of the right UMP, Jacques Chirac, reached the second round 
of the election.  
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strategy. Table 2 displays the competitive configurations, the resulting electoral strategies 
for the social democratic party and the country examples for each configuration.32 
 
Table 2: Competitive configurations, electoral strategies and country examples 
  Competition for low-skilled votes (left wing and right populist) 
  yes no 
Additional 
competition for 
high-skilled votes 
(new left, green or 
liberal) 
yes 
H4: Encompassing strategy:  
Social investment, social insurance, 
redistribution 
H2: Middle class strategy:  
Social investment, liberal logic 
 
LSO, LSI, HSO LSO, HSO, HSI 
Countries: DE, CH, NL Country: Britain 
no 
H3: Outsider strategy:  
Social investment, redistribution  
LSO, HSO  
 Countries: FR, ES  
Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO =high-skilled outsiders, HSI = high-
skilled insiders. 
 
 
Methods and data  
To analyse the electoral strategies of social democratic parties we need parties’ positions 
and salience regarding the issues that are relevant for insiders and outsiders, i.e. labour 
market regulation and social policies. A new dataset was generated by an extensive content 
analysis based on human coding of newspapers reports of electoral campaigns in each 
country in the context of a wider project. Data are based on the most important national 
elections. For France, data are based on the presidential election of 2007. For Switzerland, 
data are based on the parliamentary election of 2007, for Spain on the same election of 
2008. Data for Germany are based on the parliamentary election of 2009 and for the 
                                                
32 Because there is no two-party system in Europe, the lower right quadrant of Table 2 remains empty. 
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Netherlands and Britain, the data are based on the 2010 parliamentary elections. As 
database for the content analysis serve the quality newspaper and the tabloid with the 
highest prints runs.33 
Selected were all newspaper articles referring to labour market and social policies during 
the last two months of the electoral campaign. Included are all labour market related 
policies such as labour market regulation, minimum wage, active and passive labour market 
policies, unemployment schemes as well as policies about the reconciliation of work and 
family and old age pensions. All articles were coded sentence-by-sentence using a method 
developed by Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001) and Kriesi and collaborators (Kriesi et al. 
2008a, Kriesi et al. 2012). The following table shows the selected newspaper, the election 
year and the number of coded statements. 
 
Table 3: Description of selected years, newspapers and number of statements 
Country Election year Newspaper Party 
No. of coded 
statements 
Britain 2010 The Times, The Sun British Labour Party – Labour 212 
Spain 2008 El Pais, 20 minutos Partido Socialista Obrero Español –PSOE 126 
France 2007 Le Monde, Le Parisien Parti Socialiste – PSF 110 
Germany 2009 Die Süddeutsche, Bild Sozialdemokratische Partei – SPD 467 
Netherlands  2010 Algmeen Dagblad,  NRC Handelsblad Partij van der Arbeid – PvdA 77 
Switzerland 2007 Neue Züricher Zeitung, Blick Sozialdemokratische Partei – SPS 132 
 
I re-coded the statements according to two categories: welfare logics and interests of a 
distributive group. For this, I rely on a detailed coding scheme that distinguishes more than 
                                                
33 In the Netherlands, no genuine tabloid exists. We therefore selected a widespread tabloid-style newspaper 
(see Kriesi et al. 2012). 
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70 issues depending on the national social policy debate. Table 4 shows a few exemplary 
policies, an extensive overview can be found in appendix 1. 
 
Table 4: Policies grouped by welfare logics and interests of distributive groups 
 Outsider Insider 
Low-
skilled 
Redistribution: 
Increase of minimum 
pension  
Social insurance: 
No wage-dumping  
Redistribution: 
Lowering of 
retirement age  
Social insurance: 
Protect existing 
jobs  
Social investment: 
Job creation  
Liberal:  
Reduction of 
unemployment 
benefits  (-1) 
Social investment: 
Vocational training 
Liberal:  
Increase of 
retirement age (-1) 
High-
skilled 
Redistribution: 
Higher pension 
benefits  
Social insurance: 
Advanced training  
Redistribution: 
Higher pension 
benefits  
Social insurance: 
Equivalence 
principle  
Social investment: 
Policies to reconcile 
work and family 
Liberal:  
Flexibilisation of 
labour market 
Social investment: 
Subsidised private 
pension plans 
Liberal:  
Expansion of 
private saving 
plans 
 
The first set of categories refers to the welfare logics. This classification helps us to discern 
the general welfare orientation of parties. In times when distributive conflicts are not only 
about more or less redistribution (Fernàndez-Albertos and Manzano 2011) and traditional 
lines between pro and contra welfare state parties have become blurred (Ross 2000, 
Kitschelt 2001), this insight is relevant for the literature on political parties and welfare state 
research alike. Statements that imply a distribution from ‘better-offs’ to ‘have-nots’ are 
attributed to the redistribution logic. Policies that reinforce the equivalence principle, 
protect existing jobs or preserve existing social rights belong to the social insurance logic. 
Social investment policies have an activating effect, i.e. they bring people to work, either by 
enhancing their employability or creating new employment opportunities. Policies implying 
a retrenchment of the welfare state or a strengthening of market mechanisms are ascribed to 
Chapter 3 
 123 
the liberal logic of the welfare state. The statements are coded in a 0/1 way: a statement 
either fortifies a logic or is neutral in its effect. 
The second set of categories refers to the interests of a distributive group. Each statement 
can either improve the situation of a specific distributive group or reduce an existing social 
right. Hence, the statements have a direction, which is measured by a three-point scale: 0 
means a neutral, +1 a positive and -1 a negative relationship between the political actor and 
the distributive group. Obviously, policies have effects on more than one group, and for 
some policies one could argue that they are beneficial for all or most of all individuals. For 
example, improved childcare facilities benefit not only women but also their partners who 
can now count on a second income without having to reduce their working hours. Also, 
everyone wants the fight against unemployment to be won. However, most statements 
concern some groups more immediately than others and, from a rational-choice perspective, 
should matter more for them than for others. Hence, I code the distributive effects only for 
those group(s) whose situation is directly affected. Nevertheless, a statement can change the 
situation of more than one group directly. For example, to improve public or affordable 
childcare facilities is in the interest of both high- and low skilled outsiders, while a lowering 
of the retirement age is beneficial for low-skilled insiders and low-skilled outsiders. A 
statement can also address more than one welfare logic. The minimum wage, for example, 
has both a redistributive and activating effect: as the minimum wage is clearly aimed at 
reducing poverty and preventing a class of ‘working poor’, it is a redistributive benefit, but 
because the minimum wage benefits only those in employment, it has an activation effect, 
and therefore belongs to the social investment logic. It follows that one statement can 
generate more than one observation. 
Policies that aim to enhance employment opportunities by creating new jobs, reducing 
working hours or providing policies to reconcile work and family such as external 
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childcare, all-day schools or the right for flexible work hours are in the interests of outsiders 
because women are disproportionately often outsiders (see Schwander and Häusermann 
2012). Similarly, policies that increase the incentives to take up employment concern 
outsiders. For example, attempts to eliminate discrimination at work or closing the gender 
wage gap concern high-and low-skilled outsiders, while a minimum wage or tax breaks are 
in the interests of low-skilled outsiders. However, incentives to work can also be increased 
in a punitive way, for example by reducing social benefits or pushing unemployed to accept 
any jobs at the risk of that they remain working poor or lose the job again. Despite having 
an activating effect, these punitive workfare policies are not in the interests of outsiders. 
Therefore, I assign -1 for statements that aim to push outsiders to work by reducing social 
benefits.  
Policies that protect existing jobs or flexibilise the labour market only at the margins match 
the interests of low-skilled insiders. I do not code these policies as favourable for high-
skilled insiders as they are not threatened by the flexibilisation of labour markets due to 
their high levels of human capital. In the interests of high-skilled insiders are all policies 
that strengthen market mechanisms, for example the promotion of private old-age provision. 
However, if private pension provision is publicly subsidized, it matches not only the 
interests of high-skilled insiders but also of high-skilled outsiders: Due to their irregular 
contribution records, high-skilled outsiders are often punished by occupational, 
contribution-based pension systems, but the public, often flat-rate, pension is not in their 
favour either because of their higher earnings. Tax-supported private pension plans offer a 
possible solution.  
The following sentence serves as a coding example: When asked why her party deserves the 
vote, Harriet Harman says “Our Equality Act will protect women from discrimination at 
work.” Harriet Harman is a member of the British Labour party. The sentence is therefore 
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attributed to the British Labour party. I attribute the sentence to the particular welfare 
logic(s) and to the distributive group(s) in whose interest (s) the proposal lays. The Equality 
Act will increase the incentives for women to work because they do not need to fear 
discrimination. All policies with an activating effect refer to the social investment logic. 
Therefore, I code +1 for the social investment logic and 0 for all other logics. Regarding the 
distributive groups, the statement clearly aims for enhancing the employability of women, 
regardless of skills. Because outsiders are over-proportionally female (see Schwander and 
Häusermann 2012), I code +1 for both low-skilled and high-skilled outsiders (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Coding example 
 
Liberal logic 0 Low-skilled outsider 1 
Redistribution logic 0 Low-skilled insider 0 
Social investment logic 1 High-skilled outsider 1 
Social insurance logic 0 High-skilled insider 0 
 
From this data, I construct indicators for the salience of a welfare logic and the electoral 
orientation of a party. The salience of a welfare logic is expressed by the relative frequency 
with which the party announces a position that refers to this logic. The electoral orientation 
is measured by the relative frequency by which the propositions intend to protect the 
interests of a distributive group. 
 
 
Empirical analysis 
I begin with showing why social investment is important for social democratic parties 
regardless of the competitive constellation. I then analyse differences in the social 
democratic electoral strategies in various competitive constellations.  
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Table 6 displays the salience of the four different welfare logics as percentages of 
statements that refers to a welfare logic. Due to the importance of social investment, the 
most important issues for this logic are listed separately as percentages of social investment 
statements.  
 
Table 6: Salience of welfare logics for social democratic parties 
 
Logic Britain France Spain Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Liberal 15.1 8.6 3.0 12.0 13.3 4.3 
Redistribution 25.4 36.7 39.3 26.1 25.3 26.8 
Social investment 32.7 44.5 54.8 37.9 32.5 43.9 
Job creation as % of social 
investment 14.0 21.1 13.5 17.2 18.5 - 
Minimum wage as % of social 
investment  21.4 12.3 17.6 14.8 - 1.4 
Family-work reconciliation as 
% of social investment 7.7 - 50.0 22.1 48.1 58.3 
Social insurance 26.8 10.2 3.0 24.0 28.9 18.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 6 shows that – as expected in the first hypothesis – the social investment logic is the 
most salient logic for the social democratic electoral strategy in all countries. One of the 
most important issues in Britain, Spain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands was the 
creation of jobs and job programs: Even without the numerous statements referring to 
unemployment as a pressing issue, between 13.5 percent (Spain) and 18.5 percent (the 
Netherlands) of all statements promised explicitly to create jobs. In Britain, Labour 
guaranteed (re-)training for all unemployed and promised to create high-skilled jobs and to 
increase work incentives for women: It supported an extension of parental leave and a right 
for flexible working hours. In France, jobs should be created especially for young 
unemployed (so called ‘springboard-jobs’) while the Spanish Socialists promised jobs for 
young adults and women. In Germany, the SPD’s campaign for new jobs and a better 
reconciliation of work and family through the provision of childcare and all-day schools 
explains the salience of the social investment logic. Considering the high share of female 
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outsiders in Germany and the low levels of public childcare provision, it makes sense for 
the SPD to link these two demands. In Switzerland and Spain, too, the social democratic 
party campaigned for affordable and high-quality childcare and an extension of paternity 
leave. In the Netherlands, the PdvA proposed retraining for redundant employees to fight 
unemployment and tax credits for low-paid jobs. The introduction or the increase of the 
minimum wage was another important social investment issue in Britain, Spain, France and 
Germany. 
 
In addition to confirming the first hypothesis, Table 6 shows that the social investment logic 
is not the only salient logic but that social democratic parties employ various combinations 
of logics in their electoral campaigns. The second part of the analysis is dedicated to these 
differences.  
In Britain, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives compete for the high-skilled 
segment of Labour’s electorate, while Labour is the only representative of the working 
class. I therefore expect Labour to emphasise the liberal logic in addition to the social 
investment logic (H2a) and to pursue a middle class-strategy (H2b). Figure 1 presents the 
salience of the welfare logics and Labour’s electoral orientation. As a statement can be in 
favour of or against the interests of a distributive group, the bars in light grey represent the 
share of statements in favour of a particular distributive group,  while the bars in dark grey 
represent the share of statements against it.   
  
 
The electoral strategies of social democratic parties 
 128 
 
 
Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO = high-skilled outsiders, HSI = 
high-skilled insiders 
 
Figure 1: Salience of welfare state logics and Labour’s electoral orientation 
 
From Figure 1 we gain three insights: First, – and surprisingly – we see that the social 
insurance logic is highly salient in the electoral campaign. This is partly related to Labour’s 
attempts to connect education with firm-intern training and its aim to re-establish the link 
between earnings and pension benefits. But around two-third of all social insurance 
proposals go back to the need to increase national insurance contributions. Financing the 
welfare state through social contributions lies at the heart of the social insurance state 
(Palier 2010a). To raise social contributions to finance social benefits means therefore to re-
enforce the social insurance logic. However, in the case of rising national insurance 
contributions, the strengthening of the social insurance logic has a retrenching effect for all 
distributive groups, because it means lower net incomes and higher non-wage labour costs. 
As the governing party, Labour was responsible for the increase of social contributions and 
did not deny any plans to do so. Because of the retrenching effect of the contribution 
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increase and its importance during the electoral campaign, I highlight the share of 
statements referring to it in Figure 1. If we exclude these statements, social insurance is 
much less salient (10.4 percent). As these social insurance statements have a retrenching 
effect, they could also be added to the liberal logic. This would increase the share of liberal 
statements to 31.5 percent, rendering the liberal logic as salient as social investment. Even 
without, the liberal logic – and this is the second important finding – is significantly more 
salient in Britain than in any other country, accounting for 15.2 percent of all statements.34 
H2a is thus confirmed. 
Furthermore, we find a high share of negative statements on the right side of Figure 1, 
which adds to the impression that cutting back the state and reducing its responsibilities 
were important in the electoral campaign of Labour. Contributing to the high share of 
negative statements and the salience of the liberal logic are Labour’s proposal to dismiss the 
statutory retirement age or its promises to get tough on unemployed. We also see that 
Labour aimed to reduce the rights of low-skilled outsiders more than any other social 
democratic party.35 However, it would be misleading to argue that Labour pursues a logic of 
deregulation and retrenchment only given the high share of statements aiming to improve 
the situation of low-skilled outsiders and the overall salience of the redistribution logic. 
This is the third insight of Figure 1. Almost 20 percent of Labour’s social policy 
propositions matched the interests of low-skilled outsiders. Labour proposed to increase the 
minimum wage and to introduce tax credits to supplement low wages. Labour also pledged 
to tackle unemployment, especially youth unemployment, for example by guaranteeing a 
                                                
34 As a robustness test, I compared the pattern from 2010 with the pattern in 2005, when the social 
contribution hike was not an important issue. In 2005, the liberal logic accounts for 17 percent of all social 
policy statements and has thus the same importance as in 2010 if we exclude the statements referring to the 
social contribution hike. Moreover, the social investment logic was also the most salient logic in 2005 
accounting for almost 40 percent of all statements. Further, t-tests indicate significant differences between the 
salience of the liberal logic in Britain and each other country at the p< 0.01 (exception: NL: p< 0.05). 
35 T-tests indicate significant differences at the p< 0.01 between the share of negative statements for low-
skilled outsiders in Britain and each other country.   
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job or a training program to young unemployed, policies that all follow the social 
investment logic.  
In line with the expectation, Labour follows a middle-class strategy aimed to mobilise both 
high-skilled insiders and outsiders. By contrast, Labour addressed the interests of low-
skilled outsiders stronger than expected, which – I would argue – is an unintentional side 
effect of its middle-class strategy. Activation is mainly promoted to satisfy the middle class, 
which has an economic but also a moral interest in activation as support for the weakest 
members of the society corresponds to the values of solidarity of the libertarian part of the 
middle class (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998). Nevertheless, and despite the fact 
that activation is coupled with liberal instead of redistributive policies, low-skilled outsiders 
benefit from the activation policies. H2b is thus only partly confirmed. 
 
According to the third hypothesis, the social democratic parties in France and Spain should 
follow an ‘outsider’-strategy. Their policy proposals should emphasise the redistribution 
logic in addition to the social investment logic and correspond to the interests of low- and 
high-skilled outsiders. The left side of Figure 2 displays the salience of the welfare logics 
while the right side shows how the propositions correspond to the interests of the 
distributive groups in France and Spain.  
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Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO =high-skilled outsiders, HSI = high-skilled 
insiders 
 
Figure 2: Salience of welfare state logics and electoral orientation of social democratic parties 
in France and Spain 
 
From Figure 2 we see that the redistribution logic is the second most important logic in 
France and Spain – a finding supportive of H3a. The importance of the minimum wage 
contributed to the salience of both logics as the minimum wage has both a redistributive and 
social investment aspect. It also explains the high share of statements matching the interests 
of low-skilled outsiders. A second important topic concerned lifting of pension benefits 
above poverty levels, especially for individuals with low contribution records. This matters 
for low-skilled insiders and outsiders but a promised increase of all pension benefits in 
Spain is relevant for high-skilled outsiders too. Moreover, policies to reconcile work and 
family and promises to create new jobs contribute to the relatively high share of statements 
in the high-skilled outsiders’ interests in Spain as expected in hypothesis 3b. Figure 2 
confirms that the social democratic party in France and Spain tried to mobilise low-and 
high-skilled outsiders, thus following an ‘outsider’-strategy.  
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For the last constellation with competition for the entire social democratic electorate, I 
analyse the social democratic strategy in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
According to hypothesis 4, its campaign should try to mobilise all segments of its electorate 
following an ‘encompassing strategy’. Figure 3 shows the salience of the welfare logics in 
the upper half of the figure and the electoral orientation of social democratic parties in the 
lower half.  
 
 
Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO = high-skilled outsiders, HSI = 
high-skilled insiders 
 
Figure 3: Salience of welfare state logics and electoral orientation of social 
democratic parties in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
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Figure 3 reveals two important findings. First, as expected, the social democratic parties 
emphasise social insurance and redistribution in addition to social investment. In all three 
countries, the social democratic position in the pension debate contributed to the salience of 
the redistribution logic. In the Netherlands, for instance, the PvdA fiercely defended the 
level of the state pension AOW (algemeene ouderdomswet), which is a flat-rate benefit and 
in its effect highly redistributive, benefiting both low-skilled insiders and outsiders. 
Similarly, the Swiss social democratic party proposed to increase benefit levels of the 
redistributive, public first pillar (Alters- und Hinterbliebendenversicherung) and argued for 
a subsidised flexibilisation of the retirement age for low-income earners. In Germany, the 
minimum wage was an important topic with regard to the redistribution logic. 
The Swiss pension debate also added to the salience of the social insurance logic as the SPS 
defended the levels of the contribution-based, occupational second pillar of the Swiss multi-
pillar pension system. But more important in this regard is the SPS’s campaign for more 
apprenticeship positions. Despite the fact that youth unemployment is comparatively low in 
Switzerland (3.3 percent in 2007), unemployment among young adults between 15-24 years 
was higher than the national average of 2.8 percent (Seco 2008). An early integration in the 
labour market via the dual vocational training system is regarded as crucial for economic 
success in Switzerland. Youth unemployment is therefore highly salient and coupled with a 
demand for more apprenticeship positions. To achieve this, the SPS argued for a ‘fund for 
apprenticeships’ (Bildungsfond) which would reimburse commendable companies for their 
training efforts. More apprenticeship positions help young adults to gain a firm position in 
the labour market regardless of their risk for atypical employment and correspond therefore 
to the interests of both low-skilled insiders and outsiders.  
In the Netherlands, in addition to the activation policies previously discussed, the PvdA 
stood for strong employment protection and refused a further reduction of the earning-
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related unemployment benefit (werkloosheidswet uitkering). These passive labour market 
policy proposals add to the salience of the social insurance logic and suit the needs of low-
skilled insiders. In Germany, the elections were held in the midst of the economic crisis that 
followed the financial crisis of 2008. Consequently, the SPD promoted short-time work and 
promised stimulus programmes to save jobs, especially jobs from car manufacturer Opel. 
These measures to protect existing jobs correspond to the social insurance logic and most of 
all the interests of low-skilled insiders. The stimulus package entailed also the creation of 
jobs, a social investment component benefiting outsiders. Another important social 
insurance issue was the guarantee that existing pension benefits would never be shortened 
(Rentengarantie), what benefits insiders most of all because of their full contribution 
records. 
As a second important point, the importance of the social investment logic means that the 
policy proposals of the social democratic parties matter to high-skilled outsiders, albeit to a 
lesser extent in the Netherlands than in Germany and Switzerland. The discussion of the 
individual topics and the right side of Figure 3 show that the social democratic party intends 
to mobilise a broad electoral coalition of low-skilled insiders as well as  low- and high-
skilled outsiders. One qualification must be made: the SPD does not focus as strongly on 
low-skilled insiders as the PvdA and the SPS, which may be a remnant from the Agenda 
2010.36 Nevertheless, I interpret these findings as supportive for H4b.  
 
 
                                                
36 This shows in the lower share of statements in favour of low-skilled insiders in Germany compared to the 
share of statements in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Furthermore, the shares of pro low-skilled insider-
statements do not significantly differ between the encompassing countries and the outsider-countries. because 
France has a slightly higher share of pro low-skilled insider statements than expected due to its campaign for 
higher pension benefits for low-income earners and the retirement age 60 which were in the interests of low-
skilled outsiders but benefit also low-skilled insiders.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has examined the electoral strategies of social democratic parties in the context 
of labour market dualisation. I have argued that party competition matters for the electoral 
strategy of  social democratic parties. The presence of one or several competitors for 
specific segments of its electorate compels the party to focus on those segments and to 
address the concerns of this contested electorate. Let me summarise the most important 
findings before discussing implications and alternative explanations of my findings. The 
analysis of the social policy proposals during the electoral campaigns in six West European 
countries has shown that social democratic parties do not only represent insiders but aim to 
mobilise a larger electoral coalition and that outsiders may be part of the electoral coalition 
too. Instead of defending the interests of insiders on any account, they rather promote a 
welfare state based on the social investment logic. This allows for a large electoral coalition 
between insiders and outsiders, since the social investment logic is seen as viable option to 
combine an efficient labour market with social justice. 
The second point of this article is that the electoral focus of social democratic parties 
depends on the competitive constellation within the party system. In Britain, Labour 
emphasised social insurance policies next to the social investment logic. However, since 
most of the social insurance statements had a retrenching and not a protecting effect, they 
add to the importance of the liberal logic and confirm the expectation that Labour follows a 
middle class-strategy of mobilising the high-skilled segments of its electorate. In France and 
Spain, the social democratic party follows an outsider-strategy promoting social investment 
and redistributive policies and appealing to both low- and high-skilled outsiders. In 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the social democratic party pursues an 
encompassing electoral strategy. They broaden their electoral appeal by emphasising 
The electoral strategies of social democratic parties 
 136 
redistribution, social investment and social insurance. Their proposals thus address low-
skilled insiders, low-skilled outsiders and high-skilled outsiders. 
However, I have analysed the social democratic electoral strategies in different competitive 
constellations without observing the direct effect of my explanatory variable, party 
competition, what renders causal claims difficult. Fortunately, the German party 
constellation changed in the 2000s when a new party left from the social democrats 
established itself in the party system. This enables us to compare the electoral strategies of 
the SPD before and after the emergence of the new competitor. Before 2005, the SPD faced 
competition for its high-skilled electorate by the green party. But the presence of a strong 
Christian democratic party with its stance as a co-founder of the social insurance based 
welfare state implies a higher salience of the social insurance logic. Hence, I expect the 
SPD to first promote social investment to mobilise high-skilled outsiders, followed by the 
social insurance logic due to the competition with the Christian democratic party.  
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Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO = high-skilled outsiders, HSI = high-skilled 
insiders. 
 
Figure 4: Salience of welfare state logics and electoral orientation of social democratic 
parties in Germany, 1998 and 2002 
 
Figure 4 shows the electoral strategies of the SPD in 1998 and 2002. The results indicate a 
clear break in the electoral strategies of 1998 and 2002 compared to 2009 (see Figure 3). In 
1998, the social democratic party promoted first social investment, followed by the social 
insurance logic. The social investment logic was dominated by the discussion of how to 
reconcile work and family. Topics were the introduction of flexible working hours and all-
day schools (28.2 percent of all social investment statements), the Kombi-Lohn (a wage 
subsidy for low-skilled jobs for unemployed, 14.3 percent), and the guarantee for 
apprenticeship positions for youngsters (10.2 percent). Further, the SPD promised to undo 
the social policy reforms of the Christian democratic-liberal coalition which has reduced 
employment protection, pension benefits and replacement rates for sickness benefits in the 
previous legislative period. Almost 2/3 of the social insurance statements promised to undo 
these reforms.  
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In 2002, the programmatic idea of the Agenda 2010 was already approaching: social 
insurance was abandoned and the social democratic party focused almost exclusively on 
social investment, especially on the recently published proposals of the Hartz commission. 
30 percent of its social policy statements endorsed or defended what later would be known 
as the Hartz laws. The abandonment of the social insurance logic appears also in the high 
share of negative statements towards low-skilled insiders (13.3 percent of all social policy 
statements). Between 2002 and 2009 the competitive constellation changed: As a reaction to 
the reforms that were enacted in the ensuing legislation by the red-green government, the 
left competitor Die Linke came into existence through the fusion of the WASG (Arbeit und 
soziale Gerechtigkeit – die Wahlalternative), which had been  formed by disappointed SPD 
and union members and the East-German ex-communist PDS (Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus). Indeed, in West Germany, 40 percent of voters for Die Linke have voted for 
the social democrats in the previous election (Schoen and Falter 2005: 37). As a reaction to 
the new left competitor, the SPD changed its electoral strategy to the encompassing 
approach we have seen in Figure 3.  
 
In addition to the changed party constellation, a different understanding of the state’s role in 
the economy acerbates differences between Spain and France on the one hand and Britain 
on the other. In liberal Britain, the state is a ‘laissez faire’ state that sets only the rules for 
the interactions between market players (Schmidt 2009). Consequently, the idea of 
liberalisation and deregulation is more popular among the middle class in these countries 
than in countries where the state is a powerful actor in the economy. In these ‘state-led’ 
economies (Royo 2008, Schmidt 2009), the idea of a powerful state intervening in the 
economy is common not only in the left discourse but also in the right discourse (Schmid 
2009). Consequently, the idea of dismantling the state is less popular among the middle 
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class in France and Spain and the social democratic party is more cautious to push for 
liberalisation than in liberal countries.  
 
I have shown that parties base their electoral campaigns on different welfare logics to 
mobilise a large electoral coalition. The paper takes up the differentiation between the 
general welfare state and its various distributive dimensions (or logics). In times where 
labour market and welfare state reforms imply different distributive implications for social 
groups and social democratic governments are responsive for many of these reforms, this 
insight is relevant for the literature on political representation. It is also relevant for the 
research on political parties which often treats parties as either pro or contra welfare parties. 
The article provides further insights for the research on political parties and party 
competition. In contrast to most of the literature about partisan effects on the welfare state, 
which equates the position of a party with the position of its core constituency, I argue that 
we should not merely focus on preferences and interests of a party’s core constituency. 
Rather, we need to consider the preferences and interests of contested segments of the 
electorate, since these voters are ‘at risk’ to vote for a rival party. Thus, with regards to the 
mobilisation of insiders and outsiders, patterns of party competition explain whether social 
democratic parties are insider parties or try to integrate outsiders in their electoral 
coalitions, a finding that contributes to the debate about the role of social democracy in 
shaping dualisation.  
 
My findings are clearly at odds with some of the findings in the literature on the link 
between social democracy and dualisation, most prominently with Rueda’s argument that 
social democratic governments promote insider- instead of outsider-policies (see Rueda 
2006, 2007). For example, he shows that the Spanish and Dutch social democratic 
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governments retained strict employment protection for standard employment when 
confronted with unemployment and slogging economic growth between 1970 and 2000, and 
associates Labour’s return to power in the mid 1990s with avowedly ‘timid attempts to 
promote insiders [employment] protection’ (Rueda 2007: 105). Indeed, Spain is considered 
as one of the most dualised countries (Fernàndez-Albertos and Manzano 2011, Häusermann 
et al. forthcoming). How can we explain these different findings regarding the insider-
orientation of social democracy? One of the reasons lies in the analytical focus of the two 
studies. Rueda examines the policies of social democratic governments because he wants to 
show how social democratic parties actually promoted dualisation in office. He also takes 
into account the role of unions as representative of insiders. By contrast, I am interested in 
parties’ responses to dualisation in the electoral arena. Furthermore, if we are interested in 
whether dualisation is a politically relevant conflict line, the analysis of electoral campaigns 
enables us to study the link between parties and voter groups more directly, as parties are 
forced to express their positions in a short time (Kriesi et al. 2008: 55) and voters evaluate 
parties based on the electoral campaigns (Lachat 2010). 
A second reason lies in the analysed time period. In contrast to Rueda, who covers the 
period between 1970 and 2000, I analyse the late 2000s. By that time, the strategy of 
dualisation is seen less suited to deal with unemployment, but is itself seen as problematic, 
as high entry barriers hinder the creation of jobs. Thus, the need to integrate less productive 
segments of the labour force in the labour market has become widely acknowledged by 
social democratic parties (Bonoli and Powell 2004). Additionally, the share of outsiders has 
been growing over the past decades as the job growth in the EU has been driven largely by 
atypical employment (Plougmann 2003, OECD 2006, 2010). As a consequence, targeting 
outsiders becomes more attractive for social democratic parties.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Extensive coding scheme for the classification of statements into welfare 
logics and interests of distributive groups 
Policy Welfare logic LSO LSI HSO HSI 
Labour market policies       
Maintaining or increasing employment 
protection Social insurance  +   
Protect existing jobs Social insurance  +   
Wage increase Social insurance  +  + 
Performance based pay Social insurance, liberal logic  +  + 
Active labour market policies Social investment +  +  
Job creation, job creating programs Social investment +  +  
Redistribution of work, reduction of the 
working week without salary compensation Social investment   +  
Upgrading of flexible employment Social investment +  +  
Vocational training Social investment + +   
Policies against (gender) labour market 
discrimination or the gender wage gap Social investment +  +  
Policies to ingrate the elderly in the labour 
market Social investment +  +  
Fight against unemployment  Social investment +  +  
DE: Introduction or defence of Agenda 2010 Social investment + - +  
Increase of benefit or duration of ALG I Social insurance  +  + 
Increase of ALG II Redistribution +    
Fight against youth unemployment  Social investment +  ES &FR:     +  
Flexibilisation and deregulation of labour 
market 
Social investment, 
liberal logic   +  
Reduce labour costs, reduction of social 
contributions 
Social investment, 
liberal logic + + + + 
Reduction of unemployment benefit to increase 
incentives to work 
Social investment, 
liberal logic -  -  
Higher pressure on unemployed to accept jobs Social investment, liberal logic -  -  
Introduction or increase of minimum wage Social investment, redistribution +    
Reduction of the working week with salary 
compensation (FR: 35h working week) 
Social investment, 
redistribution  - +  
FR: tax relief for overtime Social insurance  +  + 
Advanced training Social investment, social insurance  + + + 
Stimulus packages Social investment, social insurance + + +  
Support for small and middle enterprises Liberal logic    + 
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Pensions      
Subsidised lowering of the retirement age Redistribution + +   
Increase of minimum pension Redistribution +    
Increase of pension benefit, pension benefit 
guarantee (DE: “Rentengarantie”) Redistribution + + + + 
Expansion of state, flat rate pension pillar  Redistribution + +   
Flexibilisation of retirement Social investment   + + 
Subsidized private pension saving plans Social investment   + + 
Education credits for pension system Social investment +  +  
Part-time retirement with mandatory 
replacement by younger employee Social investment + + + + 
Lowering of the retirement age Social insurance  +   
Expansion of occupational pension pillar Social insurance  + + + 
Against increase of the retirement age Redistribution, social insurance + +   
Increase of retirement age, abandoning of 
statutory retirement age Liberal logic - -   
Extension of private old age provision Liberal logic - -   
Lowering of benefits for pensioners Liberal logic - - - - 
      
Social contributions and benefits      
Increase of social contributions Social insurance - - - - 
Contribution-dependent benefits Social insurance - +  + 
Needs-based benefits Redistribution +    
Lowering of benefits Liberal logic - -   
Promotion of equivalence principle Social insurance  +  + 
Tighter eligibility criteria for social benefits Social insurance, liberal logic  +  + 
Inclusion of all employment forms in social 
insurance scheme 
Social investment, 
social insurance + + + + 
      
Policies to reconcile work and family      
Policies to reconcile work and family Social investment +  +  
Right for flexible work hours, right for part-
time when working full-time or full-time when 
working part-time 
Social investment +  +  
Expansion of paid maternity or paternity leave Social investment +  +  
Expansion of affordable, high-quality childcare, 
all-day schools, kindergartens Social investment +  +  
Free childcare, kindergartens Social investment, redistribution +  +  
      
State responsibility      
Retrenchment of welfare state or state 
responsibilities Liberal logic -   - + 
Business-friendly policies Liberal logic    + 
Note: LSO = low-skilled outsiders, LSI = low-skilled insiders, HSO =high-skilled outsiders, HSI = high-
skilled insiders.
  
  
Chapter 4: The politics of dualisation: The electoral behaviour 
of insiders and outsiders in Germany, France and Britain 
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Introduction 
The financial crisis starting in 2008 and the following international debt crisis plunged 
Europe into a deep economic recession. This economic downturn was accompanied by 
rising unemployment levels and reinforced the deep divide between insiders, who are firmly 
integrated in the labour market and whose secure jobs protect them from most of the 
consequences of the economic downturn, and outsiders with only weak labour market 
attachment. But even before the crisis shifted the attention of the media to those 
‘indignados’, women, young and low-skilled individuals have found it increasingly hard to 
compete in the labour market and struggled between spells of temporary work, 
unemployment, or part-time work (Oesch 2006, Esping-Andersen 2009, Chauvel 2009). 
The divide of the workforce in insiders holding secure positions in the labour market and 
outsiders with only weak labour market attachment is a trend that we have observed in 
advanced industrial societies since the 1980s. After a decline in social and economic 
inequality until the 1970s, inequality began to rise again (OECD 2008, 2011, Kenworthy 
2008) when labour markets were flexibilised in order to meet increasing demands for a 
flexible workforce and when social policies lost part of their redistributive capacity 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012: 8-9). Additionally, most of the job growth in the European Union 
was due to atypical forms of unemployment, mostly part-time and temporary work 
(Plougman 2003) which are characterised by higher job insecurity (Burgoon and Dekker 
2010) and lower social rights in Europe’s social insurance welfare states.  
 
Causes and consequences of the rising inequality and dualisation of both labour markets and 
welfare states have been key topics in the social policy and social inequality literature. Only 
recently, a literature about the political implications of dualisation emerged. This literature 
Chapter 4 
 146 
of the ‘politics of dualisation’ focuses mainly on diverging preferences of insiders and 
outsiders for labour market policies, social protection and distributive policies (Rueda 2005, 
2007, Emmenegger 2009, Burgoon and Dekker 2010, Häusermann and Schwander 2011, 
Schwander and Häusermann 2012). The related question whether the divergent preferences 
of insiders and outsiders result in different electoral behaviour remains, however, largely 
unexplored. Only a few studies address the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders 
(Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008, Lindvall and Rueda 2012). Moreover, with the 
exception of Lindvall and Rueda (2012), who analyse the electoral behaviour of insiders 
and outsiders in Sweden, none of them addresses the question empirically.  
The present article is thus the first empirical study to examine the electoral behaviour of 
insiders and outsiders in a comparative and systematic perspective drawing on data from the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). I focus on the electoral consequences of 
dualisation in Germany, France and Britain. The country selection is motivated by the 
differences with respect to the supply side of political competition. Germany, France and 
Britain represent different party systems, where the main left party is confronted with 
different numbers of challengers which influences the electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders by offering them different voting opportunities. The countries vary also regarding 
the second explanatory factor: In Germany and Britain, the social democrats campaign as 
incumbent party, whereas, in France, the Socialists compete as opposition party. For 
incumbent parties, the need to combine social protection and economic prosperity in 
practise is much more pressing than for opposition parties as the electorate will held them 
accountable for their actions of the last legislative period (Green-Pedersen and van 
Keersbergen 2002, Kitschelt 2003). Additionally, a substantial share of the workforce in 
these countries is confronted with a high risk of atypical employment and unemployment in 
the three countries. Britain has traditionally a liberal, flexible labour market where atypical 
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employment and unemployment are widespread (Tomlinson and Walker 2012). In France 
and Germany, the demand for a flexible workforce was met by an increasing dualisation of 
the workforce in well protected insiders and flexible outsiders (Palier and Thelen 2010). 
Hence, these countries have experienced a massive rise in inequality in the last decades or 
are traditionally characterised by sharp social and economic inequalities (OECD 2008, 
2011, Tomlinson and Walker 2012).  
The present article shares the special focus that social democratic parties enjoy in the 
literature on the politics of dualisation: As the main representative of the working class, it is 
the electorate of the social democratic party that is divided into outsiders and insiders. 
Moreover, the role that social democratic parties have played in shaping dualisation is, 
however, far from clear. It has both been argued that social democratic parties foster 
dualisation by defending the interests of insiders (Rueda 2007) and that social democracy 
attenuates dualisation with universalistic and redistributive policies (Palier and Thelen 
2010, Pontusson 2011, Häusermann and Schwander 2012). Furthermore, the social 
democrats were decisive for welfare state and labour market reforms in many European 
countries that reduced privileges of insiders. Since this should have disappointed many 
insiders and at the same time lead to more support among outsiders, the decisive role of the 
social democratic parties in these reforms makes the question which group supports the 
social democrats electorally particularly relevant. 
 
The analysis reveals that the electoral consequences of dualisation varies from country to 
country. In Britain, outsiders have a higher likelihood not to participate in politics than 
insiders. In France and Germany, the voting probabilities of insiders and outsiders do not 
differ, but their party preferences do. In Germany, outsiders are more inclined to vote for 
the social democratic party than insiders. By contrast, in France, insiders and outsiders are 
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equally likely to support the French Socialist party. I explain this with the incumbency 
status of the French Socialist party that enables it to mobilise both insiders and outsiders by 
promising favourable policies to both groups. Conversely, outsiders are more likely to 
support one of the left challengers of the Socialists. As a robustness test, I control for the 
selection bias caused by the lower probabilities of certain electoral groups to participate in 
the electoral process and demonstrate that the results are consistent with the findings 
mentioned before. In doing so, the article contributes to the literature on the politics of 
dualisation and to the literature of electoral behaviour. 
 
The article is organised as follows: I first develop the theoretical argument why the electoral 
behaviour of insiders and outsiders differs across the three countries. In the empirical 
section, I present data and operationalisations and explain why we need to consider a 
selection bias in the analysis of party preferences. I analyse whether outsiders are less likely 
to participate in politics than insiders before exploring their party preferences once they 
decided to participate. As a robustness test, I correct for the selection bias by specifying a 
‘Heckman model’ for party preferences of outsiders and insiders. Then, I investigate the 
preferences of insiders and outsiders for one of the challengers of the social democratic 
party. The final section concludes. 
 
 
The theoretical argument 
Before outlining the theoretical argument about the electoral behaviour of outsiders and 
insiders, let me briefly outline the structural process of dualisation and its consequences for 
politics. In most Western European societies, social and economic inequalities are rising 
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(OECD 2008, 2011). The reduced capacity of social policy to correct for market inequalities 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012) and secular processes such as globalisation, post-
industrialisation, skill-biased technological changes and transformations in the labour 
market are seen as the main culprits for the rising inequality: Unemployment rates and, 
especially, long-term unemployment rates have risen (OECD 2006) and most of job growth 
in the European Union is due to atypical employment such as part-time employment and 
temporary or fixed term work (Plougmann 2003). As a consequence fewer labour market 
participants work in stable, standard employment relations, which characterised the 
booming post-war decades. This segmentation of the labour market in ‘good’, secure jobs 
and ‘bad’, unstable jobs is known as dualisation of the labour market (Saint-Paul 2002, 
Rueda 2006, 2007, Palier and Thelen 2010, Emmenegger et al. 2012). Consequently, 
individuals find themselves in very different positions in the labour market even though 
they work in the same occupations. Acknowledging that part-time and temporary 
employment may improve the economic perspectives for some of the atypically employed, 
these findings indicate that dualisation brings considerable differences in life chances 
between the two groups and raises the question about the political consequences of 
dualisation. Studies analysing the implications of labour market dualisation for individuals 
have shown that insiders dispose of higher incomes, higher satisfaction with their job and 
better promotion possibilities than outsiders (Häusermann and Schwander 2012b). The 
literature on the politics of dualisation has mainly addressed preferences of insiders and 
outsiders regarding labour market policies as the divergent preferences for labour market 
policies lie at the heart of the distinction between insiders and outsiders (Rueda 2005, 2007, 
Emmenegger 2009, Schwander and Häusermann 2012). Recent work has shown that 
insiders and outsiders also differ more generally with regard to preferences for distributive 
and regulative policies (Häusermann and Schwander 2011). 
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The political behaviour of insiders and outsiders, however, remains largely unexplored. The 
literature offers contradictory arguments about the electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsider. Scholars mostly assume that outsiders are politically alienated and show little 
propensity to participate in the electoral process because they are dissatisfied with 
democracy (Rueda and King 2008) or no party represents their interests (Rueda 2005, 
2006). Contrary to these expectations, Lindvall and Rueda (2012) show in an analysis of 
Swedish elections that outsiders are likely to support the social democratic party if the party 
stresses unemployment as an urgent issue and offers compelling employment policies 
during the electoral campaign. Similarly, Iversen and Stephens (2008: 605) argue that the 
low-skilled (outsiders) vote for communist and social democratic parties.  
We also find quite different arguments in the literature regarding the electoral behaviour of 
insiders. Rueda (2006, 2007) contends that insiders are the core constituency of the social 
democratic party because the party feels compelled to defend their interests due to historical 
and ideological reasons and the weaker political organisation of outsiders. King and Rueda 
(2008), on the other hand, maintain that in times of globalisation, immigration and high 
unemployment, (low-skilled) workers in standard jobs (insiders) may increasingly hold anti-
immigrant and protectionist preferences. In order to defend their privileges against non-
standard and immigrant rival workers, they are expected to vote for radical (right) parties. 
Indeed, literature on the electorate of right populist parties has shown that low-skilled 
workers do over-proportionately support right populist parties (Mayer and Perrineau 1996, 
Dolezal and Lachat 2008, Oesch 2008, Bornschier 2010), but without taking into account 
the differentiation between insiders and outsiders.  
With the exception of the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders in Sweden (Lindvall 
and Rueda 2012), none of the presented arguments focussing on insiders and outsiders have 
The electoral consequences of the insider-outsider divide 
 151 
been tested empirically. The present article is the first empirical study to examine the 
electoral behaviour of outsiders and insiders in a comparative and systematic perspective.  
 
I conclude that it is far from clear which party enjoys the loyalty of insiders or outsiders, 
and, if we are interested in the electoral behaviour of outsiders and insiders, we need to 
consider not only party preference but also the possibility of non-voting. Moreover, in 
proportional or mixed electoral systems, voters are presented with an electoral alternative to 
the social democratic party, either a left or a right populist party. Essentially, outsiders have 
three options of electoral behaviour: They may either vote for the main party of the left, 
vote for another party or refrain from participating in politics at all.  
 
My argument about the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders includes the supply 
side of political competition.37 I argue that due to differences in party configurations and the 
incumbency status of the social democratic party, the electoral behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders differs cross-nationally. Parties are not passive objects exposed to the attitudes and 
preferences of voters, but political subjects that actively seek the support of political 
potentials (Sartori 1969, Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Kriesi et al. 2008b). In general, the 
social democratic party aims to mobilise its entire electoral potential, but under certain 
conditions, the social democratic party is not able to mobilise both insiders and outsiders. If 
insiders and outsiders are not mobilised jointly, this has two consequences: First, either 
insiders or outsiders are less likely to support the social democratic party, or, second, 
insiders or outsiders are less likely to participate in elections. I further argue that the 
                                                
37 The argument about the importance of party competition for the social democratic electoral strategy 
regarding low-skilled and high-skilled insiders and outsiders has been originally made in the project 
application for the project „Who is in and how is out?“, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(grant number 100017-131994/1). The project is conducted by Silja Häusermann, Thomas Kurer and Hanna 
Schwander. 
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electoral behaviour of outsiders depends on the mobilisation efforts of parties and the 
electoral alternatives, both factors being influenced by the party configuration.  
Let us first discuss the outsiders’ electoral behaviour in majoritarian electoral systems. 
When only two parties compete for votes, the left party is drawn to the median voter in the 
middle of the political spectrum (Downs 1957), i.e. to the insiders. The outsiders are 
neglected by both parties. Thus, in majoritarian systems, outsiders find no party that 
mobilises them and choose therefore to abstain from voting (H1). 
The argument explains insiders and outsiders’ electoral behaviour in majoritarian systems, 
but not in proportional or mixed electoral systems, where the social democratic party faces a 
different competitive constellation. If more than one party competes for the votes on the left 
side of the political spectrum, parties adapt their electoral campaign accordingly. Pontusson 
and Rueda (2010), for example, argue that left parties only react to economic inequality 
with redistributive policies (which are in the interests of outsiders, see Häusermann and 
Schwander 2011) if low-income voters participate in the electoral process, which is far from 
certain. However, the presence of a second left party increases turnout rates among the less 
privileged voters (Anderson and Beramendi forthcoming) which makes it more attractive 
for parties to target these voters. Thus, the competition for the left votes prevents the main 
left party to move to the median voter, which is why both parties aim to mobilise the under-
privileged. The argument can be extended to the presence of a right populist party. Since the 
1990s, workers (mainly male and low-skilled) have become one of the electoral backbones 
of right populist parties. Thus, not only the existence of a left, but also the presence of a 
populist right competitor should increase the electoral participation of outsiders. My second 
hypothesis is therefore: In countries where social democratic parties are confronted with left 
or populist right challengers, outsiders and insiders have the same probability to participate 
in the electoral process (H2).  
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In proportional systems, the incumbency status of the social democratic party figures as a 
second explanatory factor. In general, the social democratic party intends to mobilise all 
segments of its electorate. Whether this strategy is successful, however, depends on the 
incumbency status of the social democratic party: If the social democratic party is in the 
opposition, it is able to offer a broader range of policy proposals, so that both insiders and 
outsiders find themselves targeted. If, however, the social democratic party is in the 
government, its possibilities for electoral offers are more limited. In times of increasing 
social and economic inequalities and persistent pressure for financial consolidation and 
labour market flexibilisation, each social democratic government will need to address the 
question of social security. At the same time, it is compelled to provide economic growth 
(Green-Pedersen and van Keersbergen 2002, Kitschelt 2003). The social democratic party 
must thus combine social justice and economic prosperity in practise and not just in theory 
and will be held accountable for the solutions it proposes. 
There are several ways for a social democratic government to react to the pressures to 
combine an effective labour market with social justice with different distributive 
implications for its electorate. The government can try to liberalise labour market and 
welfare state in order to reduce labour costs and provide incentives to accept work. This 
solution, however, satisfies neither insiders nor outsiders as it reduces the secure positions 
of insiders, but offers no help to outsiders to improve their labour market position. A second 
solution is to flexibilise the labour market at the margins and to strengthen the social 
insurance principle regarding the access to social security. This dualisation strategy, which 
preserves the privileges of insiders, is likely to reduce the electoral support among outsiders 
but secures the votes of the insiders which are the main beneficiaries of such a strategy.  
Third, a strategy of social investment and flexicurity with which the government attempts to 
enable individuals to participate in the labour market by enhancing skills and employment 
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opportunities (Lister 2004, Palier 2006a, Morel, Palier and Palme 2011) is more likely to 
find the support of outsiders, especially if coupled with redistributive policies.  
I therefore expect that in proportional or mixed electoral systems, where the social 
democratic party campaigns as opposition party, it is able to attract the votes of both 
insiders and outsiders by promising favourable policies to both groups (H3). If the social 
democratic party competes as incumbent party, by contrast, it has to decide between the 
interests of insiders and outsiders and is less likely to be supported by both segments 
equally (H4).  
As incumbent party, the social democratic party will be held accountable for the policies of 
the last legislative period and finds it harder to convince both insiders and outsiders. 
Outsiders may then react with opposition to a system that offers few benefits to them (King 
and Rueda 2008) and vote for one of the radical parties instead. From this argument, 
hypothesis 5 follows: If the social democratic party fails to mobilise outsiders, they decide 
to vote for one of the radical parties (H5).  
 
 
Methods, data and operationalisations 
I analyse the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders in Germany, France and Britain in 
the late 1990s and 2000s. The focus on these countries is motivated by their differences 
with respect to the supply side of political competition. The majoritarian electoral system in 
Britain prevents a competitor of Labour at the margins of the political spectrum. The French 
majoritarian electoral system with two rounds for the presidential election is a mixed case 
between a majoritarian and a proportional system. The first round of the presidential 
election presents the voters with a wide range of political offers, while voters choose only 
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between the candidates of the two strongest parties in the second round. Several radical left 
parties such as Lutte Ouvrière, Parti Communiste or Ligue Révolutionnaire compete for the 
left votes and the right populist Front National shows no signs of electoral weakness. The 
French Socialists thus struggle with competitors from both the left and the populist right. 
The competitive situation of the German Social democratic party was more comfortable 
until the 2000s: Despite the proportional electoral system, the only competition of the SPD 
from the left was the Green party, which mobilises mainly high-skilled, young socio-
cultural professionals with pro-immigration and libertarian attitudes (Dolezal 2010). But 
since the implementation of the extensive welfare and labour market reform project 
‘Agenda 2010’, the SPD faces with Die Linke a new left challenger. 
The different party systems allow examining the consequences of a varying number of 
challengers to the main left party for the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders.  
Furthermore, the labour markets of these countries are marked by high degrees of 
inequality. The dualisation of labour markets is pronounced in Continental Europe (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999a, Iversen and Stephens 2008, Häusermann and Schwander 2012b) 
and most prominent in France and Germany (Palier and Thelen 2010). The labour market in 
Britain displays all the features of a liberal labour market with high wage inequalities and 
low employment protection. Accordingly, a substantial share of the workforce is confronted 
with a high risk of atypical employment and unemployment (50.6 percent in Germany, 34.2 
percent in France and 39.5 percent in Britain).38 Consequently, these countries have 
experienced a massive rise in inequality during the last decades or are traditionally 
characterised by sharp social and economic inequalities (OECD 2008, 2011).  
The analysis is based on data from the three waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES). I focus on elections in the late 1990s and the 2000s because dualisation is 
                                                
38 Own calculations, based on EU-SILC 2007, see appendix 2. 
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a recent development in Western Europe and the insider/outsider divide must be rooted in 
society before we can expect it to be reflected in the electoral behaviour. Due to the fact that 
I expect the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders to differ between the countries I 
conduct the analysis for each country separately. Using data from CSES has the advantage 
that respondents were asked immediately after the election for which party they had voted 
for. Thus, in contrast to other social surveys such as the European Social Survey, the data 
avoids the ‘mid-term’ effect: If respondents are asked in the midst of a legislation period, 
the electoral support for the incumbent party might be underestimated, because the 
government has lost part of its initial support. Data for Germany and Britain refer to the 
parliamentary elections of the Bundestag and the House of Commons while data for France 
refer to the first round of the presidential elections. For two elections I have to rely on other, 
comparable data sources and merge them to the CSES data set. Data for the French election 
in 2002 do not include detailed occupation information that would allow operationalising 
respondents’ outsider-status, so I use the post-electoral survey of the Panel Electoral 
Francais 2002. For the missing British election in 2001, I use the British Election Study. In 
total, I have data from 4 elections in Germany (1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009), 3 elections in 
Britain (1997, 2001, 2005) and 2 elections in France (2002 and 2007).  
 
The individual decision to participate in the election (i.e. whether to cast a vote or to 
abstain) creates a potential selection bias in the study of the voting decision because non-
voters are systematically excluded from the analysis of party preferences. If the decision to 
participate is influenced by the same unobserved factors as the decision which party to vote 
for, we should correct for the selection bias by estimating a Heckman selection model 
(Heckmann 1979, Guo and Fraser 2010). In the case of the electoral behaviour of insiders 
and outsiders, both decisions are influenced by the party configuration in the country. If we 
The electoral consequences of the insider-outsider divide 
 157 
do not take into account that outsiders might be less likely to participate, we might 
overestimate the effect of the outsider-status on the decision which party to vote for. In such 
a situation, Heckman (1979) proposes to estimate first the probability of a respondent to be 
in the sample (i.e. to vote) and then use that information for estimating the outcome of 
interest (i.e. the party preference).  
Another requirement of Heckman is the so-called exclusion restriction. It means that we 
need at least one factor that influences the selection but not the outcome (Achen 1986: 99). 
The CSES allows to include ‘satisfaction with democracy’ as exclusion restriction: 
Individuals that are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country might see 
no sense to participate in the electoral process. It is, however, hard to find a plausible 
argument why dissatisfied citizens should be more or less likely to vote for the social 
democratic party. 
 
Dependent variables 
The electoral behaviour of outsiders and insiders constitutes the dependent variable, 
measured by three dichotomous variables. The first variable ‘abstention’ is based on the 
question ‘did you cast a ballot in the last election?’. The second variable is ‘voting yes/no 
for the social democratic party’.39 The third variable is ‘voting for one of the challenger’ of 
the social democratic party, i.e. either for the Front National in France, or for a left 
challenger (Lutte Ouvrière, Parti Communiste, Ligue Révolutionnaire in France or Die 
Linke in Germany).  
 
 
 
                                                
39 I use the expression social democratic party for the British Labour party, the French Socialist party and the 
Germany social democratic party. 
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Independent and control variables 
Individuals are labour market outsiders if they have an over-proportional risk of being 
atypically employed (unemployment, involuntary part-time or fixed term employment) (see 
Schwander and Häusermann 2012). To measure the risk, we need to relate individuals to 
their occupational category (composed by post-industrial class, gender and age) instead of 
relying on their individual situation alone. By doing so, we assure that respondents who 
have a high labour market vulnerability – because they work in jobs that are characterised 
by unemployment or atypical employment  – are classified as outsiders even if they happen 
to be in full time employment at the time the survey is conducted. For this undertaking, I 
rely on a conceptualisation of outsiders that relates the probability of experiencing atypical 
employment to the incidence of atypical work within a respondent’s occupational category 
(Häuserman and Schwander 2011, Schwander and Häusermann 2012). Individuals in a 
category with a significantly higher rate of unemployment or atypical work than the 
national average are coded as outsiders, those with a lower rate as insiders. It is important to 
note that both insiders and outsiders are heterogeneous with regard to skill levels (Polavieja 
2005, Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, Schwander and Häusermann 2012). 
For measuring outsiders and insiders in the CSES, I apply this map of dualisation to the 
CSES: I construct the occupational categories by gender, age and post-industrial class and 
code the individuals in the groups that have shown an over-proportional risk of atypical 
employment as outsiders. Class is measured with the class schema by Oesch (2006), which 
was regrouped by Rehm and Kitschelt (2005) into five class group: Capital accumulators 
(high-skilled managers, self-employed and experts), socio-cultural professionals (high-
skilled professionals in the public and private service sector), blue-collar workers (unskilled 
and skilled workers), low service functionaries (unskilled and skilled employees in 
interpersonal services), and mixed service functionaries (routine and skilled clerk). More 
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information about the location of the occupations in the class scheme and the distribution of 
outsiders in the three countries can be found in appendix 1 and 2. 
 
Education is decisive for labour market prospects and political behaviour (Kitschelt 1995, 
Kriesi 1998, Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007, Stubager 2010). Due to this relevance and the 
heterogeneous skill levels of both insiders and outsiders (see Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, 
Schwander and Häusermann 2012), I include education in the analysis. Education is 
measured as the highest completed degree (in 8 levels from uncompleted primary education 
to post-tertiary education). I split this variable in three dichotomous variables, indicating 
low, medium and high skills. High skill levels will serve as the reference category. 
Following the conventions of the literature, I control for household income, whether a 
person lives in a couple household, union membership and church attendance. An 
individual is coded as religious if she or he goes to church at least once a month. I also 
include self-placement on the left/right scale (ranging from 0 to 10, 10 indicating an 
extreme right ideology). Satisfaction with democracy is measured by the question ‘how 
satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country’, where higher values 
represent higher satisfaction. For more details on the operationalisation, see appendix 3. 
 
 
Empirical analysis 
I first analyse whether outsiders are less likely to participate in the electoral process than 
insiders (hypotheses 1 and 2). Next, I turn to the question whether insiders are still the core 
constituency of social democratic parties or whether outsiders are more likely to vote for 
social democratic parties than insiders (hypotheses 3 and 4). At this point, I employ a two 
step procedure: I first analyse the party preferences of insiders and outsiders by using 
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logistic regressions before I correct for the selection bias due to the unequal likelihood of 
outsiders and insiders to participate in the electoral process. Then, I investigate whether 
outsiders choose to vote for a competitor of the social democratic party in France and 
Germany (hypothesis 5).  
 
Vote abstention 
The likelihood of outsiders to participate in politics is analysed by five different models in 
each country: Model 1 displays the effect of the main independent variable, the outsider-
status, on vote abstention. Model 2 controls for different skill levels. Model 3 includes the 
socio-structural components of the outsider-status. Besides gender, age and class, it also 
covers the square of age as I expect the relationship between age and voting participation to 
be curvilinear: In general, age increases the chances to participate, but above a certain level, 
increasing age reduces the chances to participate because voting might become too tiring 
and less important for old citizens. Model 4 adds income, union membership and church 
attendance as well as the two ideological variables self-placement on the left/right scale and 
satisfaction with democracy to the analysis. Income, union membership and church 
attendance are all expected to reduce the likelihood of abstention. The less people are 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, the less I expect them to 
participate in the election process. The relation between self-placement on the left/right 
scale and voting participation is again expected to be non-linear. People at the margins of 
the political spectrum have a higher probability to participate especially if we control for 
satisfaction with democracy because they have a higher interest in politics.  
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Table 1: Not voting: coefficients from binary logistic regressions, plain and education 
model 
Decision not Germany France Britain 
to vote M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Outsider 0.232*** 0.164* 0.232** 0.401*** 0.616*** 0.620*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)    (0.07) (0.09) 
Low skills  1.254***  0.083     0.058 
  (0.19)  (0.13)     (0.12) 
Medium skills  0.538**  -0.165     0.190 
  (0.25)  (0.13)     (0.13) 
Constant -2.358*** -3.386*** -1.837*** -1.870*** -1.439*** -1.600*** 
  (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.09)    (0.04) (0.11) 
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.007    0.014 0.015 
N 6392 6367 3456 3214 4915 4029 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; binary logistic regression with robust standard errors; data 
is weighted; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2, high-
skills as reference category for education; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** 
= significant at the 0.01 level.  
  
We find that outsiders have a significantly lower probability to participate in elections in all 
three countries, even if we control for skill levels. Outsiders remain less likely to cast a vote 
once we control for education (M2). In substantive terms, the probability of an outsider not 
to vote is 10.7 percent in Germany, 29.2 percent in Britain and 18.6 percent in France, while 
insiders have corresponding probabilities of 8.5 percent in Germany, 18.0 percent in Britain 
and 13.1 percent in France. The predicted probabilities for insiders and outsiders of 
different skills levels and the corresponding confidence intervals (95% level) are displayed 
in Figure 1. As Figure 1 shows, the differences between insiders and outsiders of the same 
skill levels are significant in Britain but not in Germany. In Britain, the difference is around 
11.0 percentage points between insiders and outsiders of each educational level. In France, 
the difference between insiders and outsiders is only significant for the low-skilled. Low-
skilled outsiders have a likelihood for non-voting of 20.0 percent compared to 14.4 percent 
for low-skilled insiders.40 The fact that we find consistently lower vote probabilities for 
                                                
40 I also tested an interaction effects between low skill levels and outsider-status. In France and Britain, the 
interaction does not indicate that the effect of outsiderness is different among voters with different skill levels. 
In Germany, insiders and outsiders are equally likely to participate in the election once we include the 
possibility that outsiderness might have different implications for high- and low-skilled individuals. 
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outsiders in Britain but not in Germany, and only to a certain extent in France supports 
hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Given that individuals with higher education are less likely to abstain from voting, we ask 
whether higher education may compensate for outsiders’ lower chances to vote. If this were 
the case, high-skilled outsiders should have a lower probability of vote abstention than low-
skilled insiders. Comparing the probabilities of high-skilled outsiders and low-skilled 
insiders shows that in Germany, high-skilled outsiders have indeed a significantly lower 
probability not to vote than low-skilled insiders. The reverse is true in Britain: High-skilled 
outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting than low-skilled insiders. The effect in 
France is similar to the one in Britain but not significant as the overlapping confidence 
intervals in Figure 1 indicate. Whereas in Britain higher education cannot compensate the 
reducing effect that the outsider-status has on voting probability, in Germany, the effect of 
education is clearly more important than being an outsider. 
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Note: The dots indicate the predicted probabilities for insiders and outsiders not to vote in the 
three countries, at different skill levels 
 
Figure 1: Predicted probability not to vote for insiders and outsiders, per skill level 
  
Table 2 presents two additional models for the explanation of non-voting. Model 3 includes 
the socio-structural components of outsiders (gender, age and class). Model 4 integrates the 
control variables income, union membership, church attendance and the ideological variable 
self-placement on the left/right scale.  
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Table 2: Not voting: coefficients from binary logistic regressions, socio-structural and 
ideological model 
Germany France Britain Decision not to 
vote M3 M4 M3 M4 M3 M4 
Outsider 0.302 0.314 -0.201 -0.205    0.386*** 0.141 
 (0.36) (0.45) (0.19) (0.19)    (0.15) (0.24) 
Female -0.084 -0.197 0.074 0.108    -0.328*** -0.133 
 (0.35) (0.43) (0.14) (0.15)    (0.12) (0.19) 
Age -0.078*** -0.048** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.103*** -0.047 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) (0.03) 
Age2 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*   0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
MSF -0.314 -0.541* 0.239 0.356*   -0.117 0.124 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.18) (0.21)    (0.16) (0.24) 
BC 0.515** -0.001 0.020 0.108    0.185 0.202 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.21) (0.25)    (0.15) (0.25) 
SCP -0.235 -0.214 0.210 0.304    -0.264 -0.615** 
 (0.24) (0.29) (0.18) (0.19)    (0.17) (0.29) 
LSF 0.653*** 0.305 0.605** 0.713**  0.168 0.114 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.24) (0.28)    (0.18) (0.30) 
Low skills 0.852*** 0.827*** 0.347** 0.375**  0.306** 0.050 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17)    (0.14) (0.24) 
0.256 0.219 -0.116 -0.169    0.208 -0.039 
Medium skills (0.26) (0.33) (0.15) (0.16)    (0.14) (0.24) 
Income  -0.173***  0.060     -0.065 
  (0.05)  (0.06)     (0.07) 
 -0.470**  -0.211     0.035 Union 
membership  (0.19)  (0.33)     (0.17) 
 -0.481***  -0.139     -0.629*** Church 
attendance  (0.13)  (0.17)     (0.16) 
 0.154*  0.195*    0.326** Left/right self-
placement  (0.08)  (0.11)     (0.13) 
 -0.016*  -0.017*    -0.031** Left/right self-
placement2  (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.01) 
Satisfaction   -0.494***  -0.244***  -0.206** 
with democracy  (0.09)  (0.08)     (0.10) 
Constant -1.134** -0.394 0.021 0.036    1.599*** 0.183 
  (0.46) (0.65) (0.53) (0.67)    (0.44) (0.87) 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.078 0.028 0.035 0.064 0.064 
N 6367 4958 3214 2997 4026 1729 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; binary logistic regression with robust standard 
errors; data is weighted; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley 
and Zavoina R2; CA as reference category for post-industrial class; high-skills as reference 
category for education level; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = 
significant at the 0.01 level; LSF are low service functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural 
professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed service functionaries and CA are capital 
accumulators. 
  
From Table 2 we gain two main insights: First, model 3 shows that in Britain outsiders are 
less likely to participate in the election than insiders even if we control for components of 
the outsider-status. By contrast, in France and Germany, the effect of outsider-status can be 
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decomposed to its components: The outsider-status loses its significant effect on the vote 
probability once we control for its components gender, age and class. This corresponds to 
the expectations in hypotheses 1 and 2: Only in Britain does the outsider-status lead to a 
smaller likelihood to participate in politics while in Germany and France, outsiders are not 
less likely to participate than insiders. 
Second, both models 3 and 4 reveal considerable cross-national variation in the 
determinants of vote abstention. Gender, age, class, income and union membership have an 
inconsistent effect whereas religious individuals and those dissatisfied with democracy are 
equally more likely to vote in Germany, Britain and France. Also, the curvilinear 
relationship between ideology and voting probability is confirmed: Voters on the extreme 
sides have a lower probability not to participate than voters in the middle of the political 
spectrum in all three countries. Consider the relationship in France: An individual on the 
extreme left has a 15.4 percent probability not to participate. The probability for the same 
individual that considers him- or herself moderately left, increases to 18.2 percent, before 
sinking again to 17.8 percent for a moderate right and 12.3 percent for an extreme right 
individual. 
 
In Britain, older citizens, union members and regular churchgoers have higher probabilities 
to vote. Can these characteristics make up for the lower chance of outsiders to do so? To see 
whether this is the case, I compare the predicted probabilities to vote for insiders and 
outsiders with and without these characteristics. For instance, I compare the probability for 
a non-unionized insider with the probability of a unionized outsider. If these characteristics 
compensate the lower chances of outsiders to participate, the differences between the two 
individuals should become smaller.  
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Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of the different insider/outsider groups in 
Britain graphically. If we compare the effect of age and outsider-status on voting 
probability, age clearly compensates for the effect of being an outsider: Whereas an outsider 
is clearly less inclined to participate than an insider of the same age, there are no differences 
between the voting probability of a 30-years old insider and a 35-years old outsider (around 
69 percent). Older outsiders are generally more likely to vote than younger insiders. Just as 
age, regular church attendance make up for the lower voting probabilities of outsiders: A 
religious outsider has a significantly higher probability to vote than a non-religious 
insider.41 Also, union membership partly compensates for being an outsider. A unionized 
outsider has still a higher probability not to vote than a non-unionized insider, but the 
difference has become significantly smaller.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
41 The findings hold when we focus on low-skilled, high-skilled or female voters. 
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Note: The dots indicate the predicted probabilities for insiders and outsiders (Plain),  
depending on union membership (Union) and church attendance (Religiosity). 
 
Figure 2: Predicted probability not to vote for various insider and outsider groups in Britain 
  
Voting for the social democratic party 
Next, I turn to the analysis of the voting behaviour which follows the same structure as the 
analysis before. I first analyse whether insiders and outsiders differ in their likelihood to 
vote for the social democratic party (M1). In model 2, I include two dichotomous 
predicators for low and medium skill levels. The estimates of the models are presented in 
Table 3. Model 3 in Table 4 adds the socio-structural components of the outsider-status to 
the analysis. Income, union membership, church attendance and self-placement on the 
left/right scale are introduced in model 4. We will see that the effect of the outsider-status 
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on the probability to vote for the social democratic party increases once we include the 
socio-structural variables, so I test for suppressor effects.  
 
Table 3: Voting for the social democratic party: coefficients from binary logistic 
regressions, plain and education model 
Vote for social 
democratic party 
Germany France Britain 
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Outsider 0.010 -0.023 -0.065 0.035 0.092 0.199** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) 
Low skills  0.337***  -0.194  0.629*** 
  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Medium skills  0.147  -0.246**  0.137 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Constant -0.678*** -0.927*** -1.043*** -1.014*** -0.084** -0.491*** 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10) 
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015 
N  5617  5596  2718  2535  3587 3016 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; binary logistic regression with robust standard errors; 
data is weighted; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina 
R2;high-skills as reference category for education; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 
0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level. 
  
We find that the outsider-status alone has no effect on the decision which party to vote for. 
Model 2 shows that education affects the decision to vote for the social democratic party, 
but in an inconsistent way across countries: In Germany and Britain, low-skilled voters are 
more likely to vote for the social democrats than high-skilled voters. In France, voters with 
medium skills (postsecondary education level) are less likely to vote for the Socialists than 
high-skilled voters. By contrast, outsiders are significantly more likely to vote for Labour in 
Britain once we control for skill levels. 42  
 
                                                
42 With 58 percent, low-skilled outsiders have a significantly higher probability to vote for Labour than low-
skilled insiders (53 percent). The same holds for high-skilled voters, where the difference between the vote 
probability of outsiders (43 percent) and insiders (38 percent) is significant as well. In Germany and France, 
the differences between low-skilled insiders and outsiders and high-skilled insiders and outsiders respectively, 
are not significant.  
I also tested an interaction effect between low skill levels and outsider-status. In Germany and France, no such 
interaction effect can be found. In Britain, however, the interaction indicates that low-skilled outsiders are less 
likely to vote for Labour. While the outsider-status and low-skill levels in general lead to higher chances to 
support Labour, low skill levels make an outsider less likely to vote for Labour. 
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Table 4 displays the estimates of the socio-structural and ideological models.  
 
Table 4: Voting for the social democratic party: coefficients from binary logistic regressions, 
socio-structural and ideological model 
Vote for social 
democratic party 
Germany France Britain 
M3 M4 M3 M4 M3 M4 
Outsider 0.297 0.413* -0.113 -0.251 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) 
Low skills 0.264*** 0.304*** -0.166 0.000 0.516*** 0.434** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) 
Medium skills 0.139 0.170 -0.150 -0.271* 0.032 -0.087 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) 
Female -0.369* -0.386* 0.086 0.177 -0.094 -0.088 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) 
Age 0.004** 0.008*** 0.004 0.009* -0.012*** -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MSF 0.152 0.052 -0.010 0.080 0.358** 0.222 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) (0.15) (0.21) 
BC 0.169 0.101 0.341* 0.351 0.769*** 0.669*** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.28) (0.13) (0.21) 
SCP 0.105 -0.032 0.498*** 0.412** 0.356** 0.288 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) 
LSF 0.178 0.133 0.450** 0.567* 0.866*** 0.520** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) (0.33) (0.16) (0.26) 
Income  -0.023  0.026  -0.261*** 
  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Union 
membership 
 0.446***  0.248  0.371*** 
 (0.09)  (0.37)  (0.14) 
Church   -0.144**  -0.363***  -0.248* 
attendance  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
Left/right self-
placement 
 -0.192***  -0.500***  -0.450*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Constant -1.189*** -0.423** -1.499*** 0.538 -0.151 3.006*** 
  (0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.40) (0.19) (0.44) 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.047 0.010 0.183 0.034 0.183 
N 5596 4570 2535 2420 3015      1406 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; binary logistic regression with robust standard errors; data 
is weighted ; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2; CA 
as reference category for post-industrial class; high-skills as reference category for education; * = significant 
at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level; LSF are low service 
functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed service 
functionaries and CA are capital accumulators. 
  
We find that in Germany, outsiders have a significantly higher likelihood to vote for the 
social democratic party than insiders once we include the socio-structural and ideological 
variables. This finding corresponds to the expectation in hypothesis 3 postulating that 
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insiders and outsiders should differ in their party preferences in a proportional electoral 
system with an incumbent social democratic party. In France, by contrast, where the social 
democratic party campaigns as the opposition party, the chances of insiders and outsiders to 
vote for the French Socialists do not differ. As expected in hypotheses 4, the PSF is able to 
mobilise insiders and outsiders equally.  
Regarding the effects of the socio-structural components and the control variables, we find 
similarities and variance across the countries: gender, age, class, income and union 
membership show no consistent effect across countries, whereas religious voters and voters 
with a right ideology are less likely to vote for the social democratic party in all countries.  
The significant effect of outsiderness in Germany is the result of a suppressor effect of 
union membership. Outsiders are less likely to be union members than insiders but union 
members are more likely to support the social democratic party (results not shown). To see 
whether the inclusion of union membership increases the effect of outsider-status, I 
compare the insider/outsider difference on the probability to vote for the SPD with and 
without the effect of union membership. Being an outsider makes an exemplary individual 8 
percentage points more likely to vote for the SPD.43 If we include the effect of union 
membership, the difference between the insider and the outsider rises to 11 percentage 
points. This explains why we find a significant effect of the outsider-status in Germany 
once we include union membership. 
 
The analysis revealed that insiders and outsiders differ in their probability to participate in 
politics, in particular low-skilled insiders and outsiders. As argued before, the probability to 
participate is likely to be influenced by the same unobserved factors as the party preference. 
As a robustness test, I present a Heckman model for the decision to vote for the social 
                                                
43 Difference between the vote probability of a 30-years, low-skilled female outsider and of the same person 
being an insider. 
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democratic party for each country in Table 5. I include the main independent variable plus 
those variables in the outcome equation that were significant in the logit models for vote 
abstention in one of the countries (see Table 4). The dependent variable of the selection 
equation is the individual participation decision. The selection model includes as 
independent variables the outsider-status, gender, age, age2, income, union membership, 
church attendance and the three variables denoting the ideological orientation of the 
respondent (self-placement on the left/right scale, self-placement2 and satisfaction with 
democracy). Satisfaction with democracy represents the exclusion restriction. 
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Table 5: Voting for the social democratic party: Heckman for the effect of outsider-status 
on vote decision 
Vote for social democratic 
party Germany   France  Britain  
Outsider 0.216* (0.126) -0.156 (0.107) 0.042 (0.104) 
Income -0.040** (0.016) 0.018 (0.035) -0.148*** (0.029) 
Low skills 0.253*** (0.060) -0.035 (0.106) 0.229** (0.108) 
Medium skills 0.128* (0.074) -0.142 (0.087) -0.046 (0.103) 
MSF 0.018 (0.079) 0.071 (0.121) 0.102 (0.096) 
BC 0.056 (0.079) 0.239 (0.148) 0.315*** (0.100) 
SCP -0.025 (0.077) 0.249** (0.105) 0.083 (0.092) 
LSF 0.065 (0.091) 0.350** (0.178) 0.245** (0.119) 
Female -0.173 (0.119) 0.087 (0.088) -0.106 (0.080) 
Age 0.003** (0.001) 0.006** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.003) 
Union membership 0.218*** (0.053) 0.154 (0.186) 0.170** (0.075) 
Church attendance -0.128*** (0.042) -0.172** (0.077) -0.201*** (0.069) 
Left/right self-placement -0.102*** (0.010) -0.278*** (0.020) -0.218*** (0.018) 
Constant -0.071 (0.114) 0.038 (0.239) 2.104*** (0.218) 
Vote             
Outsider 0.046 (0.139) -0.045 (0.085) -0.115 (0.096) 
Gender -0.098 (0.138) -0.013 (0.073) 0.106 (0.082) 
Age 0.026*** (0.010) 0.025** (0.012) 0.030** (0.014) 
Age2 -0.000** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Income 0.079*** (0.021) 0.006 (0.024) 0.034 (0.031) 
Low skills -0.381*** (0.096) -0.241*** (0.081) -0.092 (0.117) 
Medium skills -0.206 (0.125) 0.085 (0.075) -0.024 (0.117) 
Union membership 0.149* (0.081) 0.149 (0.154) 0.018 (0.080) 
Church attendance 0.147** (0.062) 0.150** (0.067) 0.188** (0.078) 
Left/right self-placement -0.063* (0.037) -0.227*** (0.066) -0.289*** (0.065) 
Left/right self-placement2 0.006* (0.003) 0.021*** (0.006) 0.026*** (0.006) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.258*** (0.036) -0.162*** (0.040) -0.148*** (0.048) 
Constant 1.545*** (0.293) 0.955*** (0.353) 0.768* (0.406) 
Observations      5011   2997   1749  
rho -0.840  0.554  -0.987  
p of rho 0.001  0.054  0.001  
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; heckprob regression with robust standard errors; data is 
weighted; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2; CA as 
reference category for post-industrial class; high-skills as reference category for education level; * = 
significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level; LSF are low 
service functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed 
service functionaries and CA are capital accumulators; the variable in italics indicates the selection 
restriction. 
 
Rho is significant for all countries, indicating a selection bias and justifying the use of 
Heckman models. If we compare the effects of the logit and the Heckman models, we note 
that accounting for the selection mechanism leads to similar results but smaller differences 
between insiders and outsiders in the probabilities to vote for a social democratic party. In 
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Britain and France, outsiders do not differ from insiders in their probability to vote for the 
moderate left party. By contrast, in Germany, outsiders are still more likely to vote for the 
social democratic party than insiders, which confirms hypothesis 4.  
 
Voting for left or populist right parties as alternatives to the social democratic vote 
We have seen so far that outsiders are less likely to participate in politics in Britain but are 
more likely to vote for the SPD in Germany. How does the political behaviour of French 
outsiders differ from the behaviour of insiders? France is a revealing case as the mixed 
electoral system offers the voters a wide range of electoral alternatives to the party of the 
moderate left. In a situation where the French Socialists were excluded from the 
government during the 2000, voters who are dissatisfied with the PSF may not only choose 
not to cast a vote but can also choose to vote for either one of the various left competitors or 
the right populist party (hypothesis 5). The Heckman models showed non-significant rhos 
indicating that we do not encounter a selection bias, so I present the estimates of regular 
logit models instead. 
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Table 6: Voting for the challengers in France: coefficients from binary logistic regressions, 
all models 
Vote for the challengers 
    
M1 M2 M3 M4 
Outsider 0.278** 0.276** -0.015 -0.045    
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21)    
Low skills  0.418*** 0.349* 0.255    
  (0.16) (0.19) (0.22)    
Medium skills  0.796*** 0.538*** 0.495*** 
  (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)    
Female   -0.081 -0.053    
   (0.15) (0.18)    
Age   -0.025*** -0.024*** 
   (0.00) (0.00)    
MSF   0.151 0.072    
   (0.18) (0.23)    
BC   0.466** 0.317    
   (0.20) (0.28)    
SCP   -0.479** -0.454**  
   (0.20) (0.20)    
LSF   0.105 -0.055    
   (0.28) (0.40)    
Income    -0.022    
    (0.10)    
Union membership    -1.080**  
    (0.44)    
Church attendance    -0.204    
    (0.17)    
Left/right self-
placement 
   -0.315*** 
   (0.10)    
Left/right self-
placement2 
   0.032*** 
   (0.01)    
Satisfaction wi    -0.485*** 
democracy    (0.08)    
Constant -1.560*** -2.032*** -0.664*** 1.393**  
  (0.07) (0.12) (0.25) (0.62)    
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.019 0.052 0.084    
N 2951 2743 2743 2563 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors; binary logistic regression with robust standard 
errors; data is weighted; cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the 
McKley and Zavoina R2; CA as reference category for post-industrial class; high-skills as 
reference category for education level; * = significant at the 0.1 level, ** = significant at the 0.05 
level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level; LSF are low service functionaries; SCP are socio-
cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are mixed service functionaries and CA 
are capital accumulators. 
 
Table 6 shows that outsiders and voters with low skills are more inclined to support one of 
the PSF’s challengers (Model 1-Model 2). The effect of the outsider-status is mainly driven 
by the higher likelihood of outsiders to vote for one of the left alternatives to the French 
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Socialists. By contrast, outsiders are not more likely to vote for the Front National (results 
not shown). The higher likelihood of outsiders to vote for the left alternatives remains 
significant until we control for age, which reduces the probability to vote for one of the 
alternatives. 
It seems that in France, outsiders do not react to a potential dislike of the social democratic 
party by abstaining from the electoral process but by voting for one of the left challengers 
of the Socialists. When examining the likelihood of outsiders to support the new challenger 
of the social democratic party in Germany, we find that outsiders are not more likely than 
insiders to vote for Die Linke (results not shown). The findings support the idea that not 
only the competitive situation of the social democratic party within the party system may be 
important for securing the vote of insiders or outsiders but also the status of social 
democratic parties as incumbent or opposition party. I interpret this finding as supportive 
evidence for hypothesis 5.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In the context of increasing social and economic inequality and especially in the light of the 
ongoing economic recession, the political implications of labour market dualisation remain 
a pressing issue. In this article, I explore the electoral behaviour of labour market insiders 
and outsiders in Germany, France and Britain, drawing on data from the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES). I argue that their electoral behaviour is influenced by both the 
party configuration and the incumbency status of the social democratic party.  
Let me summarise the main findings: First, the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders 
varies across countries. In Britain, outsiders are less likely to participate in politics, but once 
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they decide to cast a vote, they are equally supportive of Labour than insiders. In Germany 
and France, the bivariate effect of the outsider-status on participation can be explained by 
its socio-structural components. Being an outsider loses its effect on the vote probability 
once we control for its components gender, age and class. This is in line with the 
expectation that outsiders should be less likely to participate in the elections in a 
majoritarian system, but not in countries with proportional or mixed electoral systems, 
where the social democratic party faces competition from the left or the populist right. The 
findings also correspond to the expectations regarding party preferences of insiders and 
outsiders. In Germany, where the SPD was part of the governing coalition in the 2000s, 
outsiders are more inclined to support the social democratic party than insiders. In France, 
by contrast, outsiders are more likely to support one of the challengers to the PSF, either the 
right populist Front National or one of the radical left parties, but do not differ from 
insiders in their support for the socialists. The expectation that variations in party 
competition and incumbency status of the social democratic party explain differences in 
insiders and outsiders voting behaviour is thus confirmed.  
As robustness test I employed Heckman selection models to account for the selection bias 
caused by the systematic exclusion of non-voters in the analysis of party preference. 
Controlling for the selection effect confirmed that in Germany outsiders are more 
supportive of the social democratic party than insiders.  
 
By analysing the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders comparatively and 
underlining the importance of party configurations for the electoral consequences of 
dualisation, the findings of this article improve our understanding of the politics of 
dualisation. The article demonstrated that social democratic parties might be able to 
mobilise both insiders and outsiders if competing as opposition party. The article also 
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indicates that this might be less feasible for governing social democratic parties. However, 
in the light of the ongoing international debt crisis and the increased pressure to adapt 
labour markets to post-industrial challenges, the finding that governing parties might lose 
the electoral support of one segment of their electorate – the low-skilled insiders – but gain 
in turn the support of outsiders might be reassuring for social democratic politicians. 
  
!
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups 
Classification of occupations in post-industrial class groups, based on Oesch 2006 and Kitschelt and 
Rehm 2005: 23 (adapted from Häusermann 2010) 
Independent work 
logic 
Technical work 
logic 
Organizational 
work logic 
Interpersonal work 
logic  
Large employers, self-
employed professionals 
and petty bourgeoisie 
with employees 
(Capital accumulators) 
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
<=24 
Technical experts 
(Capital 
accumulators) 
ISCO88-2d 21  
Higher-grade 
managers (Capital 
accumulators)                         
ISCO88-2d 11, 12 
Socio-cultural semi-
professionals (Socio-
cultural 
professionals)   
ISCO88-2d 22-24, 32-34     
Professional/        
managerial 
Technicians (Mixed 
service 
functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 31 
Associate managers 
(Capital 
accumulators) 
ISCO88-2d 13 
Associate 
professional 
/ managerial 
Petty bourgeoisie 
without employees 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
self-employed and ISCO88-2d 
>24 
Skilled crafts (Blue-
collar workers) 
ISCO88-2d 71-74                   
Skilled office 
workers and routine 
office workers 
(Mixed service 
functionaries)  
ISCO88-2d 41, 42                       
Skilled service and 
routine service (Low 
service functionaries) 
ISCO88-2d 51, 52, 91                      
Generally / 
vocationally 
skilled 
 Routine operatives 
and routine 
agriculture (Blue-
collar workers)     
ISCO88-2d 61, 92, 81-
83, 93               
Low/ un-
skilled 
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Appendix 2 – Identification of insiders and outsiders across countries 
Germany N 
Atypical 
work / 
unempl. France N 
Atypical 
work / 
unempl. Britain  N 
Atypical 
work / 
unempl. 
LSF young women 539 32.1 LSF young women 794 28.2 LSF young women 623 31.1 
LSF young men 193 -3.1 LSF young men 293 6.6 LSF young men 285 6.2 
LSF old women 874 44.1 LSF old women 1038 24.0 LSF old women 597 22.1 
LSF old men 360 -10.9 LSF old men 260 -7.0 LSF old men 284 -5.7 
SCP young women 1117 12.5 SCP young women 727 11.0 SCP young women 503 3.3 
SCP young men 600 -14.8 SCP young men 385 -3.5 SCP young men 308 -17.4 
SCP old women 1944 15.0 SCP old women 830 -5.8 SCP old women 596 3.2 
SCP old men 1282 -24.0 SCP old men 601 -21.6 SCP old men 444 -13.1 
BC young women 154 18.0 BC young women 230 25.3 BC young women 54 7.7 
BC young men 983 -17.9 BC young men 1248 -0.7 BC young men 638 -15.4 
BC old women 300 26.2 BC old women 394 18.9 BC old women 126 1.1 
BC old men 1458 -16.0 BC old men 1321 -17.0 BC old men 922 -18.6 
MSF young women 545 15.6 MSF young women 559 14.3 MSF young women 454 9.7 
MSF young men 415 -19.3 MSF young men 379 -7.5 MSF young men 206 -9.5 
MSF old women 911 22.2 MSF old women 620 6.3 MSF old women 536 6.6 
MSF old men 725 -25.3 MSF old men 367 -23.8 MSF old men 218 -18.2 
CA 1364 -19.5 CA 1287 -20.9 CA 1700 -19.9 
Total 13,764  Total 11,333  Total 8,494  
Mean  37.8 Mean  34.7 Mean  27.5 
Standard deviation  22.9 Standard deviation  17.9 Standard deviation  16.8 
Note: Values are the deviations in percentage points of a group working in atypical employment or unemployed from the country-
mean. Highlighted groups are significantly more affected by atypical employment / unemployment than the average workforce; 
based on EU-SILC 2007. 
Abbbreviations: LSF are low service functionaries; SCP are socio-cultural professionals, BC are blue-collar workers, MSF are 
mixed service functionaries and CA are capital accumulators, Young means < 40; old means > 40.   
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Appendix 3 – Table of operationalisation 
Variable Operationalisation 
Vote for the social 
democratic party 
A2030, A2031, B2018_1C3032_PR_1, C2023_LH_PL; dichotomous 
variable measuring if respondent has voted for social democratic 
party; 1 = vote for social democratic party, 0 = vote for other party 
Abstention 
A2028, B3004, C3021_1; dichotomous variable measuring if 
respondent has voted in last election; 1 = not voted;  0 = voted 
Vote for a challenger of 
the social democratic 
party 
A2030, A2031, B2018_1C3032_PR_1, C2023_LH_PL; dichotomous 
variable measuring if respondent has voted for one of the left or 
populist right contender of the social democratic party; 1 = vote for 
contender;,0 = not vote for contender 
Classes 
A2008; B/C2012; ISCO-2d codes; recoded into CA, MSF, BC, SCP, 
LSF; see appendix 1 
Outsider Recoded from EU-SILC map of dualisation; see appendix 2 
Female A/B/C2002; gender of respondent; 0 = male, 1 = female 
Age A/B/C2001; age in years 
Education 
A/B/C2003; continuous variable based on highest completed degree; 1 
= no education, 8 =  completed university degree 
Low skills 
A/B/C2003; dichotomous variable based on highest completed degree; 
0= completed higher secondary education, 1 = below completed 
secondary education 
Medium skills 
A/B/C2003; dichotomous variable based on highest completed degree; 
1 = completed higher secondary education, 0 = below completed 
secondary education or tertiary education 
High skills 
A/B/C2003; dichotomous variable based on highest completed degree; 
1 = tertiary education, 0 = below tertiary education 
Income 
A212, B/C2020; total household income; 0 = lowest income quintile, 
1 = second income quintile, 2 = third income quintile; 3 = income 
quintile, 4 = highest income quintile 
Church attendance 
A2015, B2023; how often does respondents go to church; 1 = at least 
once a month, 0 = less than once a month 
Living in a couple 
household 
A/B/C2004; dichotomous variable measuring if respondent lives in a 
couple household; 1 = married or living with someone, 0 = single, 
divorced, widowed 
Union membership 
A/B/C2005; dichotomous variable measuring union membership; 1 = 
union member, 0 = not a union member 
Left/right self-placement 
A3031, B3045; C3013; self-placement on the right/left scale; 0-10; 0 
= extreme left, 10 = extreme right 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
A3001, B3012; C3019; satisfaction with democracy; 4 = very 
satisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 1 = not at all 
satisfied 
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Conclusions 
 
The starting point of the thesis has been the unequal distribution of labour market risks in 
the course of post-industrialisation in Western Europe which divides the workforce in 
insiders with secure labour market positions and more marginalised outsiders. The thesis 
has addressed the question of a politicisation of this insider-outsider divide. I have 
investigated this question from four different perspectives with different empirical 
approaches mixing thereby large N-studies with more detailed case studies: I have 
examined the socio-structural foundation of dualisation, i.e. of the distribution of labour 
market vulnerability across different socio-structural groups, the divergent preferences of 
insiders and outsiders with different skill levels regarding labour market and social policies, 
the response of social democratic parties to dualisation and its electoral consequences.  
 
Findings and implications 
I show that a full politicisation of the insider-outsider divide is unlikely to manifest itself 
despite the fact that labour market vulnerability is concentrated among certain socio-
structural groups and that insiders and outsiders have divergent political preferences. As 
shown in Chapter 1, labour market vulnerability is concentrated among women, as well as 
young and lower skilled individuals but the extent to which different groups are confronted 
with these labour market risks varies across countries, as does the share of outsiders among 
the entire workforce. We developed a dichotomous measure for outsiders and a continuous 
measure for the degree of outsiderness, i.e. for the extent to which someone is affected by 
these labour market risks. We also showed that both being an outsider and higher degrees of 
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outsiderness result in lower income and reduced upward mobility and distinct preferences 
regarding labour market policies. These risk-based measures enable us to study the political 
consequences of dualisation as it is based on more stable social and economic categories 
that affect their life chances and constraints over a longer time. Hence, these measures 
might be of interest to other scholars in this research field. The analysis also showed that 
insiders and outsiders are heterogeneous with regard to class, age and gender, which is a 
first reason why a full politicisation of the insider-outsider divide is rather unlikely. Most 
important in this regard is the heterogeneity of outsiders in terms of skills that affects their 
labour market prospects and expectations regarding the welfare state, i.e. their welfare state 
preferences. This makes it unlikely that they can be mobilised as a single group. 
The analysis of insiders and outsiders’ preferences in a broader welfare state perspective 
included the effect of education, since we have seen that high skill levels are no guarantee 
to avoid labour market risks. In addition to analysing welfare state preferences on the 
individual level, Chapter 2 investigated the size of preference differences between insiders 
and outsiders and linked them to the extent of dualisation. The results showed that while 
insiders and outsiders do prefer a different kind of welfare state, differences are less marked 
than we would expect given the extent of dualisation. For a full cleavage to develop we 
would expect the preference divide to increase with increasing barriers between insiders and 
outsiders, i.e. we would expect it to be most pronounced in Continental and Southern 
Europe. However, this turns out not to be the case. In Continental and Southern Europe, 
outsiders are mostly dependent family members (wives, young adults, see Schwander and 
Häusermann 2012). Together with the social insurance orientation of Continental and 
Southern welfare states, this offers outsiders the possibility to compensate their weak labour 
market attachment through household formation with insiders. Hence, in exactly those 
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countries where dualisation is most pronounced, a shared notion of membership, which is 
essential for forming a collective identity as outsiders distinct from insiders, is missing.  
The last reason why a full politicisation of the insider-outsider divide is unlikely relates to 
the electoral strategies of social democratic parties in the context of dualisation. For a 
political potential to be politicised, a political actor (most likely a political party) needs to 
mobilise the potential (Sartori 1969, Kriesi et al. 2008a, Bornschier 2010). However, I 
demonstrated that social democratic parties neither mobilise insiders nor outsiders, but 
rather try to mobilise a larger electoral coalition composed of insiders and outsiders at 
different skill levels. The analysis revealed that the social democratic electoral strategy 
depends on the electoral incentives set by party competition. In addition, the most important 
logic for social democratic parties was the social investment logic of the welfare state which 
enables the social democratic parties to combine outsider-policies and an effective labour 
market.  
However, the analysis of the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders in Germany, 
France and Britain revealed that the social democratic strategy to mobilise a large electoral 
coalition composed of different insider and outsider groups, was not always successful. 
Thus, we find that the insider-outsider divide showed in the electoral arena despite the small 
preferences divides and the often inclusive electoral strategies of social democratic parties. 
The insider-outsider divide in the electoral arena manifests itself in either different 
probabilities of abstaining from voting, or voting for either the social democratic party or 
one of its competitors depending on the configuration of the party system. However, the 
chapter also demonstrated that the social democratic party is able to mobilise both insiders 
and outsiders if it campaigns as opposition party. Conversely, insiders and outsiders differ 
in their party preferences if there is a party alternative to vote for and the social democratic 
party competes as incumbent party. 
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Limits of the analysis and future research agenda  
The thesis has demonstrated that dualisation results in divergent labour market and social 
policy preferences of insiders and outsiders and has – depending on the party system – 
consequences in the electoral arena. Further research along four lines seems to be 
promising. First, one of the most intriguing findings is that size of preference divides 
between insiders and outsiders and the extent of institutional dualisation do not correlate as 
strongly as we would expect from a rational-choice perspective. The line of argument 
suggested in Chapter 2 that outsiders compensate their labour market vulnerability by 
sharing a household with an insider and by gaining social rights as members of an insider 
household. This reduces the effect of labour market vulnerability on formation of distinct 
political preferences between insiders and outsiders. Because outsiders are likely to be their 
sons, daughters or wives, also insiders favour policies in the interests of outsiders in 
Continental and Southern European countries. Vice versa, outsiders support insider-policies 
because they benefit from these policies as members of a household with an insider. 
However, we were unable to test similar mechanisms for the Southern European countries. 
Therefore, further research should investigate the mechanisms in more details and also spell 
out alternative mechanisms how outsiders compensate for their weak labour market 
attachment. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent these bonds of household solidarity are 
likely to persist. In the course of the current employment crisis in Southern Europe first 
signs of a breaking of generational solidarity are visible as young adults demand better 
access to the labour market. At the same time, it is telling that demands for a reduction of 
privileges of insiders are seldom voiced (so far). This might also indicate that despite the 
fact that insider-policies are part of the reason for their precarious labour market 
attachment, outsiders hope to become insiders one day and to benefit from these policies 
themselves. 
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The thesis also revealed the necessity for a comparative and qualitative measure of 
dualisation. Most of the literature presumes the insider-outsider divide to be most 
pronounced in Continental and Southern Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999a, Ferrera 
2005, 2007, Iversen and Stephens 2008, Palier and Thelen 2010, Häusermann and 
Schwander 2012b). Further, dualisation is associated with institutions that hamper the entry 
to the labour market (Esping-Andersen 2000, Rueda 2007, Jessoula, graziano and Madama 
2010, Palier and Thelen 2010, Eichhorst and Marx 2012). However, an exact measure of 
dualisation that would enable us to compare the extent of dualisation over time or across 
countries is lacking. Chapter 2 that deals with determinants of insider-outsider divides in 
Europe suggested an index of dualisation based on the strictness of employment protection 
for the standard employed and the level of labour costs. However, a more comprehensive 
measure of dualisation would include not only institutional components but also a socio-
structural dimension of dualisation such as the share of outsiders (Schwander 2010, see also 
Fernàndez-Albertos and Manzano 2011, who measured the extent of dualisation through 
employment protection legislation and the share of outsiders) or the distribution of labour 
market vulnerability in the workforce.  
Regarding political mobilisation of insiders and outsiders, the thesis has concentrated on the 
effects of dualisation in the electoral arena of political competition by examining the social 
democratic electoral strategies and the electoral behaviour of insiders and outsiders. I have 
argued that parties address the interests of the contested electorate in particular during the 
electoral campaign because they fear for the electoral support of these segments. By 
contrast, the policies that a party actually implements once it has taken office, or the stances 
of parties in parliamentary debates remain unexplored in my research. It is possible that 
parties campaign for election by addressing the interests of the swing-voters but actually 
implement policies in favour of the core constituency. In order to strengthen the link 
Conclusions 
 187 
between dualisation and political representation, further research should compare the 
positions of parties in the parliamentary arena and the policies that (social democratic) 
governments implement during the legislative period. Do positions in the parliamentary 
arena and implemented policies correspond to the positions in the electoral campaigns? 
How do voters react to an eventual discrepancy between the party position during the 
electoral campaign and in the parliament? A related question addresses the electoral 
consequences of welfare state reforms: How do voters react to actual welfare state reforms? 
Do specific voter groups reward different kinds of welfare state reforms? 
Another direction for future research is to investigate the link between the electoral 
campaign and the vote decision of insiders and outsiders. While material self-interest and 
the economy in general are important issues for the vote decision (Powell and Whitten 
1993, Duch and Stevenson 2008), especially in times of economic crisis and for 
economically disadvantaged persons (Singer 2011), cultural attitudes influence political 
behaviour as well (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a, Oesch 
2008, Bornschier 2010). It is therefore not clear how relevant the electoral campaign on 
social policies is for the individual vote decision of insiders and outsiders, i.e. how salient 
these issues are. Moreover, the ongoing economic recession has resulted in a convergence 
in the salience that insiders and outsiders attribute to economic issues (Fleury 2012, 
Lügstenmann 2012) probably making insiders more aware of labour market risks. In 
general, the economic crisis aggravates the situation of outsiders as their weak labour 
market attachment makes them feel the vagaries of the economic downturn most strongly. 
At the same time, individuals and politicians become more aware of the risks of economic 
exclusion. Looking back in history reminds us of the risk of mass unemployment and 
economic exclusion of large segments of the population. Hope remains that policy makers 
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use the present crisis as a window of opportunity to develop new employment strategies that 
enable individuals to make the most of their potential.
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